February 2012
Written Submission
to the Public Utilities Board of Newfoundland and Labrador
with respect to
the Least-cost Analysis and Review
of the Proposed Muskrat Falls and Labrador/Island Transmission Link
Hydro Electric Project

                                    Also,                                     
For information on a LARGELY  IGNORED "least-cost" SOLUTION, on how demand and electricity costs can be SUBSTANTIALLY reduced (and the perceived need for Muskrat Falls eliminated), go to the EFFICIENCY page.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public Utilities Board
Investigation and Hearing into Supply Issues and Power
Outages on the Island Interconnected System

NL Hydro, NL Power, Liberty Consulting, and the PUB  Interim Reports 
Related Applications (e.g. NL Hydro's application for an additional 100 MW of thermal generation)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

• A MUST HEAR  07 August 2014 Muskrat Falls conversation on VOCM's Backtalk (with guest David Vardy)  Part 1.   and    Part 2.   (and then click 'download'). ------- NOTE:--- Please be sure to also listen to Part 2, which includes a call from a citizen from Nova Scotia and his view of the deal that Nova Scotia got and at what cost to NL.  Also, Nalcor's Gilbert Bennett is the final caller.

• Check out this Muskrat Madness facebook page.



• Everything Is Leaking
• Muskrat Falls Video

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

                               2019



06 July 2019

• Kudos to ex-PUB head Andy Wells

09 February 2019

• Hard to overstate seriousness of SNC-Lavalin allegations

05 February 2019

• Many people saw the obvious about Muskrat Falls early on

02 January 2019

• Rate Mitigation Report (Liberty Consulting)
• Rate Mitigation Report (Synapse Energy Economics)

                               2018

---

February 2018
Written Submission
to the Muskrat Falls Public Inquiry
with respect to the
interpretation of the Inquiry
Terms of Reference

12 December 2018

• Here we go again !!!!

08 November 2018

• Large hydropower dams 'not sustainable' in the developing world

20 October 2018

• Muskrat Falls --- the more things change...

12 October 2018

Maurice Adams12 October 2018 at 12:49It seems that the Commission co-counsel, and the consumer and citizens's advocates took little if any advantage of their opportunity to relate Philip Raphaels' evidence (the importance and potential application of integrated resource management to Nalcor's linear/top-down project planning and island options analyses).

It seems to me that this issue relates in no small part to the inquiry’s determination or standard of "reasonableness" and to whether it was available, "known" or not "known at the time".

For example, the principle underlying the more horizontal/rational/bottom-up 'integrated resource management' approach (as opposed to a linear/top-down planning methodology) has been around for a long time (I recall first outlining/proposing a rational/integrated project planning approach to Coast Guard's 1984 Capital Investment Strategy/Plan, approx. a $1 million study for its national vessel traffic services directorate).

In 1995, I expanded on that 'rational/integrated' approach when Coast Guard was seeking to develop a new management structure for its multi-disciplined regional operations centre in St. John’s (and such an integrated structure was whole-heartedly adopted).

And around 2011 I argued with Gilbert Bennett for Nalcor to utilize such an approach, and in 2012 I generally outlined on my vision2041.com website (DEMAND page – graphics, a little more than half way down) such a similar, integrated planning approach, an approach that should have been used for Nalcor's project planning (real/collaborative options analyses instead of its linear, top-down, single-minded approach).

The prior existence and application of an integrated planning approach speaks to "what" was knowable to Nalcor 'at the time', and the very description of such an approach as a "rational" project planning approach speaks to what the Commissioner might judge and determine as "reasonable".

Regrettably, it seems that the availability/suitability/benefits, potential use of a more rational planning approach was not well inquired into during yesterday's and today's hearings.

And I cannot understand why.



11 October 2018

Below is a Comment I posted today on the UNCLE GNARLEY blog:--

Maurice Adams11 October 2018 at 10:55By the fall of 2011, I had written several letters to The Telegram and had been invited to meet with Nalcor on 17 November 2011.

By then I had also become aware that Peat Resources Ltd. was a reported clean energy company with rights to hundreds of thousands of hectares of peat lands in Newfoundland.

Below is a relevant portion of my contemporaneous 18 November, 2011 email summary of that meeting (which was also attended by Mr. Vardy and MUN's Mike Clair):--

QUOTE:--

"...my discussions with Nalcor Energy yesterday concerning the Muskrat Falls hydro-power project centred mostly on Nalcor's load and demand forecasting methodology, I raised the issue of peat not having been assessed as a possible low cost option for domestic power generation.

I pointed out that while Nalcor's Final Submission states that its mandate is derived from the province's Electrical Power Control Act (EPCA) as well as the province's Energy Plan, and that since the Energy Plan lists peat as one of the province's key undeveloped energy resources (1.4 billion cubic metres), why wasn't peat fuel assessed to see if it would be (as the EPCA requires) the 'lowest possible cost' power option.

In summary, Nalcor made a number of arguments ---- that peat is not biomass, not really renewable, then Nalcor took the position that they did indeed review peat, and that provincial studies dating back to the 1990's did not show peat as being viable.

Of course, I countered each of these positions based on my own somewhat limited knowledge (I referenced your success with Corner Brook Pulp and Paper, pointed out that their screening out of biomass as a possible source for domestic power generation only included 'forest' biomass and not peat, that Peat Resources has produced power in Ontario for 8 cents/KWh, that peat is renewable, and that 1990's peat studies is not an appropriate basis on which to bypass the need for a more thorough and recent assessment of the technical and economic feasibility of using peat fuel for domestic power generation." UNQUOTE

As a result of a recent internet search, below is a Peat Resources Ltd.'s Winter 2011 Update ---- published March 1, 2011:--

"The Company continues to be active mainly in two provinces, Ontario and Newfoundland, where it holds rights to large fuel-grade peat deposits. In recent months, the Company has made important progress in its relations with governments and potential customers in these regions of Canada. In 2010, Company representatives met with then-Premier Danny Williams and other senior members of the Newfoundland government to review our proposals for development of a peat fuel industry. The Newfoundland Minister of Business and his senior staff also visited our Stephenville peat harvesting and processing facility. It was recommended that, in order to fully explore financial and other support from provincial and federal-provincial agencies, the Company should prepare a comprehensive business plan. Accordingly, a business plan (based on initial establishment of a 200,000 tonne per year peat fuel production facility in western Newfoundland) was submitted to the Newfoundland Department of Business on February 3, 2011."

Notwithstanding the above, I could find no reference in Nalcor's final PUB submission (nor any reference in the Grant Thornton forensic audit report) to the word "peat", even though a business plan for a peat fuel production facility was apparently submitted “on February 3, 2011”, and in May, 2011 Peat Resources advised that "Newfoundland has very large peat resources and this was recognized in the provincial government's 2007 Energy Plan. We believe that the resources are large enough to support production of up to 5 million tonnes of peat fuel pellets per year".

Where is the review and analyses for 1.4 billion cubic meters of peat resources identified as "proposed" in the 2007 Energy Plan?



30 September 2018

RE my Telegram letter (see 29 September 2018 post below), here is an excerpt from Des Sullivan's UNCLE GNARLEY blog by someone who uses the handle "Economist".

Economist30 September 2018 at 14:52
One learns in ECON 101 that higher prices lead to lower demand. Yet Nalcor did not allow for this in its general service and industrial demand forecast on the basis that Stratton could not estimate any statistical relationship between price and demand in these sectors. This is a matter of allowing statistical analysis of historic Newfoundland data to override both theory and common sense. In a case like this where a large increase in price is being contemplated, even a small elasticity effect would have a major impact on demand.

When local statistical analysis fails to find an effect it is not unusual for economists to adopt estimates from studies of other jurisdictions. It is better to use an estimate from someplace else than to assume no effect. This economy cannot be that much different from other places and to assume no effect, as Nalcor did, is implausible.

A first hit from a simple google search lead me to Akihiro Otsuka, Journal of Economic Structures (2015) "Demand for industrial and commercial electricity: evidence from Japan". Here is what the author stated in his literature review: "For instance, Pindyck (1979) examined industrial and commercial electricity demand using 1959–1973 data from 10 developed countries to estimate price elasticity in each country and found that the price elasticity of the demand was significantly low (from −0.07 to −0.16). Similarly, Bohi and Zimmerman (1984) reviewed several previous studies conducted in the USA and found low price elasticity for industrial electricity demand in the short run (between −0.10 and −0.27) as well as in the long run (between −0.61 and −3.55). However, for commercial electricity demand, they found low price elasticity in the short run (−0.27) but high elasticity in the long run (between −1.05 and −4.56). Hisnanick and Kyer (1995) and Kamershen and Porter(2004) adopted time-series data from the USA. Hisnanick and Kyer (1995) used manufacturing industry data for 1958–1985 and found a low price elasticity value of −0.19. Using industrial and commercial sector data for 1973–1998, Kamershen and Porter (2004) derived price elasticity values ranging between −0.34 and −0.55 for industrial and commercial electricity demand."

It seems to me that even employing price elasticities on the low end would have made quite a difference to the load forecast.


29 September 2018

• Nalcor excluded electricity price elasticity... why?

16 September 2018

• Canadian taxpayers will ultimately bear Muskrat Falls burden, predicts Ron Penney
• Inquiry into $12.7 billion Muskrat Falls 'boondoggle' set to begin in Labrador

15 September 2018

• When public inquiries were public

11 September 2018

• A theory based on flawed assumptions

05 September 2018

• Terms of Reference for PUB MF Rate Mitigation Review

25 August 2018

Was there collusion between the federal, Nova Scotia governments and Emera (the principal beneficiaries) to 'enable' this Muskrat Falls fiasco?

• We're having the wrong argument about Muskrat Falls

12 August 2018

Alliance Calls for Rejection of Hydropower Imports from Canada at the 42nd Annual Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers Conference in Stowe, Vermont
 
On August 12-13, 2018, during the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, in Stowe, Vermont, the North American Megadams Resistance Alliance (NAMRA), an international network of environmental and social justice groups, will participate in events to address the cross border plight of transmission corridors and electricity produced by megadams in Canada.
 
The NAMRA mission is to block transmission corridors and contracts to import hydroelectric power produced by mega dams in Canada, such as Muskrat Falls, which are causing irreversible harm to ecosystems and to impacted communities. These mega dam systems are no longer permitted to be built in the United States.
 
Northeast states can meet all decarbonization and greenhouse gas reduction targets by expanding renewable energy, efficiency and conservation initiatives, while promoting local economies and creating jobs, NAMRA states.
 
NAMRA is opposed to the construction of new long-distance transmission corridors for the export of hydropower from Quebec and Labrador into the United States. Proposed corridors include the Atlantic Link, New England Clean Energy Connect, Champlain Hudson Power Express, New England Clean Power Link, Vermont Green Line, and the Northern Pass.
 
NAMRA supports the efforts of the Labrador Land Protectors and Grand Riverkeeper, Labrador, to halt the construction of the $13 billion Muskrat Falls hydroelectric complex. For decades, First Nations, Metis and settlers, living in the Happy Valley/ Goose Bay region of Labrador, have been ignored in a process that has allowed the Muskrat Falls construction to proceed, despite the certainty of methylmercury poisoning the food chain, the destruction of a way of life, and the daily threat of a dam collapse due to quick clay liquefaction.
 
“It is time to stop destroying rivers everywhere," said Tom Ellis of the Solidarity Committee of the Capital District, in Albany, New York. ”The Solidarity Committee opposed the Great Whale hydroelectric project 25 years ago and we have opposed the Champlain Hudson Power Express transmission corridor since it was proposed in 2010.”
 
The Sierra Club Maine Chapter, a member of NAMRA, is opposing the Maine Central Power’s proposed New England Clean Power Link transmission corridor, which would require clearing a large, currently undisturbed swath of Maine’s North Woods. While failing to reduce climate changing pollution, threatening wildlife, and disturbing pristine forests, the project would jeopardize existing and future renewable energy development in the region.
 
“We should be using electricity that is carbon-emission free and fully renewable, and these mega dam projects are neither,” says NAMRA member Steve Crowley, Energy Chair of the Vermont Sierra Club. “Beyond this, when you consider poisoning the fish, and the people who consume them, with methyl mercury, and disrupting the lives of Indigenous communities, there's no way this is the right thing to do. By using this mega dam power, we are directly responsible for impacts that would be completely intolerable if they were here in our backyard. We don’t need to import electricity produced by destructive mega dams 1,000 or more miles away. ”
 
“We ask the citizens of northeastern states to pay attention to the struggle underway in Labrador over Muskrat Falls. Hydro-electricity from large dams is neither clean nor green. Our energy policies must be based on respect for social justice and human rights. Large dams destroy forests and wetlands, contributing significantly to climate change and biodiversity loss,” stated Rachel Smolker, a Vermont member of the Alliance.
 
“Making it Real: A Forum on Energy and Climate” will be on Sunday August 12, at 5-7 pm, at the Waterbury United Church of Christ, 8 North Main Street (at the top of Bank Hill), in Waterbury, Vermont.
 
“Rally for Real Climate Solutions: No Pipelines. Nukes, or Megadams” will take place on Monday August 13, at 2:30 pm, in front of the Stowe Mountain Lodge, 7412 Mountain Road, Stowe, Vermont.  press conference will begin at 5 pm, at the same location.

02 August 2018

• Scholars call on PM to halt Muskrat Falls

https://openlettermuskratfalls.wordpress.com/

28 July 2018

• Muskrat Falls brings to mind N.L. government boondoggles of the past
• Pam Frampton: N.L. Hydro has a team working on it

02 July 2018

• Jim Gordon's Final Comments On The North Spur

Related readings::

1. Nalcor mum on questions about the North Spur
2. North Spur a risky business

25 June 2018

• Newfoundland and Labrador Tory leader Ches Crosbie tries to distance PCs from Muskrat Falls legacy

03 June 2018

• Labrador activist believes landslide a natural occurrence

31 May 2018

• Putting a human face on the risks at Muskrat Falls: Behrens
• Dennis Browne granted full standing as Consumer Advocate at Muskrat Falls inquiry (on behalf of domestic and general service consumers of electricity in this Province).    So who has been granted full standing to represent the best interest of taxpayers ? After all, the more successful Browne is looking out for electricity users, i.e. keeping rates low, the more taxpayers generally will have to pay)

27 May 2018

• Muskrat Falls protest planned for Monday in Ottawa

26 May 2018

• Muskrat Falls is dead ahead and we're headed for the brink
• A cable case that could cost us, big time

18 May 2018

• Muskrat Falls --- premises, assumptions and facts
• Muskrat Falls --- defending the indefensible

10 May 2018

• Is Rate Mitigation Even Possible After Muskrat?

24 April 2018

• Trans Mountain pipeline another colonial project asserting jurisdiction over Indigenous lands

• The missing ingredient in the Muskrat Falls inquiry

23 April 2018

• How Nalcor Undermines Public Policy...

21 April 2018

• What does full standing at the Muskrat Falls inquiry really mean?
• We must have accountability at the Muskrat Falls inquiry

19 April 2018

• The Inquiry: Intrigue Is Where You Find It

16 April 2018

• Secret "Management Reserve" for Muskrat Uncovered

12 April 2018

• Public submissions on the inquiry terms of reference

11 April 2018

• Targeted soil removal recommended for Muskrat falls reservoir

09 April 2018

• At the Muskrat inquiry, for whom does this pipe play?

06 April 2018

For the interest of readers:--

Among others, and subject to an order in council from government, Dennis Browne (the province's current consumer advocate) will be granted full standing to represent the province's consumers. Others granted full standing include a group comprised in part of Danny Williams, Jerome Kennedy, Tom Marshall, Shawn Skinner, and Paul Davis. Ed Martin has also been granted full standing. So has Kathy Dunderdale. The MF Concerned Citizens Group headed up by Mr. Vardy, Mr. Penney and Mr. Des Sullivan has also been granted full standing ---------- the hearings continue.

UPDATE ---- Justice Leblanc did not make a decision today on standing for the GRK/Land Protectors (will make his decision at a later date)

03 April 2018

• Reaping the wind.........
• A Lost Opportunity to Achieve More Access to Information at Nalcor

02 April 2018www.thetelegram.com/opinion/letter-to-the-editor/letter-a-lost-opportunity-to-achieve-more-access-to-information-at-nalcor-198430/

• Paying Twice: Can Muskrat Get Any Worse For Ratepayers?

26 March 2018

• Amend the Energy Corporation Act

24 March 2018

• David Vardy's interview with Ted Blades

And then see BELOW, where I have re-posted excerpts from my Vision2041.com "HOME"-page, June 2012 entries.

While I have not referenced the increased effect due to Nalcor's back-end loading of its return on equity (which Mr. Vardy emphasizes, and that I have referred to elsewhere), you will nevertheless see that as far back as mid-2012 (and to a very large extent) I said much the same thing that Mr. Vardy explains much more professionally and that now shows much greater numbers (in part also because he includes the return on equity back-end loading as well as the doubling of project costs):---

Sustainable Development ?   ----   You decide.

"...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" ... (socially, environmentally, and economically).
                                                                                                                                                                        United Nations, Brundtland Report, 1987


To obtain Muskrat Falls power, NL Hydro (our 'regulated' company) will be required to sign a 50-year power purchase agreement ("take or pay" contract) with its parent (unregulated) company --- Nalcor.

This power purchase agreement will provide Nalcor a yearly cashflow (from year 2041 up to year 2067) that totals, for the 25 year period past 2041, $21 billion --- $21 billion that comes from back-loading unnecessarily high electricity rates on our children and grandchildren.

This back-loading will NEGATIVELY impact our children's and grandchildren's future economic condition, their potential for economic growth, and in turn, NEGATIVELY impact their social well being.

Forced by contract to pay very high (New York City level) Muskrat Falls electricity rates for 25 years past year 2041, our children and grand-children are thereby prevented from benefiting from our already fully paid for, NEAR-ZERO COST Upper Churchill power.

Since Muskrat Falls imposes unnecessarily very high electricity rates (and continued debt servicing costs) on our children and grand-children (and thereby hinders their future economic growth well past year 2041), Muskrat Falls does not by definition meet the social and economic criteria NECESSARY for sustainable development.

By relying on a 50-year power purchase agreement that back-loads high electricity rates and debt servicing costs on future generations and that effectively prevents our children and grand-children from availing of the benefits of NEAR-ZERO COST Upper Churchill power, Muskrat Falls compromises (both economically and socially) our children's and grandchildren's future.

Accordingly, Muskrat Falls FAILS TO MEET THE CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT --- and should not be sanctioned.


VISION2041
Instead of an unneeded, high cost, high-debt Muskrat Falls project, a Vision 2041 approach would rely on flexible, affordable, needs-focused bridging to meet ACTUAL island demand until 2041, and unlike Muskrat Falls, a Vision 2041 approach would not impede 2041 access to Upper Churchill power.

If island demand cannot be relied on ---- where will the revenue needed to pay down our INCREASED debt come from?  HIGHER electricity rates? HIGHER taxes?

Muskrat Falls power sold to either the mining giants of Labrador or through outside sales to Emera --- can only be SOLD AT A SUBSTANTIAL LOSS.

As seen above, island electricity sales are far from assured. How then can it be said that Nalcor's forecast revenue from island ratepayers is a sound, rational basis on which to commit island ratepayers to a 50-year, multi-billion dollar, unneeded hydro project ?

22 March 2018

• Engineer Offers Judge Leblanc Points To Ponder

19 March 2018

• THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM PART I: FINANCING THE LABRADOR TRANSMISSION LINK

This article by David Vardy is a MUST READ for those wishing to grasp an easy-to-read understanding of the mess, the fiasco, that is the Muskrat Falls Project.

Undoubtedly, a MUST READ for anyone wishing to understand why this website has tried since early 2012 to inform ratepayers how they were being led down the garden path.


14 March 2018

• INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MUSKRAT FALLS INQUIRY

12 March 2018

• Independent Forensic Team Report On Oroville Dam Spillway Incident

08 March 2018

• A 'no holds barred' written submission by the Grand Riverkeeper Labrador and Labrador Land Protectors to the Commission of Inquiry into the Muskrat Falls project.

07 March 2018

• Inquiry asks for all documents related to Muskrat files

27 February 2018
Nalcor states that the 2018 landslide was about 1 kilometer downstream away from the North Spur (CLICK ON photos below and judge for yourself)

26 February 2018

• Can Muskrat Float After A Bailout? (be sure to read David Vardy's comment at the end of this article)

24 February 2018

• 'What we can learn for the future': David Vardy on the Muskrat Falls inquiry

22 February 2018

• Some of us saw the 'big picture' from the get-go

21 February 2018
Nalcor says that the 2018 landslide shown in the photo (below, left) is about a kilometer away from the North Spur.

While I am unable to find another photo showing both the bridge and the broader portion of the downstream side of the North Spur extending further eastward, it would appear that the slide may not be that far from the North Spur Kettle Lakes drainage stabilization works (CLICK TO ENLARGE) -- M.E. Adams

19 February 2018

• Stan Marshall Doubles Down On Bluster
  
• Stan Marshall and the North Spur

13 February 2018
Further graphics/info re risk of breach through the Kettle Lakes gorge.

NOTE

• the distance from the upstream impounded reservoir to the Kettle Lakes gorge is about the same as the narrowest part of the North Spur
• that distance from the impounded reservoir to the Kettle Lakes is reduced after impoundment
• the 2013 updated geotech interpretation shows a more complex  stratigraphic interpretation (more layers and more complex)
• virtually no sand layers at or below the impounded reservoir elevation
• prior to reservoir filling water levels not above clay layers
• upstream reservoir level after impoundment fully ABOVE one clay layer and partially above upper clay layer
• these layers (below the 39m level) now virtually all in the FINE category (more prone to liquefaction ?)

UNSURE OF ACTUAL LOCATION OF 2018 LANDSLIDE BUT APPEARS TO HAVE OCCURRED IN THIS AREA

12 February 2018

• North Spur landslide stoking fears ......
• Press Release from Labrador Land Protector and Labrador Grand Riverkeepers

11 February 2018

• Nalcor says a landslide at North Spur not a safety risk

      -- Notwithstanding Nalcor's claim that this landslide is not a safety risk, here (below) is a short excerpt from my 13 September 2014 post ---"

"... what evidence can Nalcor provide to assure citizens that even if/after the North Spur is stabilized, and in the absence of any publicly known and appropriate risk assessment of the Kettle Lakes area, that there will not be a breach of the reservoir's north bank, resulting in the unrestricted flow of the Churchill River --- through the Kettle Lakes area --- to the sea?" 

Coincidence?  that this most recent landslide is where a potential breach of the river has been discussed?

• Reports of land collapse at North Spur near Muskrat Falls
• Landslide Develops Near North Spur

        -- readers may also want to re-read my Telegram article "It's not just the North Spur we need to worry about" -- scroll down to my 25 October 2017 post and go to my year 2015 letters.
        -- also, readers may want to scroll down to my 13 September 2014 post (although not yet confirmed the location of the slide appears to be at the downstream, northeast end of the North Spur near the Kettle Lakes gorge drainage point --- near where the letter "B" is on the graphic at the right)
        --readers may also want to visit my North Spur page (November 2013 post),

10 February 2018

• Public input has to mean something

09 February 2018

CLICK TO ENLARGE

Your browser does not support viewing this document. Click here to download the document.

• Inquiry emboldens political scam artists

08 February 2018

• ABACUS DATA
• Muskrat Falls critic says forensic audit falls short on pre-sanction scrutiny

 

• 05 February 2018

Forensic audit ordered for Muskrat Falls inquiry

29 January 2018

• Either way, you will pay

27 January 2018

• No magic money pot at Muskrat

26 January 2018

• Emera's $2B Atlantic Link loses bid for Massachusetts clean energy deal

25 January 2018

• MF Inquiry Commissioner requests public's view on the interpretation of the inquiry Terms of Reference

23 January 2018

• In Quebec, it's power versus a people on hydroelectricity
• Buyers scarce for Muskrat Falls energy: expert
• Muskrat Falls -- a perfect storm of problems

22 January 2018

• Welcome to the Muskrat Falls Inquiry Website

18 January 2018

• Did Danny not realize?

16 January 2018

• Let's talk about all those billions spent on Muskrat Falls

14 January 2018

• Through the nose

08 January 2018

• Human error played role in ... spillway failure....
• Consumer Advocate Applies To Delay Hydro's Rate Application
• Understanding how power rates drive demand for electricity

                               2017
30 December 2017
Paul Lane wants independent review of Energy Corporation Act

29 December 2017

• Inquiry tally comes up short

26 December 2017

• The Nightmare Before Christmas

22 December 2017

• Another Dam Christmas Carol: The Ghost of Muskrat Madness

21 December 2017

• Vardy Puts Minister's North Spur Position On Public Record

18 December 2017

• The buck stops ... with some of us
• Co-counsel named in Muskrat Falls inquiry

16 December 2017

• Muskrat Falls risks were obvious from the outset

14 December 2017

• A Legal Challenge To Emera Contracts Next?
• Muskrat Falls covered in ink

13 December 2017

• To blame or not to blame: Forum debates mandate of Muskrat Falls inquiry

12 December 2017

• Eclectic panel discusses how to get the most out of Muskrat Falls inquiry
• Breaking Bad: The Pathology of Site C  (Readers could easily substitute "Muskrat Falls" for" "Site C"

11 December 2017

• Power Corridor For Quebec Not All That It Seems

09 December 2017

• These Muskrat Falls issues must be addressed
• Muskrat Falls --- legislation, loopholes, legacy

07 December 2017

• Sense of Urgency Required on North Spur Stability Issue
• Cancelling the Site C dam will be hard pill to swallow -- but alternatives are harsher

06 December 2017

• Nalcor Energy secrets secured by law

04 December 2017

• Must The People Of HV-GB and Mud Lake Learn to Live In Harm's Way?
• Democracy Cookbook: Muskrat Falls

02 December 2017

• Muskrat Falls --- looking back, looking forward

01 December 2017

• Read it and weep

30 November 2017

• Terrifying Conclusion Follows Release Of New Bernander Report On North Spur

29 November 2017
"Please join us for a panel discussion on the Public Inquiry into the Muskrat Falls Project. Each panelist will offer an assessment of the inquiry’s framework and terms of reference, consider what is missing from those terms, and reflect on what should be done to get the best possible outcome from the inquiry. These opening statements will be short – no more than ten minutes apiece – to allow plenty of time for discussion. See details (below)".

David Vardy

---

28 November 2017

• Land Protectors, Nalcor CEO To Discuss Muskrat Falls Project

27 November 2017

• If government thinks that Muskrat Falls 60-70 cents per KWh energy is good for our NL economy, or is even thinking of doing Gull Island,  take a look at where energy prices are headed https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwSkQa1tNmE

• Record cheap electricity is transforming world energy markets...

25 November 2017

• Important and further comment by David Vardy on his Telegram article Commission of inquiry into Muskrat Falls too narrow:

Government would have been well advised to seek public input on the Muskrat Falls inquiry. Instead they turned to the public service for its terms of reference and allowed them to shield themselves, as well as government, from their role in the Muskrat Falls fiasco.

Should it be an inquiry into the future or the past? Surely our future actions must be informed by our past mistakes but let us not indulge in a pathological fixation on our mistakes. The inquiry has to combine a forensic analysis into past mistakes with a prospective analysis of future solutions. In my opinion the greater part of the effort has to be to identify options which will make the future better. In so doing we will likely have to reverse decisions made in error but there are some decisions which cannot easily be reversed.

Our hubristic leaders gambled, not with their money but with ours. They followed the dictum of John Crosbie when in a Telegram article dated May 25, 2013 he quoted the prelate and poet T. S. Eliot who once said “Only those who would risk going too far can possibly find out how far you can go.” Surely our leaders took this dictum to the limit!
 
When challenged to respond to egregious cost escalation they cite other energy projects in the province’s offshore sector which have gone over budget. The difference is that the proponents of those projects are spending their own money not ours. With Muskrat Falls, politicians are committing our money and that of our children, without following sound business practices of due diligence and due process.

They took high risk decisions and placed us in deep jeopardy. They bet that oil prices would remain high and continue to rise. We all know what happened to oil prices.

They bet that consumer demand for electricity would increase. The latest projection from Nalcor shows a decline.

They bet upon a favourable interpretation of the Renewal Agreement which governs the Churchill Falls contract for the period 2016 to 2041, an interpretation which would allow us access to more power and give us more control over the flow of water on the Churchill River. The Quebec Superior Court determined a year ago that Hydro Quebec’s rights did not diminish, after the end of the first 40 years of the 65 year contract, leaving the Water Management Agreement high and dry.

Our leaders bet that the Utilities and Review Board of Nova Scotia (UARB) would embrace the 20/20 principle, whereby Nova Scotia would agree to take a mere 20% of Muskrat Falls power in exchange for Nalcor’s access to the Maritime Link, which was estimated in 2010 to constitute 20% of the overall investment. Emera was to have a 29% share in the transmission line, from which they will reap a rich reward. Now, in 2017, our commitment of Muskrat Falls energy to Nova Scotia is at least 44% (up from 20%), the Maritime Link represents only 13% of the overall project’s cost (down from 20%), yet Emera holds 63% of the equity (up from 29% in the 2010 Term Sheet) in the Labrador Island Link. Each of these three percentages has moved against us, confirming that we lost the Nova Scotia gamble, as we lost the gamble on oil prices, demand projections and water management.
 
Our hubristic leaders turned their backs on the availability of Upper Churchill power after 2041. A combination of energy efficiency and a better rate structure would have weaned us off electric space heating which is exacerbating peak demand in winter. Demand side management would have enabled Holyrood to be decommissioned as a source of baseload power. Yet we committed to an additional source of high cost power, against all the warnings.

Hubristic leaders led us into this flawed project without allowing our Public Utilities Board to hold a full hearing, examining all the alternatives. The 2011 reference to the PUB was flawed with imprecise cost estimates, exaggerated demand projections and narrow terms of reference. Now we have an Inquiry which has been given a similarly limited terms of reference, restricted to dissecting the sins of the past but with no mandate to explore future options. Are we not repeating the same mistake by restricting the terms of reference? Ought we not to give the Commissioner the broadest mandate, allowing him to go back in time as far as necessary?

Surely the main focus of the Inquiry has to be to find out what options can be pursued to mitigate the risks and to keep rates as low as possible. Do you agree that the main focus should be on the future, learning from the past? Do you agree that the Inquiry should explicitly address environmental impact, the failure of democratic institutions and that its mandate should explicitly include these matters, as well as the role of Upper Churchill power as the principal solution to our long term energy requirements?  If you agree with me how can we as citizens ensure that this happens and that the mandate of the Commissioner is expanded?

David Vardy

• Commission of inquiry into Muskrat Falls too narrow
• Those accountable must be held accountable

24 November 2017

• Inquiry announcement is more of same
• Nothing right about Muskrat Falls

---

23 November 2017

• Judge Leblanc Needs Changes in Inquiry .....

22 November 2017

• David Vardy comments on Muskrat Falls Inquiry  https://podcast-a.akamaihd.net/mp3/podcasts/current_20171121_40043.mp3.

20 November 2017

• Muskrat Falls Public Inquiry Terms of Reference My first impressions on the 'inquiry' (?) --- a limited and backward-looking inquiry, focused largely on the options, project management, contracting and costs. The 'test' is on the 'reasonableness' of past government/Nalcor decisions given the information that was available at the time !!

         There seems to be little if anything about the risks associated with the WMA, NS, methymercury, etc. and whether a benefit-cost analysis is needed of the project continuing and/or modified in a way that could reduce/mitigate the long term negative impact of this continuing fiasco.
         In short, further obfuscation that lays the foundation for government to say (right after the 2019 election) that now that we know "what happened" with Muskrat Falls, we can now safely move forward with Gull Island ---- a partisan political initiative. Maurice Adams

• Premier Announces Muskrat Falls Public Inquiry
• Premier to Make "Significant" Muskrat Falls Announcement At Noon

19 November 2017

• Cheapest electricity on the planet...

16 November 2017
Below is NP's report on my annual energy use for the past year (as compared to the average and energy efficient homes in my area).

Prior to the installation of a mini-split heat pump in December 2012 my usage was comparable to the average home.

Now it is on average about 500 KWhs a month LESS THAN the average, and for most months as good as and at times better than an energy efficient home.

My home was built in 1981 and with the exception of an added aluminum storm door there has been no other energy conservation/efficiency upgrades. Maurice Adams

13 November 2017

• Chernobyl-lite: The Price of Denying Muskrat Economics
  

12 November 2017

• Spend a bundle, save a dime

08 November 2017

• Coady Misinformed: Second Source Confirms Faulty Towers
• Might the taxman cometh

06 November 2017

• Faulty Towers: A Nalcor Comedy (Of Errors)

03 November 2017

• David Vardy in conversation with Paddy Daley (starts about 2/3rd's of the way through)

02 November 2017

• Is Muskrat Falls a Ponzi Scheme?

31 October 2017

• New energy-saving program could make Muskrat Falls power more expensive: analyst (Residents get a loan with a 4.7% interest rate and payback requires up to about $200 a month added to their electricity bills)

Now compare that help (?) from government to what industry is getting (see my two 2014 Telegram letters below -  'Who's in your wallet?" and "Muskrat straightjacket getting tighter") --- there are also a few other 'related' letters among the larger 2014 article/letter grouping below (October 25th posting):

CLICK TO ENLARGE

27 October 2017

• How to circumvent Muskrat Falls
• Ratepayers given more kicks to teeth

26 October 2017

• Has The A-G Spoken Truth To Power?

25 October 2017

• Some questioned Nalcor's numbers from the start

My 2012 PUB 'Written Submission' and early Muskrat articles and letters - from  April  2011  to  November  2017
                                                                                                                                                   (CLICK TO ENLARGE)

Year 2011

1. Give peat a chance
2. Nalcor and numbers
3. With the blessing of the people
4. By Nalcor's own numbers
5. Bad numbers from Nalcor
6. Muskrat Falls: boon or boondoggle
7. By the numbers
8. The danger of long term forecasts

Year 2012

1. Peat and power
2. Nalcor's faulty forecasts
3. Webspin
4. Another option to meet our energy needs
5. Looking for proof of increasing energy demand
6. You can't have it both ways
7. The need for power isn't proven

Written Submission to the Public Utilities Board of Newfoundland and Labrador with Respect to the Least-Cost Analysis and Review

Year 2013

1. Playing with power numbers
2. Marginal increase in power demand enough reason for Muskrat?
3. Support for Muskrat is misguided
4. Nalcor should be brought to task
5. We carry the freight for N.S.'s cheap power

Year 2014

1. Full-page Hydro advertisement adds insult to injury
2. Ratepayers and risks
3. So happy to share our wealth with the world
4. Cod tales
5. Mad as hell over Muskrat
6. This time we are doing it to ourselves
7. Smart meters dumbed down by Muskrat agreement
   
8. Who's in your wallet?
9. Muskrat straightjacket getting tighter

Years 2015 and 2016

1. The white elephant can't be ignored
2. It's not just the North Spur we have to worry about
3. Concentrate on the transmission line
4. Holyrood by the numbers
5. Bring on the review of Muskrat Falls
6. Here we go again
7. Consumer advocate should stop chasing rabbits
8. We don't need another hero
9. A money-back guarantee
10. Stop the short-sighted bargaining
11. Nalcor mum on questions about the North Spur

Year 2017 (up to October 25)

1. PUB should consider expert reports
2. North Spur a risky business
3. Stop digging already
4. Consumers deserve stronger advocacy on Muskrat Falls
5. 'Reassuring' gobbledygook on Muskrat Falls
6. Muskrat Falls --- there's far too much at risk
7. Some questioned Nalcor's numbers from the start
   
8. Nothing right about Muskrat Falls
   

23 October 2017

• Parkway papered with 'Audit Nalcor'
• Plea to Federal Government: Mitigate the Harm You have Caused at Muskrat Falls
• Premier Should Tell Beothuck Energy to 'Go Fly A Kite'

17 October 2017

• Hiding billions in hydro debt 'unacceptable'......

Nalcor claims that its North Spur stabilization and re-grading work is completed.

I would ask:---

---

16 October 2017

• Vardy Tells B.C. "Site C" Not To Repeat Muskrat Folly
• Here's what we need from a Muskrat Falls inquiry
• North Spur Dam Construction Complete --- readers should note that there has been NO "slope stabilization" and/or "regrading" of the steepest slope (underwater) portion of the North Spur and that is connected on the downstream side to the Lower Clay Layer

12 October 2017

• Muskrat Falls --- there's far too much at risk
• Muskrat Subsidies Will Cause a Gov't Debt Spiral
• Muskrat Falls inquiry should be well worth the price
• What a tangled web they weave...

09 October 2017

• Public Inquiry Needs Broad Mandate Says Vardy

08 October 2017

• Make Muskrat Inquiry right, say critics

07 October 2017

• Inquiring minds want to know
• NL's aging population, demographics a looming financial problem....

05 October 2017

• North Spur concerns unaddressed
• Inquiry Needs Engineering Capability .....

04 October 2017

• Muskrat Falls resistance growing across Canada

02 October 2017

• Nalcor Meddling A Threat to Muskrat Inquiry

01 October 2017

• Pay packets and privacy: Why Nalcor says contractor compensation at Muskrat Falls is off limits
• Muskrat Falls Inquiry doomed before it starts?

30 September 2017

• Muskrat Falls Focused On Politics, Not Politics: Tomblin (Excerpt: "... there are deliberate knowledge and information gaps around the Muskrat Falls project..." , emphasis added)
• Russell Wangersky: 22 words with a very big bite
• What to do about our boondoggle
• Another megaproject pushing public utilities to the brink
• Pam Frampton: Hallelujah -- Muskrat Falls inquiry's a go
• Would the people who profess to care about Newfoundland and Labrador  please stand up?

29 September 2017

• NunatuKavut support inquiry into Muskrat Falls

28 September 2017

• Muskrat Falls inquiry to commence this fall, Premier announces
• Premier to announce timeline for Muskrat Falls inquiry
• Nalcor and Consultants Face Liability If North Spur Fails

27 September 2017

• Land Protectors to meet with Nalcor CEO (based on past experience, assurances from Nalcor's communications people may not mean much -- Maurice Adams)
• Land Protectors shut Hydro Place
• Of governance and criticism

25 September 2017

• Energy Innovation Means Site C Already A White Elephant (just like Muskrat)
• Social Programs To Be Crushed By Muskrat Subsidies           Excerpt:--- "The real alternative needing urgent consideration is how to end this useless nightmare of a public utility project."
• When does electricity become unaffordable to all in N.L.?

21 September 2017

• In Pictures: Nalcor Dumps Millions

17 September 2017

• Muskrat Falls Commitment Not Being Honoured: Lampe
• Muskrat Will Destroy Utility System in 2020 (readers should also take careful note of David Vardy's comment at the bottom of this article -- M. Adams)

16 September 2017

• Review raises doubt Site C's costs, schedule (EXCERPT -- "...on Feb. 11, a 400-metre-long tension crack opened up on the north bank, forcing a 10-week halt to construction on that side of the river. Barely had construction resumed when a second 250-metre-long tension crack emerged on the same side of the river."
• Clock ticking for Holyrood ... or not?

14 September 2017

• Premier Needs Quebec Judge's Help On Forensic Audit

13 September 2017

• Nalcor - too secretive
• 'They didn't have the data' - Labrador scientist questions Mud Lake flood research

12 September 2017

• Anderson Brings Muskrat Falls Water Protest To Federal Cabinet

11 September 2017

• Today, Judgement Day finally comes to the  Ontario Liberals' gas-plant scandal
• Premier Preparing To Launch Muskrat Falls Inquiry
• Ball concerned over Nalcor use of contractors
• RCMP Must Account For Failure To Investigate Nalcor

09 September 2017

• 'Reassuring' gobbledygook on Muskrat Falls
• 'Embedded contractors' make up about 90 per cent of Muskrat Falls management team
• You're going to hear a lot of this

07 September 2017

• 'Weak oversight' plagued B.C. megaproject,.....
• EY Report On Muskrat Falls Mostly A Big Mess

06 September 2017

• World energy demand to plateau from 2030 - DNV GL Report ‘The world is approaching a watershed moment as energy demand is set to flatten out from 2030, driven by greater efficiency with the wider application of electricity.......'

04 September 2017

• B.C.'s Site C and Muskrat Falls Compared

02 September 2017

• Risks remain
• Six Stages of Boondoggle

01 September 2017

• Final EY Report    ------- EXCERPT --- "9.1 The Project, Nalcor Board and the Provincial Government should maintain a relentless focus on risk management given the Project’s high level of inherent risk." (emphasis added).                 I would ask -- "What is that HIGH LEVEL of 'inherent risk'?" Given that SNC-Lavelin has previously reported that 'risk' is a function of BOTH the 'probability' of occurrence and the impact/magnitude/consequences of such occurrence, for more than $2 million, one would think that such RISKS would have been clearly identified, described, quantified and costed. If not, WHY NOT?   This long-delayed report is a continuation of the previous government's policy of obfuscation, deceit by omission, and the burying of the real needs of ratepayers/citizens underneath the cover of a supposed independent and credible EY consulting firm.    Maurice Adams.

31 August 2017

• Government Releasing EY Report On Muskrat Falls This Afternoon
• PUB Should Treat Hydro's Rate App Harshly
• Protesters hope to have injunction for Muskrat Falls site overturned

28 August 2017

• Get ready for rates to go up -- again
• Nalcor paid out $766K in bonuses to top execs this year

25 August 2017

• Consumers deserve stronger advocacy on Muskrat Falls

24 August 2017

• "Empty Words" From Consumer Advocate Draws Reply From Anonymous Engineer

22 August 2017

• Nalcor says $66.9 million hedging loss was normal and prudent (perhaps 'normal' for Nalcor ---- but 'prudent'?)

21 August 2017

• Nalcor Loses $66.9 million In 6-day Failed Hedging Scheme: Public Not Told

19 August 2017

• Actions must be taken to address Muskrat Falls [Readers will note that the CA omits the need for there first to be a benefit/cost analysis of putting the generation/dam component on hold, of having the right experts assess the safety of the North Spur, of determining the potential for saving billions of dollars if it is determined that the dam/generation component is not needed nor viable and of re-configuring the project to include only the transmission line. Now is not the time to negotiate a new or extended Upper Churchill contract with Quebec. The time to do that is when --- 1. we are on the road to or have solved our weak fiscal position, 2. when Quebec needs the Upper Churchill contract renewed more than we do. 

          We must not renew the UC deal from a position of weakness. If need be, the most we should do now (with Quebec) is buy some 4-6 cent UC power (if needed) to help us over the winter months] ---- Maurice Adams

• Muskrat Falls demands a public inquiry
• Andy Wells says he was always against Muskrat Falls --- privately

17 August 2017

• Reflections On The Muskrat Falls Project

16 August 2017

• Muskrat Falls was always a done deal, and a bad one

15 August 2021

• A dodgy dam in Canada's east

14 August 2017

• The AG And The Consumer Advocate Do The Province A Disservice
• Empowering the PUB

12 August 2017

• Severance scales
• Muskrat Falls audit must wait? Tell us why

11 August 2017

• Muskrat Falls and other white elephants
• Circular solutions to Muskrat Falls

10 August 2017

• Coady Wrong About North Spur Review, Says Senior Engineer

09 August 2017

• Dwight Ball's dilemma
• Shareholders deserve answers on Muskrat Falls

08 August 2017

• Net-metering policy needs revamping
• Smart meters dumbed down by Muskrat agreement (you heard it here first)
• Muskrat, risk, and memory [Just a reminder to readers, my Muskrat questions and evidence-based opposition to this project (letters, articles, and comments to The Telegram began in April 2011 --- dozens in all, as well as written submissions and comments to the PUB and on this website by 2012, as well as emails to the premier and other government officials) and continue to this day]

07 August 2017

• NL Needs A Revolution. You Will Have To Lead It.

05 August 2017

• Muskrat Falls and the politics of mistrust
• A rate hike scheme to make you boil

04 August 2017

• Smart to cancel billion-dollar boondoggles

01 August 2017

• Feed the insatiable beasts ---- NL Hydro and Nalcor

31 July 2017

• (Real) Rate Mitigation Measures Requires Sparking The Largest Lawsuit In Canadian History  [My Comment --- Dennis Browne seems to be parroting Liberal Party policies, e.g., that a forensic audit can wait till the Muskrat Falls fiasco/boondoggle is completed.  He needs to stop touting/spouting government's position (as his predecessor did) and do his duty as "Consumer" Advocate. ]  --- M.E. Adams

29 July 2017

• Nunatukavut elder says he's not eating in prison
• Winds of change
• A major red flag
• A power play where you pay and pay
• Electricity rates can't go much above 17 cents per kWh, Ball says
• Tensions flow high over Muskrat Falls
• Tempers rising on the turbine trail
• Williams compared apples to oranges

28 July 2017

• NL Hydro wants to hike your power bill by 6-6.6 percent a year
• 'We need political leadership': Senators call on Premier to release jailed Muskrat Falls protestors
• Ontarians gouged, Newfoundlanders eviscerated

27 July 2017

• Cutting losses
• Effort to free elders continues

26 July 2017

• SNC-Lavalin was obligated to deliver risk report
• "We are not a bunch of criminals, we are people trying to protect our land"

24 July 2017

• Elders jailed after refusing to stay away from Muskrat Falls
• Russell Wangersky: In reply to Minister Coady
• Why We Should Respect The Incarcerated Labrador Three

23 July 2017

• Consumer Advocate Calls For Muskrat Falls Hearing To Keep Rates Down (If the 'Consumer' Advocate wanted to keep rates down he would call for the Liberal government to stop throwing good money after bad and stop wasting thousands of millions of dollars more on the unneeded generation component of this Muskrat Falls Project.)

22 July 2017

• Three demonstrators are arrested over Muskrat Falls injunction...
• Paying for past mistakes
• Muskrat Falls shareholders have mounting misgivings
• Premier should have Muskrat Falls project audited - now

21 July 2017

• Muskrat Falls Inquiry a Must: Consumer Advocate (Dennis Browne is now mouthing the Liberal government position that now is not the time to launch an inquiry into Muskrat Falls. Whose best interest is he looking out for? Certainly not the consumers he seemed to be fighting for when he, among others, launched Group 2041)

• Courtroom drama as Muskrat Falls protester taken into custody
• MHA's letter on Muskrat Falls wasn't convincing

20 July 2017

Nalcor's Expert Reviews -- Timing/Sequence/Reliability Problem?
With respect to how much ratepayers can rely on Nalcor's North Spur geotechnical and stabilization work:---

Nalcor recently advised that its geotechnical report was dated November 2013, while its "Technical reviews of the current engineering were performed by the Advisory Board" in April and October 2013, by the Independent Engineer in September 2013 and by Hatch Consulting in September 2013 --- ALL BEFORE the November 2013 date of the geotechnical report.

That should make everyone feel safe and secure ---- knowing that Nalcor's North Spur's 'expert' technical reviews of the North Spur engineering were completed BEFORE the most recent geotechnical report.

• Media Focus On 'Chase The Ace' Has UNCLE GNARLEY Out Of Sorts

19 July 2017

• PUB consumer advocate wants Muskrat Falls inquiry

(Dennis should stop wearing his red Liberal jacket and start fighting for what is in the best interest of consumers. Delaying the inquiry is what both the Liberal and PC Parties want, not what the people want and need. Putting this back to the PUB at this stage is a delaying/diversion tactic. Dennis can and should do better)

• Protesters block entry to Muskrat Falls main gate
• Nalcor owes the public answers

17 July 2017

• Meet UNCLE GNARLEY: Muskrat Falls' prolific doomsayer blogs in turbulent times
• Mud Lake vs. Pennecon: Giving Profit A Bad Name
• Where is Gilbert Bennett?

16 July 2017

• Residents demand review as fears grow over Muskrat Falls project

15 July 2017

• Report warned of grave risks; a shame nobody read it

(and some of us 'naysayers' warned of grave risks, wrong vision, unreasonable/unjustified forecasts, uneconomic boondoggle, etc. etc. as far back as 2011 and through  a multitude of letters to The Telegram and through this Vision2041 website since 2012 -------- shame almost nobody cared)

• Muskrat Falls --- we'll pay and pay and pay

(and many will switch to oil, wood and heat pumps, and then rates will have to go up and up and up)

13 July 2017

• Filled Reservoir Will Cause North Spur To Fail, Study Predicts

Below is a comment copied from the Uncle Gnarley blog:
Anonymous14 July 2017 at 11:22

My background is an advanced degree in geotechniques and 20yrs civil experience in NL----as I said earlier to Vardy, I am barely qualified to assess the resumes of those need to do this review and to identify the issues with this thing. I understand the issues and could possible lead a field program but am not nearly qualified to determine final remediation required.

To me, this needs to be assessed as no less a technical feat of landing the first man on the moon... From what I have read and experienced on this project---it seems as if everyone is awestruck by the 'sexy' factor of standing towers/pulling wire and moving stators with the 'moving dirt and pouring concrete' seen as rudimentary....

I see a fail of epic proportions coming at the hands of a group of engineers that ignored engineering 1st principles....

PENG2

• Grand Riverkeepers Demand Answers.... (NTV News item)
• It's not just the North Spur we have to worry about ( More than a year and a half ago I wrote how the water pressure on the North Spur would about double and increase the risk of failure, Maurice Adams )

12 July 2017

• Muskrat mistake
• CFIB Calls For PUB Oversight On Muskrat Falls  (too little, too late?)

10 July 2017

• Public deserves an inquiry into Muskrat Falls
• New Whistleblower Reveals Nalcor Responsible For Mud Lake Flooding

09 July 2017

• The truth about Ed

08 July 2017

• Stan Marshall -- 'a boondoggle buffoon'?

07 July 2017

• Progressive landslide analysis of North Spur by masters degree student of Dr. Bernander (it appears that his analysis concludes that the North Spur safety factor is 0.5, while Nalcor claims a safety factor of 1.5)
• DEGREE PROJECT --- Progressive Landslides Analysis

06 July 2017
Anonymous Engineer Alleges Ed Martin's Statement Makes No Sense

05 July 2017
How much is a million dollars?
Read this anonymous comment copied from today's Uncle Gnarley blog:

Anonymous 5 July 2017 at 15:42 How much is a million $? How much is a billion $'s. A friend asked me that some time ago. I replied a billion is 1,000 million. But can I really comprehend that since I don't have that kind of money in my bank account as I suspect most readers don't either. Remember when Tom Marshall was finance minister he carried a deficit clock I think it was called. Most people like me throw around a million and a billion $'s a if they were around the same. But here is a relative comparison .....if you were to count, make, spend or repay a million dollars at a rate of 1$ per second, 24/7, how long would it take to count, repay etc. a million dollars? If you do the math, it comes out to approx. 11.5 days. If you were to count, repay etc. a BILLION dollars at the same rate, of one dollar per second, how long would it take to count, repay etc. Again, if you do the math it would take 32 years approx. OMG, 11.5 days to count a million, BUT 32 years to count a billion dollars. Wow, that puts things in prospective. You could probably stand on your head and spit nickels for 11.5 days, but 32 years, that's maybe half a lifetime. I have no idea at what rate we will pay back the cost of muskrat, but assume it is 1$ per second, to payback 10 billion would take something like 320 years, imagine that. Just food food for taught, and the average joe like me, but especially for the brilliant brave media.

And readers might keep in mind that that does not seem to include interest (interest for 11.5 days is negligible compared to interest for 320 years. So we are really talking, who knows, 500?, 1000? years?

• Calls for Nalcor audit, Muskrat inquiry intensify amid ongoing protests

(Readers should note that a reference in the above article to Cabot Martin being associated with "Vision 2041" is in error, the article should read "Group 2041)

• Peckford calls for immediate Muskrat Falls forensic audit
• Former premier Brian Peckford demand immediate audit of Muskrat Falls project
• Vardy/Penney Seek Expert Panel On North Spur

04 July 2017

• No choice between heating and eating

03 July 2017

An awakening of the power of the people

There was an important demonstration today in St. John's that signals an awakening of the 'power of the people'.

Here is how Mr. David Vardy, with bullhorn in hand, summarized what he had to say:

"I asked if people had heard about Nalcor’s Anti-Poverty program, which has become most effective in stealing from the poor and making the rich richer. Robin Hood in reverse! I  talked about Nalcor’s anti-poverty program, which begins with 787 people on the sunshine list but reaches out to enrich thousands of contractors and consultants. I said that Nalcor is like an iceberg, the 787 people earning over $100,000 per year represent only one seventh of the mass that lies below the surface.

How many people living in this province are making a killing on this project? Maybe 5000-7500 and they are in control of the project, even though they make up one to two  per cent of our population . The government does not listen to the rest, the other 98%. The winners, who constitute the favoured 2%,  have the ear of government. The losers, 98%, are disenfranchised. They have no say. Nalcor’s Anti-Poverty program benefits 2% of the population, the winners who are paid a lot of money either in salaries or profits. This Anti-Poverty program works really well for the 2% but it impoverishes the remaining 98%.

We do not need Nalcor. We have an oil and gas division within the Department of Natural Resources. We used to have a strong NL Hydro. We had two large energy bureaucracies and now we have three. We do not need Muskrat Falls. We need to shut it down." ---- David Vardy

• Protesters rally against Muskrat Falls in St. John's
• Public Should Be Afraid Of Possible Corruption
• More on Muskrat Falls

30 June 2017

• David Vardy interview with NTV
• Stop digging already

29 June 2017

• Major questions on SNC-Lavalin report remain unanswered
• Some Notes On How The Muskrat Scheme Is Falling Apart
• Straight talk on Muskrat Falls, please

28 June 2017

• Muskrat inquiry, now!

27 June 2017

• Did Ed Martin see report detailing Muskrat Falls risk?
• Premier can't say when Muskrat investigation begins
• Ed Martin fires back......

26 June 2017

• Premier's Claims About Forensic Audit Are False Says Anonymous Engineer
• Russell Wangersky: It's happening there and it's happening here
• Liberals commit to Muskrat Falls audit, but say starting one now would be distraction

25 June 2017

• SNC-Lavalin Risk Assessment Report

24 June 2017

• Brian Peckford's Wake-up Call (while Des Sullivan's article may seem off topic, Des weaves together many principles of leadership, vision, strategy, etc. that has been sadly lacking in our province for decades, and the absence of which has helped create the mess we are in today ---- especially with respect to the Muskrat Falls boondoggle)
• Beyond boondoggle
• Muskrat Falls and the lack of public confidence

23 June 2017

• 2013 Report Foresaw Muskrat Problems: Premier

(I would note that by then, 2013, I had perhaps a dozen or more letters/articles published in The Telegram, starting just a few months after Williams' announcement in 2010, identifying significant issues related to this boondoggle, and started this Vision2041 website in early 2012 as a way to inform citizens ------------------------------ so what is Premier Ball's excuse?) --- Maurice Adams.

• Muskrat Falls pricetag now $12.7 billion
• Muskrat Falls bill now $12.7 billion

22 June 2017
Nalcor lowering water levels at Muskrat Falls reservoir


20 June 2017

• Support For Muskrat Falls At All-time Low

14 June 2017

• Halifax Lawyer Looking Into Class-action Lawsuit Related to Mud Lake Flooding
• Hunter vows to continue fighting Muskrat Falls

10 June 2017

• Nalcor Seeks Meeting With Beatrice Hunter

09 June 2017

• Beatrice Hunter released from jail,...
• Support growing for Beatrice Hunter

08 June 2017

• EY Report Confirms Need For Forensic Audit Says Whistleblower

03 June 2017

• Protester Holds Vigil On Nalcor Lawn

02 June 2017
Free Beatrice Hunter

01 June 2017

• Mud Lake flooding victims prepare to launch class action suit
  

31 May 2017

• Inuit grandmother jailed for refusing to stay away from Muskrat Falls

30 May 2017

• 'She's a hero': group holds vigil for Muskrat Falls protester behind bars

---

29 May 2017

• Electrical rates have nowhere to go but up

               EXCERPT--- "...55 cents per kWh for Muskrat power (Nalcor’s figure)… (and) north of that number as cost overruns continue to rise".

• Half-Truths and Lies: The Media Should Triple Check Nalcor's "Facts"

28 May 2017

• Happy Valley- Goose Bay wants inquiry, not just investigation into Churchill River flooding

24 May 2017

• Nalcor 'dismissiveness' a worry when it comes to flood blame, say MUN profs
• "I have nothing else to lose": Mud Lake leader to Nalcor

22 May 2017

• Premier tours Mud Lake flood damage, vows 'to get to the bottom of this'

• Cop behind violent Muskrat Falls arrest named "Office of the Year"

20 May 2017
           DO WE NEED THE POWER?
Keep in mind that the Muskrat Falls power purchase agreement (PPA) requires guaranteed revenues over 50 years (so if demand goes down, rates must go up)

19 May 2017

• "We Just Want the Truth"......
• Mud Lake residents grill politicians, call for flooding investigation

18 May 2017

• Stan Marshall's Interview With Germain Narrows Field Of Culprits

16 May 1017

• Concern for ratepayers too little, too late

15 May 2017

• Of Deceit, Emera and Muskrat Madness

14 May 2017

Is this a new landslide on the southeast side of the rock knoll, or on the downstream north shore of the river? And a tree floating in the water approaching the entrance to the spillway?

11 May 2017

• Still no timeline for Muskrat Falls report
• Will the A-G Probe Falsification of Muskrat Falls Cost Estimates?

10 May 2017

• Call for forensic audit of Muskrat Falls cost estimates...
• Trimper Accepts North Spur Petition, But Stands By Work
• Petition demanding review of North Spur dam delivered to government

01 May 2017

• Muskrat Falls Draft Tube Investigation Report
• Be Careful Comparing Muskrat With Troubled Hydro Projects Elsewhere

29 April 2017

• Conflict of interest questions unanswered

28 April 2017

• North Spur --- a risky business  (readers please note that while it appears that this letter, published in The Telegram on 28 April 2017,  is no longer available on The Telegram's website, the practically unchanged original email that was sent to The Telegram is below):

Generally speaking, shear stress is where the stress/force within a soil layer runs parallel to its surface. Other factors being equal, the steeper that a soil layer's slope is, the greater the shear stress. When a soil layer's shear stress is high enough that it reaches the shear strength of that soil, a landslide can occur.

Just out from the shoreline of the downstream slope of the North Spur is an underwater deep hole that drops off to a depth of about 200 feet below the toe of the North Spur's downstream slope.

This deep subsurface depression has, in places, a slope inclination of about 80% (a slope inclination that is more than double what Nalcor considers safe for the North Spur above-surface slopes).

While the North Spur's original stabilization plans called for that deep hole to be filled in, Nalcor's final plans (and the existing North Spur stabilization works) has left that deep hole untouched.

One of the key reasons that Nalcor concluded that a progressive landslide failure "will never be initiated" at the base of that deep hole, as Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study states, is because Nalcor's "numerical analyses" showed that the shear stress at the base of that deep hole "is only about 60% of the minimum estimated undrained shear strength" (emphasis added).

Now we all know how reliable Nalcor's "estimated" oil prices were, we all know how reliable Nalcor's demand forecasts/estimates were, we all know how legally reliable Nalcor's water management agreement has been, and we also all know that a life and death decision based on an "estimated" shear strength is not evidence-based.

In fact, the actual evidence points to the potential for soil liquefaction and flowslides.

The 2014 Hatch "Cold Eyes" Review stated that Liquidity Index "Values in excess of 1 are an indication of the potential for both liquefaction and flow type failures", and the lower clay layer evidence shows that the upper range of Nalcor's 123 Liquidity Index test results for the Lower Clay layer is "2" (double the safe Liquidity Index value of "1").

Furthermore, the extent to which the established Liquidity Index/Shear Strength relationship applies to the Lower Clay layer, shows that a Liquidity Index value of 2 correlates to a shear strength that is 10 times lower than the point at which flowslides can occur.

Yet, and notwithstanding that mathematically up to about half of the Liquidity Index test results may exceed 1 --- indicating "the potential for both liquefaction and flow type failures", Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study concludes that because the Lower Clay layer "has a typical (average) liquidity index of 0.6...there would not be retrogression and flowslide".

So, on the one hand we have "evidence" that points to a potential risk, and on the other hand we have Nalcor's inappropriate use/reliance on "average" geotechnical test results and an "estimated" shear strength to conclude that "...progressive failure...will never be initiated".

So, where is Nalcor's first and foremost focus on safety, and government's much ballyhooed evidence-based decision making?

And if this whole 12 billion dollar 'investment' (?) should fail, who's best interest has the newly appointed Consumer Advocate, the newly appointed members of the Oversight Committee, and the Minister of Justice and Public Safety been really looking out for?

Maurice E. Adams
Paradise

• Top bureaucrat suing Nalcor in spare time

26 April 2017

• Nalcor forced to pay $900K.......

24 April 2017

• Manitoba has a problem of Muskrat proportions

22 April 2017

• What else could we have done with $12 billion?
• Muskrat Falls protesters had legitimate grievances

20 April 2017

• Don't Expect New Oversight Members To Be Wallflowers

          (of course, from an economics perspective, all Dr. Feehan has to do is study and analyze everything Dr. Wade Locke did --------- and do the opposite)


17 April 2017

• Landslide's Amazing Pictures Still Won't Spur Nalcor

         Interested readers may wish to peruse my rather lengthy comment posted at the bottom of the above-referenced article. Maurice Adams


13 April 2017

• Muskrat: Why a Review Board is Essential for the North Spur

12 April 2017

• Delayed reaction

11 April 2017

• How Queen's Park broke Ontario's provincial electricity sector
• Coady beefs up Muskrat Falls oversight

08 April 2017

• Beware of mass movements
• If you build it, customers might not exist
• The woe of Muskrat Falls

05 April 2017

• Woman Arrested At Muskrat Falls Makes Court Appearance
• PUB refuses to rescind or amend its earlier order to strike GRK's expert reports

28 March 2017

• After reading consumer advocate, Dennis Browne's "Ratepayers simply can't afford Muskrat Falls" letter in today's Telegram, readers may wish to read my  "Smart meters dumbed down by Muskrat agreement" article published in The Telegram in 2014 which highlights a key weakness in just one of Mr. Browne's suggestions.
• I would also suggest that, contrary to another of Mr. Browne's suggestions, it is over-reliance on the previous government's "experts" (Dr. Wade Locke, Manitoba Hydro International, Nalcor's 'world class' experts, etc.) that got us into the mess we are in now   ----- Remember -- Einstein is reported to have said that "insanity" is "doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result". 
• Nevertheless, taxation on all electricity production/sales may have merit in that then revenue from Hydro Quebec could possibly be several times more than tax revenue obtained from NL ratepayers --- Maurice Adams, Paradise.

27 March 2017

• Waiting for Muskrat

20 March 2017

• Dam Safety Review A "Hatch" Job, Says Engineer
• Power to the people --- but at what cost?

16 March 2017
                           DO WE NEED THE POWER?

15 March 2017
On VOCM's Backtalk with Pete Soucey yesterday, government appointed consumer advocate (Dennis Browne) argued for the province to move more quickly to net metering (smart meters) as a way to keep electricity costs for consumers down. See below:

• Smart meters dumbed down by Muskrat agreement

13 March 2017


                             DO WE NEED THE POWER?
16 years ago, NL Hydro forecast that the island's peak demand would exceed 1,800 MW by 2014, and its most recent (2016) forecast again calls for a peak demand of 1,800 MW in 2017. Since 2001, we have exceeded 1,700 MW only once, and 1,600 MW only four times (and have recently added new capacity by way of a 110 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood and building a 3rd transmission line from Bay d'Espoir).  DO WE NEED THE POWER? See below:-

10 March 2017

• 'Rate mitigation' reveals lies behind Muskrat Falls
• 'Not my idea' Dwight Ball says as Emera takes majority equity stake in Muskrat Falls link

         This means:

1. that NL ratepayers will pay ~ $50 million a year more (not into Nalcor's coffers) but to Emera
   
2. increased upward pressure on rates for NL ratepayers, and
   
3. the elimination of our government's ability to use that $50 million a year to reduce rates in NL
   

09 March 2017

• Ratepayers' Ability To Recover Investment In Muskrat Falls "Delusional" Says Critic
• Great big giveaway
• The Liberty Report: A Glaring Omission

08 March 2017

07 March 2017

• Premier Confirms Emera Holds Majority Share of Labrador-Island Link

06 March 2017

• PUB should consider expert reports
• GRK motion to rescind or amend PUB order
• Emera - Silently Building Their Own NL Energy Warehouse   

         EXCERPT:--- "...has Emera now effectively increased their investment to a level where they will also obtain 59% of the profits accruing to the Labrador Island Link? It is not a secondary question especially given that the Company will receive the allowable 8.8% return on its equity contribution.

If true, Emera are entitled to make $50-60 million in annual profits from the Newfoundland ratepayer.  This is a far cry from what was communicated by Nalcor at the beginning of this project.....................................................

If this is the case, Nalcor and the Government of Newfoundland have silently permitted a Nova Scotia company to essentially take a majority stake in this vital transmission asset! 

With annual profits expected in the $60 million range, Emera will earn almost as much on the Labrador Island Transmission system as Newfoundland Power makes over its full operation (approximately $80 million annually)."


04 March 2017

• This just in --- and it isn't good

         Wangersky says, in part, that "In the coming year, Hydro actually expects peak demand to drop below 1,800 megawatts", then look closely at the "ACTUAL" peak demand in the table below (Note that except for the ~50MW of added demand due to the ramping up of Vale, Long Harbour's nickel processing plant, there has been virtually no increase since 2002 (and both peak demand and energy use already dropped in 2016).


03 March 2017

28 February 2017

• GRK's response to parties'.......
  
• The path not taken

27 February 2017

• Are You Ready To Pay To Power Nova Scotia?

24 February 2017
This aspect of the Muskrat Falls boondoggle was well known a year and a half before sanction:
By Nalcor's own numbers  was first published in The Telegram on June 23, 2011


23 February 2017
Province's industrial electricity customers say that our Consumer Advocate's comments on the admission of Dr. Bernander's expert evidence (reports) has been "...neutral...on the merits of GRK's motion"
                                                                                Who is our Consumer Advocate advocating for?

19 February 2017

• Opposition Calls For Investigation Into Perceived Conflict of Interest With Stan Marshall

16 February 2017

• NLHydro submits that the PUB should not rescind or amend its previous order striking the Bernander and Raphals reports
• Reporters Should  Remember The Ones Who Lie

14 February 2017

• The Consumer Advocate's position is that a recent PUB order not to allow evidence (such as the Bernander and Raphals reports) 'can' be a reviewable error of law and that "any identifiable risks of potential failures in the delivery of Muskrat Falls' energy supply should be generally considered by the PUB in planning the island's energy requirements post-Muskrat".

13 February 2017

• Premier meets with Labrador land protectors
• Evacuations ordered over concerns at California dam system

09 February 2017

• PUB concerned about island power adequacy and reliability before connection with Muskrat
• Pennecon Lays Off 145 Workers At Muskrat Falls

Load Growth?

Even with Vale's nickel processing plant, at no time over the 15 year period (from 2001-2015) did our total island energy use exceed our all time high (which occurred in 2004). And by 2015 (even with Vale's nickel processing plant) we were still about 1% below our peak and 7% below our 15 year average. See DEMAND page.

Holyrood

We need Holyrood for VERY short term, peak demand time periods (Holyrood is needed to operate at capacity for less than 1 week per year --- 1.6% of the time); and we need Holyrood for the Avalon's high demand and emergency backup time periods (over the last 10 years Holyrood needed to provide on average only about 13% of the island's energy needs, and since 2012 the cost of Holyrood-generated power has gone down about 42% per kWh (see DEMAND and HOLYROOD pages).

WE HAVE BEEN CONNED. AND EVERY NL HOUSEHOLD --- you, your children, your grandchildren, and great grandchildren will be paying for this fiasco for 50+ years.

And perhaps the biggest insult and injury of all is that the benefit that we have long awaited for with the arrival of 2041, will be stifled because Muskrat Falls locks NL ratepayers into PAYING FOR ALL OF THE approx. 55-cent per kWh Muskrat Falls power --- ALL OF IT, while most will be shipped to Nova Scotia for 4-5 cents per kWh.

David Vardy is right ---- WE NEED A JUDICIAL INQUIRY (READ Mr. Vardy's latest article.

Click on link below,  Maurice Adams

• Judicial Review Best Disinfectant For Muskrat Falls Says Vardy

08 February 2017

• Grand Riverkeepers' request that the PUB rescind or amend order striking Bernander and Raphals reports
• PUB Notice to Parties
• Consumer Advocate's 2016 position (and re-affirmed in 2017) re NL Hydro's motion to strike the Bernander and Raphals' reports from the record

         (note that the CA states and re-affirms, among others, that:

1.                    "... the Board has not set a formal motions process to assess the permitted scope of expert evidence
2.                     it would be premature at this juncture to strike any such reports.
3.                     such reports have the purpose of identifying potential risks to the adequate and reliable supply of power for the Island Interconnected System resulting from the Muskrat Falls Project (and)                             
4.                     The Consumer Advocate will elaborate on his position in reference to this hearing in due course."

I would suggest that NOW IS THE TIME for our Consumer Advocate to step up and independently represent not only the interests of consumers to the extent that they most directly relate to the adequacy and reliability of Muskrat Falls power, but also, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH the Order in Council authorizing the CA's appointment, that consumers' interests be represented "in relation to any other general matters [such as safety (North Spur) and security of supply (water management)] arising outside the application or hearing process..." --- (M. Adams)


07 February 2017

• Californians are paying billions for power they don't need
• The answer (to Muskrat Falls) is blowing in the wind

04 February 2017

• N.L. Privacy Commissioner allows Nalcor to withhold Muskrat Falls information

03 February 2017

• Former PUB chair calls for public inquiry into Muskrat Falls project
• Workers Sent Home From Muskrat Falls Site

02 February 2017

• Marshall, Williams and faulty facts

31 January 2017

• PUB defers to N.L. Hydro, allows evidence too be ignored

29 January 2017

• 'This will not end until Muskrat is shut down' says protester

28 January 2017

• Danny Williams and 'alternative facts'

27 January 2017

• Cofferdam Holding As Muskrat Falls Reservoir Levels Raised: Nalcor

26 January 2017

• Vardy Upset PUB Yields To Nalcor Over DarkNL Review
• PUB Order  NO. 2 (2017)

25 January 2017

• Taxes, not electricity bills, should pay for Muskrat Falls: economist

23 January 2017

• Our ship's coming in soon, honest

19 January 2016

• Muskrat Falls 'Danny's biggest mistake,' says Roger Grimes

18 January 2017

• A bail out, a bail out...
• Happy Valley-Goose Bay residents voice concerns about Muskrat Falls...

16 January 2017

• A muskrat by any other name,,,

14 January 2017

• Muskrat Falls madness persists, even now
• Legacy or infamy?
• Earthquakes Hit Halifax, Northern Quebec
• 'I feel like you've failed me': Single mom from rural Ontario blasts Trudeau and Wynne over hydro bills

13 January 2017

• Land protectors shut down government office in Labrador

12 January 2017

• Muskrat Falls Will Undermine Sovereignty of Newfoundland and Labrador

11 January 2017

• Muskrat Falls and misconceptions

09 January 2017

• LLP demand resignation of Dwight Ball and Perry Trimper
• Premier Not Ready For CBC's Anthony Germain
• Land protectors occupy government office, demand Muskrat Falls be "Shut Down"

07 January 2017

• Will the feds have to bail out NL?
• N.L. will need 'bailout' because of Muskrat Falls, says analyst

06 January 2017

• Dwight Ball in conversation with Anthony Germain
• Putting the sunk in sunk costs

04 January 2017

• Less than half of NLers support Muskrat Falls: poll

02 January 2017

• Protesters Kick Off New Year At Gates of Muskrat Falls

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

2016

30 December 2016

• The Labrador Land Protectors are inviting ....
• Contractor sues Nalcor for $90 million...

29 December 2016

SUMMARY:
Many North Spur downstream sub-surface slope safety factors are at critical/unstable levels --- liquidity indices, shear strength, stability number, slope inclination, plasticity indices and data "not retained", all of which point toward the potential for a sub-surface downstream (deep hole) rotational landslide --- a type of slide known to be the initial and most often trigger/cause of successive, multiple failure landslides (flowslides). See below:

FIGURE 1.

Critical North Spur data "not retained"

Nalcor's 2015 North Spur Stabilization Works - Progressive Failure Study states in part that "the undrained shear strength...at a given elevation is generally similar throughout the North Spur,...(however) some lower (undrained) shear strength were measured below the slide debris at the toe (shoreline) of the southern downstream slope".

Notwithstanding that Section C-C  (see Figure 1.) corresponds most closely to the "southern downstream slope", and

1. corresponds most closely to where lower shear strength has been measured below the debris at the toe,
2. has the steepest downstream shoreline to riverbed slope,
3. has the least resistance to a large slide due its adjacency to the downstream deep depression,
4. has been most impacted by the pre-1951 large landslide,
5. is the area adjacent to the narrowest section of the North Spur, and
6. is where a significant landslide could result in a catastrophic breach of the North Spur,

Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study said that Section C-C "was analysed but not retained because it was judged less representative than Section D-D".
While the engineering definition of risk is "the product of the probability of an event occurring...and an assessment of the expected harm from the event ...(consequence in lost money/deaths)." [ http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/valrisk/ch1.pdf ], Section B-B was "identified as the most critical slope of the North Spur" (emphasis added) and was thus selected as the "reference case" to which the other sections were compared.

The non-retention of the Section C-C analyses and the real (catastrophic) risk associated with a potential or actual landslide at Section C-C as compared to the real risk (probability and impact) of a what would more likely be a slide of limited magnitude and impact at Section B-B, calls for an independent and transparent analyses of Section C-C.

A decision with respect to the impoundment of the reservoir must be withheld pending the results of a independent and transparent Section C-C analysis.

See infographics below:

IS IT EVEN TECHNICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE TO STABILIZE THE 60 METRE DEEP DOWNSTREAM SLOPE?

WHAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO ADDRESS THIS POTENTIAL CATASTROPHE?

"...embankment dams are never built with a lower slope steeper than an upper slope, since this would decrease the factor of safety." ---------- Jim Gordon, P. Eng, (retired), 8 December 2016  (note that slides 1 and 5 above show North Spur downstream "lower slope steeper than an upper slope", M. E. Adams

• Nalcor mum on questions about the North Spur

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

28 December 2016

• Slope, angle, ratio (% inclination) relationships
  

27 December 2016

• Policy is People

26 December 2016

• Talking about having talks !!!!!!!!!!

22 December 2016

• North Spur lower clay layer height - inclination relationship
• No Limits On Incompetence: Another $700 Million For Astaldi
• Sinking feeling

21 December 2016

• Spin, illustrated
• Nalcor, Astaldi reach $1.83B contract.....

19 December 2016

• Burying Secrets:..........

17 December 2016

• Muskrat? No thanks

15 December 2016

• Insolvency: learning From The Puerto Rico Model

14 December 2016

• Tory Critic Questions CF(L)Co Restructuring
• What's the difference between the warped Ontario Liberal government energy policy and Dwight Ball's Muskrat/Gull Island policy? -----

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/chris-selley-if-the-hydro-file-finally-knocks-the-ontario-liberals-back-to-earth-it-will-be-nothing-less-than-fitting


12 December 2016

• Quebec Neither Enemy Nor Benefactor Says Former Hydro-Quebec Exec.



11 December 2016

• Hickey thinks something is up

        Hickey thinks Gull Island is already happening

• Engineer Jim Gordon discusses his concerns with the North Spur (in conversation with VOCM Backtalk's Pete Soucey):----

https://www.dropbox.com/s/9oxssxtvj94b0tq/20161209_Jim_Gordon_on_VOCM_Talkback.mp3?dl=0

09 December 2016

• Captains of industry need refresher in Economics 101
• Evacuation Plan Needed Now In Case North Spur or Cofferdam Fails

08 December 2016        
                                                               

• Three new factors have recently emerged that have motivated engineer Jim Gordon to again ask the question ---- "Is the North Spur Safe?"............ see Mr. Gordon's concerns (and conclusion) below:-- Maurice Adams  

                                                  THE NORTH SPUR – STILL SAFE? 

        The answer is doubtful, likely not. Three facts have emerged since I arrived at the conclusion that the North Spur was indeed safe, which have caused me to again reverse my opinion. Two of the new facts have been published recently, and one was overlooked. One is in the recently released report for July 2016 prepared by the Independent Engineer MWH, one was found on a photograph of the upstream slope of the North Spur taken in July 2015, and the last was discovered by Mr. Maurice Adams, which will be discussed first.

         Forward – When I circulated this article, I received a lengthy reply from a person with a non-scientific degree, commenting that the article was far too difficult to be understood by a layman, and should be re-written. Unfortunately the subject matter is just too technical and consequently incomprehensible for a layman, difficult to be understood by an engineer, barely understandable by a geotechnical engineer, and clearly understandable by a geotechnical engineer with a post-graduate degree in soft soils. So for the layman reader, just skip everything and read the conclusion only.

   1.   The Liquidity Index   
      
         This index measures the moisture content in the soil which is related to strength. The definition can be found on Wikipedia as –

 The liquid limit (LL) is conceptually defined as the water content at which the behavior of a clayey soil changes from plastic to liquid. However, the transition from plastic to liquid behavior is gradual over a range of water contents, and the shear strength of the soil is not actually zero at the liquid limit.

         There is a relationship between the liquid limit and shear strength, with higher liquid limits defining lower shear strength soil. The shear strength is a required input to the FLAC program used to determine dam slope stability. The liquid limit is not required, and this is the reason I did not see the inconsistency in the NALCOR tests, which indicated both a high shear strength and a high liquid limit. In the 2016 NALCOR report on the North Spur slope stability, there is a statement on page 98 that –

         Liquidity index values vary between 0.1 and 2.0 with an average value of 0.6.

         The consistency of the clay can be qualified as stiff to very stiff, measured with in-situ undrained shear strength values varying between 53 and 200kPa.

         There is a major inconsistency in these results, since with a liquidity index ranging between 0.1 and 2.0, the shear strength values should be within the range of about 0.1 and 100kPa based on the extreme upper and lower bounds as determined by Houston and Mitchell shown in Figure 1.

          Note that the liquidity index to shear strength relationship has been determined by several scientists, including Dr. Locat and Dr. Lerouell, both from Laval University in Quebec City. Dr. Lerouell has reviewed the North Spur dam design, but did not comment on the liquidity index tests.

                                                               Figure 1 – Relationship between the liquidity index and shear strength.


           Source - The undrained strength – liquidity index relationship. Dr. P. J. Vardanega, Dr. S. K. Haigh. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 04/28/2014.  Page 32, reproduced in Figure 1, with the Muskrat data added.

           The reasons for this inconsistency have to be investigated further. The inconsistency may indicate that there is an error of about one magnitude (10) in either one or the other.

      2.   The upstream slope

         The second new fact is a photograph, reproduced in Figure 2, of the temporary 2.0:1 (a slope of 2m horizontal and a 1m drop vertically) slope in the upstream face excavated into the North Spur, taken in July 2015. I found it when looking for cofferdam photo at -
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/muskrat-fall-s-north-spur-stabilization-work-underway-1.3173784 

         The sloping arrows in Figure 2 indicate where landslides or “slips” have occurred, with the debris encroaching on the foundation area for the clay seal. Where the slips happened, the slope safety factor must be just below 1.0, and where the slope is stable, the safety factor must be just above 1.0. Overall, the safety factor can be taken as 1.0. The safety factor is the ratio of failure stress to working stress. For example, the safety factor of an elevator rope is over 5, meaning that it would take more than 5 times the passenger load to break the rope.

                                                         Figure 2. Photo of upstream slope on North Spur, July 2015.

                                       Figure 3. Section through upstream slope with typical failure surface added.

Source - NALCOR 2016 report, page 149. Please excuse the lack of clarity. All NALCOR published drawings are out of focus and illegible even when enlarged.

            In the CDA guidelines, there is no suggested safety factor for temporary slopes, since during construction of a dam, there are no temporary slopes. However, it must be acknowledged that a safety factor of 1.0 is not acceptable. A safety factor of 1.3 would be more appropriate, since this is the CDA suggested safety factor during an earthquake, another temporary state.

            The upstream slope has now been covered with layers of clay and gravel sloping at 3:1 and slightly steeper at 2.5:1 towards the bottom. It is not known whether this is adequate. One observation is that embankment dams are never built with a lower slope steeper than an upper slope, since this would decrease the factor of safety.

            With a demonstrated safety factor of 1.0 at a slope of 2.0:1, this information should now be used to back-analyse and determine the corresponding shear strength, to be used in determining the slope with a safety factor of 1.5 as required by the CDA guidelines. It is expected that this slope will be flatter than 3:1 upstream and 2.5:1 downstream.

     3.     The  quick clay

             The third new fact is the discovery of two pockets of quick clay in the North Spur. This is a game-changer. They were discovered sometime in November of last year. The first public knowledge of the discovery was mentioned in the recently released report by the Independent Engineer for mid-July 2016. To quote –

             A unique occurrence of “very sensitive” or “quick clay” occurred at an area of the downstream slope during excavations in late 2015. Nalcor reported in November 2015 quick clay at excavations in a localized area. This material liquefied when being placed in the dumps of the trucks and flowed back out of the trucks as they proceeded upgrade. Nalcor/SNC geotechnical staff informed the IE in January, 2016 that material is local and, so far, is limited to two pockets of material. They reported that only single layers have been identified and the strata is not continuous along the downstream area. It was stated that layers were identified at elevations varying between 27 m and 25 to 22 m in the area of station 0+350 and at elevations varying between 33 m and 30 to 28 m in the area of station 0+410. According to site staff, high sensitive clays had been expected and included in slope designs but the amount encountered to date is far less than expected.
 
             It is a pity that this information was not forwarded to senior management, since Mr. Gilbert Bennett, Executive Vice-President Power Development, on September 16th 2016, mentioned three times during his inspection of the Muskrat site accompanied by some residents from Goose Bay and Happy Valley, that “there is no quick clay in the North Spur”.
 
             The quick clay location is critical, since the strata in this area are sloping downstream at an angle of about 5 degrees, as shown by the red line in Figure 4. With the quick clay at an elevation of 27m, and with the Spur crest at about El. 62m, this means that there is a 35m thick slab of sand, silt and clay resting on the quick clay, all on the verge of sliding downstream under the slightest provocation. To make matters worse, the small restraint provided by material downstream of the quick clay deposit has now been removed, resulting in a decrease in stability.The situation needs to be monitored daily, looking for cracks on the surface above the quick clay.

                                                                             Figure 4. Sloping strata in the North Spur.

Source – North Spur Updated, report by the Independent Engineer dated 21 July 2014. Page 13, with vertical distortion removed.

              The extent of the quick clay deposits is not known, and with two now identified, it is likely that there are several more. It is now apparent that a more detailed geotechnical investigation is required to search for other deposits. The presence of some quick clay was included in the dam design, but how this was achieved using the FLAC program for dam safety analysis is not provided. The North Spur dam design certainly needs to be reviewed based on the presence of the quick clay, after further investigations to determine the extent of the deposit.

              Winter has now arrived at the Muskrat site. This makes searching for cracks in the surface above the quick clay easier, since the crack will be clearly visible, as shown on Figure 5.

                                      Figure 5. Personal photo of 2m thick slab of clay sliding off the downstream face of a dam.

             In the above case, the slab was sliding down at a rate of 0.3m per hour, on another clay layer. Unfortunately, this will not be the case at Muskrat, where on liquefaction of the clay layer, the movement of the overlying material will be swift, raising the question of safety for any worker in the area below the quick clay exposures. This rapid progression of landslides in the vicinity of Muskrat Falls is mentioned in a letter to NALCOR dated December 18th, 2009.

             This style of failure is typical of a complex, retrogressive, rapid to very rapid (m/min to m/sec) earth slide.
Source – Lower Churchill Generation Project – Natural Resources Canada. Response to additional information provided by NALCOR Energy, page 5.
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Conclusions – This new data indicates that it is now absolutely essential to have an independent Review Board undertake a comprehensive assessment of the stability of the North Spur.

           There have been some suggestions that the mandate of the Review Board should be extended to cover the entire project. This would be a mistake, since the expertise of the Review Board members will be mainly geotechnical and not general.
 
Jim Gordon, Peng. (Retired)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

• Independent Engineer Warns About More Than Cofferdam

07 December 2016

• Putting the cart before the Trojan horse

06 December 2016

• Opposition rails at Liberals over Muskrat Falls delay

• More bad news from independent engineer's report

• Nalcor mum on questions about the North Spur
  

05 December 2016

                                                                     JLG (Jim Gordon) COMMENTS ON IE REPORT JULY 15, 2016
                                     
                                   COMMENTS CONFINED TO POWER FACILITIES – NOT ON TRANSMISSION WORKS

1. Powerhouse – (Page 6) Falling further behind schedule. Only 23% of concrete poured, or 80,600m3 out of 310,000m3. Concrete placement started in March 2015, hence the placement rate was 80,600m3 in 16 months, or 5,040m3 per month. At this rate, it will require another 46 months to complete concrete pouring, or sometime in April 2020. After concrete is poured, it will require about 18 months to complete installation of the equipment, hence first power should be available by end 2021.

2. Formwork failure – This occurred on May 29th, this year. The reasons still have not been ascertained – a task which should have been completed in about one month. Consequently, the area is still restricted, and no attempt has been made to remove the spilled concrete. The spilled concrete will have attained its full strength, resulting in considerable difficulty in removal, causing further delays.

3. Spillway – completed and operating.

4. Upstream cofferdam – The Independent Engineer forecast the cofferdam leakage, pointing out that the sealing surface between the two starter groins had not been fully cleaned and cracks grouted. A section through the cofferdam follows –

The starter groins are simply rock dumped into the flowing water, and hence are pervious, with considerable seepage. This seepage should have been stopped to allow cleanup of the sealing surface between the two groins. Only a partial cleaning was accomplished, with no grouting of the cracks and faults in the rock.
The impervious material for the central silt-clay was then dumped onto the sealing surface with water flowing over in some areas. The water washed out the smaller clay particles, leaving a pervious sand layer. Hence, seepage could be expected, and thus the recommendation to install a cut-off wall. However, there was no time to undertake such work, it would have required at least another 3 months to accomplish.
The current attempts at sealing the foundation by grouting, will be time-consuming, since the contractor is working blindly, with no idea of where the leaks are. They will just continue grouting until the leakage stops, and this will take time.
Moreover, the pressure on the cofferdam is low, with the low water level, and will about double when the water level is raised to El. 25m. Further leakage could easily develop with the higher pressure.

5. North Spur – The engineered dam formed from the North spur is now suspect, due to the discovery of quick clay when excavating for the downstream face. Quote –
A unique occurrence of “very sensitive” or “quick clay” occurred at an area of the downstream slope during excavations in late 2015. Nalcor reported in November 2015 quick clay at excavations in a localized area. This material liquefied when being placed in the dumps of the trucks and flowed back out of the trucks as they proceeded upgrade. Nalcor/SNC geotechnical staff informed the IE in January, 2016 that material is local and, so far, is limited to two pockets of material. They reported that only single layers have been identified and the strata is not continuous along the downstream area. It was stated that layers were identified at elevations varying between 27 m and 25 to 22 m in the area of station 0+350 and at elevations varying between 33 m and 30 to 28 m in the area of station 0+410. According to site staff, high sensitive clays had been expected and included in slope designs but the amount encountered to date is far less than expected.

There is no evidence provided to support the statement that the “material is local and, so far, is limited to two pockets of material” This would require drilling around the area to determine the extent of the pocket.
Another surprise was – quote –

An anomalous feature in the upstream slope, located above el 27.0 m near the transition between the Upstream and Downstream cutoff walls. This feature had anomalously inclined bedding and could be a result of relict slope movements or melting of an embedded glacial block (described in the November 2015 IE site visit report).

In other words, it could be the relic of a landslide. This needs further investigation.
The quality control on the site is deficient. A large-scale surficial map should be maintained in the site office and updated daily.

There appears to be insufficient testing of materials – quote - A number of soil samples have been taken and sent to the laboratory for soil mechanics classification testing. With the site covering an area of about 1,000m by 500-700m, many more samples should have been taken.
Also – quote - The locations of liquefiable material are generally known but they have not been surveyed or plotted on a suitable map.
The temporary upstream slope excavated at 1:2.5 had many “slips” in the face as indicated on the site photo taken on July 29th, 2015., following –

The red arrows show slides or “slips” in the surface. The slide debris can be seen encroaching on the foundation for the clay barrier – the light brown roadway. There could be two explanations for the slips – either caused by water seeping from the slope, or due to an overly steep slope with a factor of safety of around unity. The latter is likely the more plausible explanation. If this is the case, then the friction angles (which indicate strength of the material) used in the FLAC analysis are too high. With a factor of safety of unity, the FLAC analysis could now be used in a back-analysis to determine the friction angle required to obtain a slope safety factor of unity. This new friction angle should then be used to determine the slope required to produce a safety factor of 1.3 as recommended by the CDA.

Another issue is shown in Photo E4 (below) of the upstream slope on the North Spur. This is described as “an old gully scar”. Gully scars are V-shaped and linear. The scar in the photo is U-shaped and round, indicating an old landslide. How this could have been misinterpreted is inconceivable.

Based on the foregoing, it is now essential to convene a Review Board to determine the safety of the North spur – there are just too many inconsistencies in the data obtained during construction.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

• Plasticity Index/Stability Factor Relationship ----- See below info-graphic and note my (Maurice Adams') 03 December posting of Independent Engineer photos showing plastic lower clay layer)
  

04 December 2016

• A common hydroelectric future for Quebec and N.L.? (Quebec needs a stranglehold on Labrador's river/hydro resources and Trudeau needs increased hydro development to meet its carbon reduction targets --- and NL is in the weakest bargaining position it has ever been --- Dwight will give away the shop to save his political hide ___ M. Adams)
  

03 December 2016

• Independent Engineer's Quality Assurance Report  dated November 2, 2016 (cofferdam problems and NS downstream quick clay identified)

Here are just a few photos from the above report showing the lower clay layer ---- these photos are from where the layer was exposed at the upstream side of the North Spur. This same layer is at the base of the North Spur and exposed to the river bed about 60 metres deep immediately downstream of the Spur

CLICK PHOTO TO ENLARGE

And the photos below are of the downstream slope showing quick clay

02 December 2016

• Muskrat Falls cofferdam fix could take weeks: Nalcor

28 November 2016

The 2 slides below are my comments that address, in part, Mr. Gordon's Nov. 26 "Comments" on my earlier critique of his North Spur safety analysis. Go to North Spur page to see Mr. Gordon's "Comments".

Furthermore, if you look closely at the slope (vertical distance) from elevation minus 20 metres to elevation minus 40 metres over an horizontal distance of 25 metres (ratio 1:1.25), that is an 80% grade). M.E. Adams

Anyone and everyone interested in the future of our children and grandchildren, and our province, should read the two articles below:

• OVER A BARREL: The Start Of A New Resource Giveaway?
• The graveyard of ambition

26 November 2016

• Engineer Jim Gordon's "Comments on Maurice Adams critique of Gordon North Spur safety analysis." 

25 November 2016

• Muskrat Falls: An Appeal to Nova Scotians

24 November 2016

• Nalcor Can't Be Trusted To Negotiate With Hydro Quebec

22 November 2016

• House Recessed After Protesters Read Statement From Gallery
• Premiers of N.L. and Quebec talks about future 'collaboration' (The PC's shoved us in the water up to our necks and now the Liberals want to push us under water) --- voters should revolt about the very prospect ---- when come 2041 we (not Quebec) will be in the driver's seat.
• Should we be negotiating with Quebec?
• Cofferdam seepage call emergency plan for Muskrat Falls into question

19 November 2016

• Protesters Back At Muskrat Falls

Engineer's flip-flop on stability of North Spur on shaky ground (Factor 4 --- LIQUIDITY) (See/read more...)

18 November 2018

• Muskrat Falls cofferdam leak could be worse than Nalcor is admitting
  

• A "must hear" conversation between Pete Soucey and David Vardy on Muskrat Falls   Click on November 17th edition

• Muskrat Falls reservoir water level reduced due to cofferdam problem

• Emergency Measures Taken At Muskrat To "Slow The Flow"

17 November 2016

• Muskrat Falls: The Public Right to Decide (Part I)

Engineer's flip-flop on stability of North Spur on shaky ground (Factor 3 --- STABILITY)
Stability number for downstream 1978 landslide about twice what is needed for multiple failure surfaces/successive landslides. SEE INFO-GRAPHIC


16 November 2016
Engineer's flip-flop on stability of North Spur on shaky ground (Factor 2 --- SLOPE)
The steep hole on the downstream side of the North Spur has a grade that is about 9 times as steep as where multiple/successive retrogressive failures occur in Norway. SEE INFO-GRAPHIC


15 November 2016

• Quebec Considering Reopening Churchill Falls Agreement (Of course they are. The Agreement expires in 20+ years and we have our back to the wall -- in the weakest bargaining position possible.  Now we know the price we paid for Trudeau's agreement to co-sign this province going another $2.9 Billion in debt). ----------- Shut the door on it --- NOW. (but of course, that won.t happen, because that was likely a condition of Ball getting the $2.9 billion guarantee)

         UNBELIEVABLE Read more...

• Stop the spiral toward doomsday

13 November 2016
Engineer's  flip-flop on stability of North Spur on shaky ground
        
Summary comments on retired engineer Jim Gordon's revised position that "the North Spur dam is safe":

•          Mr. Gordon disagrees with Dr. Bernander's statement that "...layers with high sensitivity...occur in the Lower Clay formation". Instead, Mr. Gordon states that "the clay is characterised as “stiff to very stiff"... (and that) NALCOR data from tests on soil samples retrieved from the lower clay layer do not indicate the presence of soft clays"

        

•           FACT:-  Nalcor's 2016 North Spur Stabilization Works Design Report actually states that the sensitivity values for the lower clay layer indicate "that the class of sensitivity of the clay can be classified as low to extra sensitive" (emphasis added)”. Furthermore, the University of British Columbia [Hungr, Non-textbook Flowslides in Fine-grained Colluvium], states that "Liquefaction requires a special type of material: Loose, 'collapsive' sand or silt or Extra-sensitive ("quick" clay)"].

•           Also, Nalcor's 2016 document goes on to say that the lower clay Liquid Index ranges from 0.1 to 2.0 over 123 tests, which means mathematically, that up to 43% of the Liquid Index tests may show the lower clay layer to be above the safe Liquid Index cut off of 1.2.

•           Notwithstanding this fact, Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study relies on the lower clay layer's AVERAGE liquid index of 0.6 to conclude that "no flowslide or retrogression landslide may develop ... (and that accordingly)... The landslide would... be limited to a single rotational slide of limited depth"

•           While the facts show that Nalcor classifies the sensitivity of the lower clay layer as "low to extra sensitive", the UBC (Hungr) presentation defines "Extra sensitive" (clay) as "quick" clay", and up to 43% of the Liquid Index tests may be above the 1.2 level required to allow a large, retrogressive, multiple failure/landslides to occur, somehow Mr. Gordon now agrees with Nalcor and now takes a revised position that does not seem to be supported by the facts.

       
         Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study states that "Flowslides in sensitive clays result from a succession of slides ... (emphasis added), and "To get a  flowslide in sensitive clays...:"there must be an initial failure"............. (click "Engineer's flip-flop..." ABOVE for info-graphic) 

11 November 2016

• Canada's Big Dams Produce Clean Energy, and High Levels of Mercury
• Who Really Benefits From Muskrat Falls?
• Muskrat Falls at any cost?

09 November 2016

• Hydroelectric dams spike methylmercury risk for indigenous people: Harvard study

08 November 2016

• Muskrat resistance enters new phase...
• Transformers destined for Muskrat Falls delayed...

07 November 2016

• Stan Marshall Deserves a Good Tongue-lashing

06 November 2016

• Ball confirms Muskrat Falls flooding has begun

04 November 2016

• Muskrat Falls' Contribution to the Reliability of the Island Interconnected System

02 November 2016    

(for the record, I believe Mr. Gordon's conclusion that the North Spur is safe is not supported by the evidence and I hope to address this further, Maurice Adams).

• Retired Engineer Reverses His Opinion On Stability Of North Spur

Below is retired engineer Jim Gordon's article explaining his rationale for changing his mind and concluding now that the North Spur is safe.                                                     
                                                            Is the North Spur dam safe?

I have written several articles about my concerns regarding the safety of the North Spur dam, concluding in my last article that the dam was not safe. However, on undertaking a more detailed analysis of the NALCOR reports, I have changed my mind, and now believe the dam to be safe.
In this analysis, I am referring to several reports as follows –

1. NALCOR “Engineering Report, North Spur Stabilization Works, Progressive Failure Study [2b], dated 21 December 2015”. Referenced as the NALCOR 2015 report.
2. NALCOR “North Spur Stabilization Works – Design Report dated 30th Jan. 2016”. Referenced as the NALCOR 2016 report.
3. Bernander “Lower Churchill River Riverbank Stability Report” dated Nov. 26, 2015, Referenced as the Bernander 2015 report
4. Bernander “COMMENTS ON THE ENGINEERING REPORT BY NALCOR/SNC-LAVALIN OF 21 DECEMBER 2015” dated 20 September 2016. Referenced as the Bernander 2016 report
5. AMEC “Geotechnical investigation: Edwards Island landslide, Churchill River”, dated August 2011. Referenced as the AMEC 2011 report.

My initial concerns centered on the report by Dr. Bernander identifying many progressive landslides in the river valley near the North Spur. What is a  progressive landslide – it is a landslide which can occur in soft (quick) clays where the land mass slides downhill on failure of a weak zone below the surface, as shown in Figure 1, sections (b) and (c).

As defined by Dr. A. Locat “the concept of progressive failure may explain translational progressive landslides and spreads — large landslides occurring in sensitive clays. During progressive failure, the strain-softening behaviour of the soil causes unstable forces to propagate a failure surface further in the slope. Translational progressive landslides generally take place in long, gently inclined slopes. Instability in a steeper upslope area is followed by redistribution of stress, which increases earth pressure further downslope.” Source – Abstract to paper referenced in Figure 1.

Dr. Bernander is an expert on progressive landslides, having worked on assessing the safety of the land mass in slide-prone areas of Sweden. He has found that the normal methodology used to assess dam safety cannot be used on areas prone to progressive landslides, as recently confirmed by Dr. Locat, and instead has developed his own methodology.

Dr. Bernander has concluded that the landslides on the Churchill River banks are all due to progressive failures, and recommends “a careful study related to progressive failure is an unavoidably necessary measure.” Source Bernander 2015 report page 1.

On the other hand, NALCOR reports all indicate that the landslides are due to flow slides. “Three landslides on the downstream side (including the slide that occurred in 1978) are all of retrogressive behaviour similar to flowslides”. Source NALCOR 2016 report, page 137. Therefore, the normal methodologies for calculating the dam safety factor can be used. This contention is supported by Photo A5 in the AMEC 2011 report. In the photo, the transverse humps, each representing a flow slide are clearly evident. Also, the flow debris level is well below land surface level, with a scarp remaining as shown in Photos A4 and A8, again indicating a flowslide.

                                                                                                    Figure 1.
                                (a) Flowslide                  (b) Downhill progressive landslide.                (c) Uphill progressive landslide.
Source Dr. Ariane Locat, Serge Leroueil, Stig Bernander, Denis Demers, Hans Petter Jostad, Lyes Ouehb . “Progressive failures in Eastern Canadian and Scandinavian sensitive clays” Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 2011. 48 (11).
 
Dr. Bernander, after inspecting the river banks and the North Spur shoreline, concluded “For the most recent large slide in the North Spur, in 1978, Nalcor’s own engineers found that the silty clay layer had developed multiple failure surfaces and liquefied over a long lateral distance”. Sources Bernander 2015 report, pages 7. No such statement could be found in the NALCOR 2015 report, on liquefaction in the 1978 landslide. In fact, the landslide is identified as being of the flow type – see Figure 1 (a) – “The slide involved a block movement triggered by weak layers within the stratified drift, followed by retrogressive flow slides” Source NALCOR 2016 report, page 137, and NALCOR 2015 report, page 31.
 
However, there is mention of liquefaction in the AMEC 2011 report in the Edwards Island landslide failure slip surface “With respect to the recent earth slide – earth flow, blocks of failed material were observed throughout the area of accumulation. … They are produced when the relatively dry upper sediments separate as a result of liquefaction in the flowing material along the slip surface” Source - Page 2
The reference to liquefaction in the Edwards Island landslide is within the slip surface, a common occurrence in soft clay landslides. It is not a general liquefaction of the land mass as occurred at Rissa in Norway. (Google Rissa landslide Norway to view documentary on the slide).

                                                                                                            Figure 2.
Section through the North Spur – vertical scale exaggerated for clarity. Shows the layers of sands and clays within the Spur. Source – North Spur Updated, Independent Engineer, 21.7.14.

                                                                                                      Figure 3.
                                                           Section through the North Spur – with no vertical scale exaggeration.



The foregoing analysis indicates that Dr. Bernander’s interpretation of the landslide type does not agree with the NALCOR assessment, as expected. However, it must be pointed out that four geotechnical engineers and two geotechnical engineers with Ph.D.’s have reviewed the NALCOR work, and all agree that the landslides are due to flowslides.

The remaining sections of the Bernander 2015 report is devoted to a theoretical analysis of slope stability using the Bernander methodology. However, he did not have enough geotechnical data on the North Spur soils to undertake an analysis of the re-shaped dam’s stability.

As mentioned, since the landslides are of the flowslide type, the normal methodologies can be used to determine dam safety factors. This has been completed in detail in the NALCOR 2016 report, with the re-shaped dam safety factors being within the Canadian Dam Safety guidelines.

Is there quick clay within the North Spur? According to Carlton University the sensitivity of soft clay must exceed 30 to be considered “quick” (Google Carlton University quick clay – a geotechnical lecture appears – third slide - quote – “quick clays are defined by their behaviour. At their natural water content, these sediments have –sensitivity >30 and remoulded shear strength <0.5kPa. When disturbed, quick clays behave as a liquid. This allows very large, retrogressive flow slides to occur on landscapes that are essentially level.”

A few tests on soil samples retrieved from the two “Upper Silty Clay Drifts” – see Figure 2 have indicated the presence of soft clays. The sensitivity ranged from 1 to 36 in 43 samples, with an average of 10. Source NALCOR 2016 report. Page 91. This is not soft enough to be considered “quick”, according to Carlton U. Moreover, during the excavation work required to re-shape the North Spur, there were no instances of liquefaction nor small landslides. All clay removed by shovels and dumped into trucks remained in clumps. This indicates that the pockets of quick clay (if any) were far too small to cause landslides.

Nor were problems encountered during excavation of the two cut-off walls. If quick clay had been present, it would have liquefied on being disturbed by the excavation work, and would then flow into the trench, preventing further work.

Dr. Bernander also reviewed the data available on the lower clay layer (See figure 2). This layer provides the foundation for all the soils above water level in the North Spur. Again, Dr, Bernander concludes “… that layers with high sensitivity also occur in the Lower Clay formation — a fact that allows the possibility of developing a progressive failure”. Source Bernander 2016 report, page 8.

On the other hand, NALCOR data from tests on soil samples retrieved from the lower clay layer do not indicate the presence of soft clays. Instead, the clay is characterised as “stiff to very stiff”. All tests on this deposit indicate sensitivities well below 30, hence no quick clay. Quote - “sensitivity values obtained for this unit vary between 2 and 11, with an average of 4”. Source – NALCOR 2016 report, page 98.

NALCOR has incorporated the usual slope stabilization techniques into the re-shaped North Spur. They were based on analysing the existing slopes to obtain a benchmark for the LEM calculations, as follows - 

• Calculations are based on slope geometry, soil properties, groundwater properties.
• Calculations are calibrated locally with an existing slope.
• Rotational, flowslide, spread stability is calculated with a first movement at the toe.
• There is no evidence of downhill progressive failure landslide along the Churchill River valley.
• Counter measure will be in place to control ‘’Human triggering.’’.

Source – North Spur Stabilization works, presentation 21 July 2014, slide 9.
 
NALCOR has used all the common measures to enhance slope stability, including flattening of the slopes, adding a toe berm, adding two cut-off walls, and improving drainage with wells and finger drains. All sound measures which will result in a stable slopes and a safe dam.
 
However, there is still the issue of toe erosion resulting in loss of rip-rap placed at the toe. The erodible material, silt and clay, extends down far below water level, but the rip-rap is placed only on the above-water soil, and perhaps for about a meter below water. It needs to be extended much further below water level to provide added protection. Also it would be prudent to place a large stockpile of suitable rip-rap somewhere on site, where it can be used by a maintenance crew, to replace lost toe rip-rap.
 
Finally, there is one unexplained issue, and that is the statement by a driller that the drill casing dropped 40ft. overnight, from 20ft. above ground to 20ft. below ground, indicating very soft material. Sonic (vibrating) drill hole locations and logs are included in the AMEC Appendix A for the FINAL – Geotechnical investigations Report, dated November 2013. A total of 4 sonic drill holes were undertaken. For drill hole NS 2-13, located on the Spur crest near the south end, there is a note that at El. 23.0m, “the core barrel dropped from 3.35m”. And again at El. 7.7m “Core barrel dropped from 4.88m”. Drilling continued down to El. -53.7m. Again for hole NS-05-13 at El. 48 - “casing and drill rods settling into clay. Free weight. Driller not vibrating.” Unfortunately, there is no statement as to when the barrel stopped dropping. Presumably, these are the incidents described by the driller.
 
In both cases, the drill head was in “Clay – some silt to silty, soft, medium to low plasticity, brown, saturated”.
 
No doubt, this analysis will not convince skeptics in Goose Bay and Happy Valley that the dam is safe. NALCOR needs to provide further assurance.
 
Jim Gordon. PEng, (Retired)

01 November 2016

• "No One Is Going To Get Their Money Back"
• Broken Politics Ruining Province, Says Vardy

31 October 2016

• Methylmercury Protests: Was Anything Gained?
  

28 October 2016

• Will Muskrat Falls Concerns Spill Over To Nova Scotia?             ( a MUST READ -- Muskrat Falls is a 'loss leader'!!!! )
• Enough of the Muskrat Falls fiasco
• Muskrat Falls questions that must be answered
• Habit of self-inflicted pain prevents stoppage of Muskrat Falls

27 October 2016

• Question --------- Has a protest intended to protect the health and way of life of the people of Labrador been turned into, first and foremost, a way to protect the Muskrat project from ice damage and then, later on, allow Nalcor to continue with full reservoir flooding?  Maurice Adams
• Muskrat Falls project 'won't proceed' if it affects human health: environment minister
• Is It Possible "To Make Muskrat Right"?
• Labrador Down

26 October 2016

• Occupiers leave Muskrat Falls camp with doubts about deal
• Scientist back Inuit in efforts to limit mercury poisoning...
• What do we make of Muskrat Falls now?
• Muskrat Falls -- clean energy?

Also,
With respect to Prime Minister Trudeau's statement in the House of Commons yesterday "that commitments we made to indigenous peoples indicate that respect, collaboration, and partnership are essential", where along the attached spectrum does the province's agreement with indigenous leaders fit?

Premier Ball described his government's October 26th agreement as working in 'partnership' with indigenous peoples.

In the key management functions shown below, is there a significant shift towards a nation-to-nation relationship? Does this agreement, with respect to the "delineation of authority and responsibility among partners", fit under the category of 'partnership' ???

• Provincial Government and Indigenous Leaders Reach Agreement
  

      --  early flooding seems a foregone conclusion
      --  the release of water from the reservoir in the spring is subject to provincial government approval
      --  additional mitigation measures, ... may include clearing trees, vegetation and/or soil from the reservoir
      --  Independent Expert Advisory Committee (IEAC) can determine and recommend mitigation options (no mandatory authority over Nalcor)
      --  no reference to the North Spur risks

25 October 2016

• The Muskrat fiasco,...

24 October 2016

• Muskrat's Increasing Costs: Stan Marshall Should Step Out Into The Light

22 October 2016

• Protesters cut lock, enter Muskrat Falls site
• Muskrat Falls resistance inspires powerful new music video
• Russell Wangersky: Zero degrees of separation
• Premier should put Muskrat Falls "on ice" pending full review

19 October 2016

• Protesters defy injunction,...
• Nalcor's consultant is reported as saying that the "...project models do not show methylmercury levels in fish on Lake Melville rising above a dangerous level. From their assessments, levels in fish will rise between 2.3 and 4.8 times the current level. However, a peer-reviewed study conducted by scientists from Memorial University, University of Manitoba and Harvard University, indicated some people around Lake Melville can expect to see an increase of methylmercury of about 1,500 per cent" http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/muskrat-falls-trees-clearing-methylmercury-1.3812358 What then does that say about the Nalcor modelling on which the North Spur's stabilization works are based?
• Subverting Muskrat Falls resistance
• Provincial Government Requires Nalcor to Increase Clearing at Muskrat Falls

17 October 2016

• NDP calls for immediate hold on flooding Muskrat reservoir

12 October 2016                                                                                                                                                                 

                                            Figure 1.

Critical North Spur data "not retained"

Nalcor's 2015 North Spur Stabilization Works - Progressive Failure Study states in part that "the undrained shear strength...at a given elevation is generally similar throughout the North Spur,...(however) some lower (undrained) shear strength were measured below the slide debris at the toe (shoreline) of the southern downstream slope".

Notwithstanding that Section C-C  (see Figure 1.) corresponds most closely to the "southern downstream slope", and

1. corresponds most closely to where lower shear strength has been measured below the debris at the toe,
2. has the steepest downstream shoreline to riverbed slope,
3. has the least resistance to a large slide due its adjacency to the downstream deep depression,
4. has been most impacted by the pre-1951 large landslide,
5. is the area adjacent to the narrowest section of the North Spur, and
6. is where a significant landslide could result in a catastrophic breach of the North Spur,

Nalcor's Progressive Failure Study said that Section C-C "was analysed but not retained because it was judged less representative than Section D-D".
                                                                             
While the engineering definition of risk is "the product of the probability of an event occurring...and an assessment of the expected harm from the event ...(consequence in lost money/deaths)." [ http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/valrisk/ch1.pdf ], Section B-B was "identified as the most critical slope of the North Spur" (emphasis added) and was thus selected as the "reference case" to which the other sections were compared.

The non-retention of the Section C-C analyses and the real (catastrophic) risk associated with a potential or actual landslide at Section C-C as compared to the real risk (probability and impact) of a what would more likely be a slide of limited magnitude and impact at Section B-B, calls for an independent and transparent analyses of Section C-C.

A decision with respect to the impoundment of the reservoir must be withheld pending the results of a Section C-C analysis.

Maurice E. Adams
Paradise, NL

---

09 October 2016

• "We...do not recognize your authority at Muskrat Falls": Land Protectors

06 October 2016

• Happy Valley-Goose Bay left out of Muskrat negotiations, Mayor

04 October 2016

• Muskrat Falls protests ramp up....
• N.L. promises to re-examine Muskrat Falls reservoir clearing....

01 October 2016

• Muskrat Falls: A deadly boondoggle....

• Reservoirs play substantial role in global warming
• Muskrat Falls protest assembles....
• Fear, anger, desperation, plans dominate Muskrat Falls rally
• What a mess
• Clear answers needed on design of North Spur
• Stop the short-sighted bargaining

30 September 2016

• Muskrat Falls: Reconciliation, or Assimilation?

29 September 2016

• PUB Phase I Report (into supply and power outages)

27 September 2016

• Coordinated approach preparing rally for early October
• Public has to be kept better informed

26 September 2016

• Muskrat Falls threatens locals' food, way of life

22 September 2016

• Poster campaign at MUN targets government over Muskrat Falls

21 September 2016

• Lawyer Bernard Coffey new top bureaucrat in N.L. government 

• Not talking but talking about something

19 September 2016

• Worst possible time for HQ deal

16 September 2016

• Minister's decision of appeal by Nunatsiavut Government

15 September 2016

• Danny Williams - Buffoonery Makes News
• "Erasing our history": Muskrat not a done deal...

• Prov gov finances headed south

12 September 2016

• "North Spur Design Unsafe" Concludes Hydro Engineer...

10 September 2016

• Premier's support for Muskrat Falls sends a message
• Muskrat money could have been better spent
• What I don't understand about Muskrat Falls

09 September 2016

• A money-back guarantee

08 September 2016

• Liberty Report Kicks Last Leg From Under Muskrat Falls Project

03 September 2016

• Too much of a good thing



01 September 2016

boon·dog·gle

noun

1. 1.
   work or activity that is wasteful or pointless but gives the appearance of having value.
   • a public project of questionable merit that typically involves political patronage and graft.

verb

1. 1.
   waste money or time on unnecessary or questionable projects.

• Time For Nalcor To Tell The Truth To The Public
• Heating up: St. John's homeowners switching to oil

29 August 2016

• The Quebec Superior Court Gives Nalcor Nothing: Water Management A Pipe Dream

26 August 2016

• Preparing to not pay preposterous power bills

20 August 2016

• No need for N.L. to import electricity

19 August 2016

• Still a risk of major outages even after Muskrat Falls,...
• PUB MEDIA RELEASE
• Phase Two Report of the Liberty Consulting Report
• Lane asks auditor general for review of Nalcor
• Make Muskrat Right protesters vow to keep up the fight

15 August 2016

• A province run on guesstimates

14 August 2016

• http://rocksolidpolitics.blogspot.ca/2016/08/nalcors-stan-marshall.....

13 August 2016

• Clear as mud

11 August 2016

• Muskrat Falls workers off the job but still getting paid

10 August 2016

• Water Rights, Muskrat Falls, and the Muskrat Falls Disaster

09 August 2016

• Nalcor loses Churchill Falls contract renewal case

08 August 2016

• We don't need another hero
• Bullshit still sells in New York

06 August 2016

• The economic fundamentals of Muskrat Falls

02 August 2016

• Elizabeth May slams Muskrat Falls, urges federal government against more loan guarantees

01 August 2016

• Hydro engineer writes "open letter" to Nalcor CEO Stan Marshall
• Way beyond our means

28 July 2016

• Muskrat Falls has become a millstone around Newfoundland's neck

27 July 2016

• Doubling electricity  rates no way to pay for Muskrat Falls: MUN economist

23 July 2016

• Consumer advocate should stop chasing rabbits

14 July 2016

• Muskrat Falls: A Heritage Project?

13 July 2016

• Nalcor offers a lesson, directors: Put the public good above all else

11 July 2016

• STOPPING THE PROJECT NOW: Weighing the Options

08 July 2016

• Brian Jones: Billions wasted on the dam thing

07 July 2016

• Keeping ratepayer assistance at the top of the agenda
• Mud Lake want road in case of 'catastrophic failure' at Muskrat Falls

04 July 2016

• In Praise Of Public Floggings

01 July 2016

• Rural Ontarians left in the dark as electricity bills skyrocket

• First as tragedy, then as farce: The Churchill River Legacy

30 June 2016
$11.4 Billion. Don't Discard Your Calculators Yet


29 June 2016

• Muskrat Falls: Yes, there is a way out

24 June 2016

• It's official: Muskrat Falls a boondoggle
• Muskrat Falls officially a boondoggle

23 June 2016

• Nalcor CEO to give update on Muskrat

• Nunatsiavut 'cannot be bought'
• Muskrat Falls: A Failed Project Before It Started (Note to readers --- This article is a bit long, but well worth the read, especially the 2nd half)
• Nalcor board was preparing for battle
• Maritime Link contractor falls behind schedule

18 June 2016

• Labrador MHA torn over Muskrat Falls mercury fears

• Nunastiavut Protest Outside Minister's Office
• Nalcor investigates "inconsistent patterns" on Muskrat Falls transmission lines
• Smooth move, or a deck-chair shuffle on the Titanic?

17 June 2016

• Perry Trimper addresses protesters in Happy Valley-Goose Bay

16 June 2016

• “We know that it (the budget) is directly related to the escalating cost of the Muskrat Falls project, which has violated the rights of Indigenous peoples in Labrador and continues to threaten our food security and way of life,” he said. “We are already paying a very high and dangerous price for Muskrat Falls and to bring even more suffering to our people as a result is deplorable.” ---- Todd Russell
• Cuts "a direct result of the costs of the Muskrat Falls project" --- Todd Russell
• Muskrat CRA Poll   (note that the Margin of Error of 4.9% means that the ACTUAL support for the project now ranges between a low of 48.9% to a high of 58.9%)

• Support for Muskrat Falls down

Muskrat's promised "full review" ??

Where is Stan Marshall's promised "full review"?

So far, instead of a comprehensive, cohesive review, we have:

--- a separate (unsubstantiated) pronouncement that cancellation of the project is "very unlikely";

--- an essential dismissal of a peer reviewed Harvard study confirming the methyl mercury poisoning of Labradorians' food supply;

--- a soon to be updated cost and completion schedule, even though it is unknown what impact the recent concrete form failure and dispute with Astaldi will have on the project;

--- still no court decision with respect to whether Nalcor controls the river waterflow;

--- as Mr. Gordon confirms, potentially inadequate Quality Control by Nalcor.

What does that then say about the quality and the design/construction of the North Spur/Kettle Lakes mitigative measures?

All of these (and many others --- lowest cost, other options, etc.) should be "fully reviewed" IN A COMPREHENSIVE, COHESIVE MANNER, and NOT trotted out in small, one-by-one, politically palatable, digestible chunks. Maurice Adams, Paradise

• Price, schedule updates on way: CEO
• Not so clean power
• Muskrat: Hydro Engineer Notes Quality Control Problems

15 June 2016
Nalcor Restructuring

  (Potentially, and seemingly, a good but insufficient move. What happened to Marshall's promise of a "full review"?)

The Telegram

• CBC
• The Telegram
• VOCM
• CBC

14 June 2016
Step One of Nalcor's/Stan Marshall's Muskrat Falls' green energy "full review" --- making the air cleaner for Newfoundlanders by swapping 20 years of Holyrood's greenhouse gas emissions for 20 plus years of methylmercury poisoning of the food for Labradorians:

• Government News Release
• VOCM News
• The Telegram

13 June 2016

• NDP leader says NDP would do a full independent review (including all options) of Muskrat Falls

         VOCM's Backtalk (at around the 25 minute mark)

11 June 2016

• Vardy Staying On Trail Of Nalcor Entitlements

09 June 2016

• Muskrat Falls entrance blocked by protesters
• Roger Grimes on CBC's Crosstalk

07 June 2016

• Don't Kill The River

06 June 2016

• Here we go again
• TIME TO TAKE CONTROL OF NALCOR

04 June 2016

• Analysis: Renewables turn utilities into dinosaurs of the energy world

01 June 2016

• Former Nalcor CEO Ed Martin release severance agreement, details exit pay
• Government Denies Approving Ed Martin's $6 Million Severance/Pension

30 May 2016

• Statement of Edmund Martin

• Nalcor confirms incident at Muskrat Falls Powerhouse
• Reported concrete collapse at Muskrat Falls project

29 May 2016

• Auditor General asked to investigate appropriateness of former Nalcor CEO's severance

• New Leaks from Insiders on Muskrat Falls

28 May 2016

• The Oracle on the Parkway

26 May 2016

• Like Ed Martin, Premier Should Spend More Time With his Family

25 May 2016

• Muskrat Falls critic wants auditor general to investigate Ed Martin severance, bonuses

• Andritz Hydro sues Nalcor firm over Muskrat Falls work

24 May 2016

• Former Board Enabled $1.4 Million Severance: Premier Ball

• Ed Martin Fired AFTER quitting

18 May 2016

• Net Metering Caught in Limbo
• NL Could Be First Province to Declare Bankruptcy

17 May 2016

• Budget 2016: Keeping up the pressure
• Six Rationalisations Pretending to Be Policy

         (excellent outline of what a real MF briefing note and MF review should contain)

16 May 2016

• Rethinking Muskrat Falls Prudent for Province: David Vardy

• Bring on the review of Muskrat Falls
• Vardy/Penney Appalled by Nalcor Briefing Note on Muskrat Falls Project

15 May 2016

• Legal arguments filed with the PUB by the Grand River Keepers re Muskrat Falls and reliability

14 May 2016

• Jerry Dean and Accountability
• Astaldi's Future Role at Muskrat Falls Being Considered

13 May 2016

• Nalcor chief says Muskrat Falls unlikely to be cancelled

• Nalcor CEO says cancelling Muskrat Falls "very unlikely"

• Marshall says Cancelling Muskrat Falls "Very Unlikely'

12 May 2016

• Brazil's plans to tighten rules on mining dams unlikely to improve safety

04 May 2016

• Maritime Link layoffs

02 May 2016

• Russell Wangersky: Shedding some light on the darkness

30 April 2016

• A Prudence Review Report of NL Hydro by the PUB

29 April 2015

• Muskrat Falls --- "...about a quarter done..."  ------- Rex Murphy
• Management failures at NL Hydro
• Brian Johns: Marshalling money for Muskrat
• Danny in "Nova Scotia" hyping up the benefits of Muskrat Falls

28 April 2016

• Will Muskrat Falls Concerns Spill Over To Nova Scotia?                 (a very worthwhile read)

26 April

• Backing out of Muskrat Falls includes heavy costs for Nalcor

• Is Stan the Man?

25 April 2016

• Feminist Group Hopes New Nalcor Board WIll Listen to Muskrat Falls Concerns

23 April 2016

• MF ... from a green dream to a bog of red ink

22 April 2016

• Interim Nalcor Board Named
• CFIB Calls for Delay of Muskrat Falls
• In appointing Stan Marshall as CEO of Nalcor, Ball has changed horses.

EXCERPT from http://www.ililani.media/2014/08/heco-makes-liquefiednatural-gas-lng.html

Fortis received a mountain of bad press when it insisted on building the $30 million seven-megawatt Chalillo Dam on the Macal River in Belize, a country on the northeastern coast of Central America.

Toronto-based Probe International and Sierra Club of Canada were joined by American and Central American groups in fighting the proposal.

The Macal River winds through large expanses of primary and secondary growth, upland forests, rain forests and jungles. The watershed is home to diverse ecosystems with great biodiversity including rare and threatened plants, fish, reptiles, mammals. Threatened species include falcons, jaguars and Belize's largest land animal, the Baird's Tapir. 

Fortis completed the Chalillo Hydroelectric Dam in 2005............................
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a senior attorney at the NRDC, wrote ..."Fortis solemnly promised that the dam would not raise electric costs while concealing secret studies proving the opposite. …

Fortis digitally removed nearby fault lines from the geological map it provided to regulators to deceive them about dire earthquake hazards at the proposed dam site. Only after the dam won approval and construction began did this become public.

Fortis knowingly lied when it claimed its dam would not harm wildlife. The project destroyed Central America's last large habitats for endangered jaguars, tapirs and scarlet macaws.

Fortis hid its study showing hazardous levels of neurotoxic mercury in the Macal River, caused by another Fortis dam, until a year after its Chalillo Dam was complete. During that period, Belizeans continued to drink river water and swim, wash, bathe and fish — all activities perilous to their health



21 April 2016

• Stan Marshall appointed CEO of Nalcor Energy

EXCERPT: New Nalcor CEO reported as saying he will launch a full review of the project.

• Former Fortis CEO named to top Nalcor job
• Engineers "Open Letter" Tells Premier Get Advice, Reset Muskrat

20 April 2016

• Ed's amnesia
• Nalcor Board to quit Friday
• Ball/Coady / Nalcor announcement (and Q and A)

• Where we're at
• Letter, Why is Nalcor exempt from budget pain?

• Actions and Words

18 April 2016

• Muskrat Falls Methylmercury Levels Higher Than Expected
• Astaldi Contract "A Recipe For Disaster "

17 April 2016

• Province's Credit Rating Downgraded Following Budget

15 April 2016

• Public Should Demand a New Budget

14 April 2016

EXCERPT from budget

---

13 April 2016

• EY Report: Ball Capitulates to Nalcor Clique
• The Rasputitsa

12 April 2016

• More Muskrat problems
• More Delays and Ballooning Cost for Muskrat Falls

• Muskrat Falls costs have gone up

1.       EY Interim Report

               EXCERPT   "As at December 2015, the proportion of contract value paid to the contractor is significantly greater than the proportion of the concrete
that has been placed......................5.9 The impacts of these risks and issues to both cost and schedule were identified by Nalcor, but not fully reflected in the September 2015 Forecast"

07 April 2016

• PUB should say "NO" to at least part of proposed rate hike

05 April 2016

• Concentrate on the transmission line

30 March 2016

• Gouging 101

23 March 2016
Readers/viewers please note corrected "CONSISTENT Island" info-graphic dated 20 March 2016 below.

20 March 2016

• Former PUB chair lays out warnings on Muskrat Falls

                                       (CLICK TO ENLARGE)
                                            (ACTUALS)

• Does this look like the island's peak demand will keep rising?
  

• What will much higher electricity rates do to future peak demand?
  

VIEWERS please note that in creating this info-graphic I had previously made an error in transposing the "Energy Use" data into graphic form. The line has now been corrected and shows the correct year to year data and consistency.

• Nalcor's (pre-sanction) Forecast Peak Demand and Energy Use both higher than 2015 actuals
• Nalcor previously reported that the island had a 'net' capacity of 1,958 MW, and since then Nalcor has added another 110 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood.
  
• Keep in mind that "peak demand" is a one-time per year occurrence  which may last for only a few hours on the coldest day in winter.
• Actual energy use in 2015 was still below the island's all-time 2004 peak (see below, left)
• At Muskrat's early $6.2 billion cost estimate, Nalcor estimated Muskrat's  combined debt servicing and operating costs at about $14.5 BILLION over 50 years (see below, right)

10 March 2016

• Not "Our" Crisis

02 March 2016

• Muskrat Falls on CBC's Crosstalk

28 February 2016

• Back to the future

27 February 2016

• Holyrood by the numbers

                                            THE ELEPHANT (dinosaur) IN THE ROOM
If a 1% increase in the HST wipes out about $100 million a year from the purchasing power of businesses/citizens, what will Muskrat Falls do (see info-graphics below)?   CLICK TO ENLARGE

26 February 2016

• MUSKRAT TAX:    MUN's Dr. Jim Feehan is proposing a Muskrat Tax (in the vicinity of 2-4 cents/KWh) to be added to island ratepayers' electricity bills. The purpose of this added tax is so that the province could borrow less in order to finance the building of Muskrat Falls (thus reducing the province's interest payments on its debt).
  

• My comment: Such a Muskrat Tax does not encourage government to make a rational/informed judgement as to whether or not the project should in whole or in part be put on hold or otherwise modified so as to eliminate or reduce at least to some acceptable extent the financial burden the project places on ratepayers, and/or taxpayers and the province.
  
• I think that government has an obligation to first conduct an analysis of the merits/costs/options related to continuing with or modifying the project and only after reaching such an informed judgement should government assess how best to finance the province's electricity needs -- Maurice Adams, Paradise
  

• Atlantic Canada missing out on natural gas opportunities

24 February 2016

Muskrat power is 2-3 times the cost of Holyrood generated power (see below) ---- and oil costs for 2016 to date are much lower than that shown below for 2015.

21 February 2016 
(Also, as I understand Nalcor's PUB Exhibit 103, their forecast at year 2005 for year 2015 was 9,513 GWh --- approaching 1,000 GWh in error)

                                                                             
15 February 2016

• Top Ten Muskrat Myths: Part I

13 February 2016

• Keep the power line, scrap the dam
• Two steps the government must take on Muskrat Falls

12 February 2016

• Landslide on Northern Peninsula

09 February 2016

• Decision-Based Evidence-Making

08 February 2016

• It's official: Muskrat Falls is a millstone

07 February 2016

• The Muskrat Liberals

06 February 2016

• No truer words...
• We must stand up to Muskrat and those forcing it on us

04 February 2016

Another option to meet our energy needs,    (first published in The Telegram, 23 June 2012)
By Maurice E. Adams

    In the House of Assembly on Thursday, May 3rd, Minister Kennedy said that the government would only sanction the proposed Muskrat Falls project if it were in the best interest of the province.
    And in an earlier letter to The Telegram, Mr. Gilbert Bennett (vice president of Nalcor) agreed that it is precisely because Newfoundland and Labrador needs a long-term vision for sustainable, renewable energy production that "Muskrat Falls is the best option to meet the province’s energy needs".
    Muskrat Falls, however, is not that vision.
 
All alone
    The Muskrat Falls project is not a comprehensive, coherent vision --- it is a single, stand-alone project.
     Muskrat Falls totally ignores the fact that Newfoundland and Labrador already has a fully paid for, sustainable, and renewable 5,200 megawatt (MW) Upper Churchill hydroelectric generation facility --- a facility that is already ours --- lock, stock and barrel, a facility that 29 years from now (by 2041) can provide this province with almost seven times as much power as Muskrat Falls. Upper Churchill power will be practically free of charge and unencumbered --- long before the proposed Muskrat Falls project can ever be paid for and owned (unencumbered) by the people of Newfoundland and Labrador.
     While the Upper Churchill generation facility is already paid for, Nalcor (through this Muskrat Falls project) wants to again put this province many more billions in debt --- and for many decades into the future.
     Muskrat Falls may appear to be least-cost, but only because Nalcor uses long-term forecast periods extending 57 years into the future, to a time (2067) that is more than 25 years past year 2041 --- the year that 5,200 MW of almost zero-cost power comes back to this province.
     Given the availability by 2041 of our paid-for 5,200 megawatts of low-cost power, any project or vision that does not address this issue is neither comprehensive nor coherent.
     Muskrat Falls will increase electricity rates, increase our debt, increase our debt servicing costs, provide partial ownership of our maritime transmission links to an out-of-province private company, seek an out-of-province loan guarantor that risks the loss of ownership of Muskrat Falls to outside interests, decrease the competitiveness of our business community (while improving the competitiveness of our neighbouring provinces).
    It will provide very little power for future export sales, do nothing to enhance the province's 2041 negotiating position with Quebec for either the Upper Churchill or Gull Island, and do nothing (post 2041) to allow for the transmission and sale of Upper Churchill or Gull Island power via Labrador-Island (and possibly Nova Scotia) maritime links.

Project will hurt province
    In essence, Muskrat Falls will weaken us fiscally, and by 2041, we will again be at the mercy of Quebec, the federal government or Emera.
     Accordingly, Muskrat Falls is not the best long-term, sustainable and coherent power option.
     Even if it were low-cost, low-cost does not equate to best value. A stand-alone project does nothing to facilitate a comprehensive, coherent vision. A coherent vision must include not only enhanced provincial economic development but also the out-of-province sale of power from the already existing Upper Churchill and future Gull Island facilities.
     With Muskrat Falls, even after 2041, our long ago paid for, high revenue generator (the Upper Churchill), and our potential revenue generator (Gull Island), will both remain stranded sources of electrical energy.
     Furthermore, Nalcor's long-term energy demand and oil cost forecasts (on which the need for Muskrat Falls is based) are not credible. Nalcor's year 2010 energy demand and oil cost forecast increases were both substantially higher than what was experienced.
     In 2010 our total island peak demand was almost 500 megawatts (MW) below the island's existing installed net capacity of 1.958 MW and in 2011 total island peak demand was a further 0.2% below our 10-year historical average of 1,547 MW.
     Accordingly, if Nalcor’s  short term forecasts are unreliable, their long-term, up to 50-year debt servicing, energy demand and oil cost forecast models (all of which are critical to the project’s viability) are not a basis on which to put this province a further $5 billion or $10 billion in debt.
     While Nalcor’s forecasts may not be sufficiently reliable, what we can rely on (what we do know) is that the Upper Churchill is already paid off and can provide both Labrador and Newfoundland with low-cost (not higher cost), long-term, stable, sustainable and potentially massive profit-generating electricity well into the future.
     What we also know is that we already have an $8-billion dollar debt, a debt that, if not paid off, will cost us billions (and possibly tens of billions) more in debt servicing charges.
     What we do know is that between now and 2041 we can pay off our existing debt and thereby save billions in debt servicing charges.
     What we also know is that by not doing an unneeded Muskrat Falls project we can save at least $5 billion more (more than enough to do a combination of island-based small hydro, wind, solar and other projects) that can meet our energy needs up to 2041.
 
Looking ahead
    Taking this more rational, step-by-step (yet comprehensive), pragmatic, coherent, integrated, fiscally responsible, 29-year vision approach --- with the goal of being fiscally strong leading up to 2041, we will also know that by then we will be in the financial position to build our own 5,200 MW line from the Upper Churchill to Newfoundland --- and beyond.
     Going this Vision 2041 route, power for both Labrador and Newfoundland will be less (not more) expensive, Emera will be beating down our doors for access, provincial revenues will be high, and we will then be in the position to build Gull Island and Muskrat Falls --- but only when we are ready --- and on our terms.
     With Vision 2041, there will be no multi-billion dollar burden of debt for our children, for our grand children or for their grand children.
     Muskrat Falls therefore is primarily a stand-alone project --- not a coherent, comprehensive vision.
     Muskrat Falls will not move Newfoundland and Labrador from being an energy warehouse to an energy powerhouse.
     While the Muskrat Falls project places Newfoundland and Labrador’s economic viability at risk, it does nothing for the Upper Churchill and nothing for Gull Island.
     Accordingly, the Muskrat Falls single-project approach contains no solutions for the Upper Churchill and Gull Island. These potentially massive revenue generators are excluded from this Muskrat Falls option (vision). There is no coherent linkage between the Upper Churchill, Gull Island and Muskrat Falls. Any possible integration of the two larger of our three revenue generators with the Muskrat Falls project is left for future generations to solve. These projects are excluded from the Muskrat Falls vision.
    The single Muskrat Falls approach offers no solutions to our post 2041 Upper Churchill and Gull Island transmission problems. Muskrat Falls, as a stand-alone project therefore, does not constitute a comprehensive, coherent long-term energy solution. It relies almost totally on massive revenues from Newfoundland and Labrador ratepayers and is uneconomic as an out-of-province revenue generator.
     What Muskrat Falls will do, however, is ensure that out-of-province forces will continue to have a stranglehold on the Upper Churchill (and Gull Island) power and that future benefits will not accrue to the people of Labrador and Newfoundland --- but to Quebec, to our Muskrat Falls loan guarantor, or to Emera.
     Then later, when it is much too late, we will all be asking --- "Whatever happened to ‘no more giveaways’? Whatever happened to --- 'have not will be no more’"?
_____________________________
Maurice E. Adams writes from Paradise. View his Muskrat Falls website at www.vision2041.com


03 February 2016

• Hydro Engineer Refuses Briefing: Wants Nalcor to Conduct Independent Review
• Former Premier Wondering if Province Should Pull the Plug on Muskrat Falls

• From a decade of prosperity to $2 billion deficits: What happened? By Roger Grimes

Excerpt:

"Premier Ball is having Muskrat Falls reviewed as we speak and all of us can only hope that maybe its not too late to make some changes.

If, as the Premier and finance minister Cathy Bennett state, “everything is on the table” in dealing with our financial crisis, then whether or not we continue to provide equity to Nalcor at $700 million per year should be high on the list. Not only that, but opportunities to cancel or significantly alter the project must also be examined. "

10 January 2016

• It's not just the North Spur we have to worry about

18 January 2016

• Expert Compares North Spur with Site of Major Norwegian Landslide

14 January 2016

• Continuation of Muskrat Falls abusive and neglectful

02 January 2016

• Muskrat Falls and the North Spur controversy

       


                                                                                                          2015

24 December 2015

• The Liberals And The Odour of Amateur

22 December 2015

• NOTES on Des Sullivan's Morning Show interview with Anthony Germaine
• Blind in one EY

21 December 2015

• VOCM update on NL government's MF review

• NL Government request for Ernst and Young to do partial review of Muskrat (NOTE, same firm that does work for government's existing Oversight Committee, will report to them and will exclude the North SPur and the methylmercury issues).

• N.L.     government to make announcement on Muskrat Falls review

17 December 2015

• Muskrat Falls becoming an over-budget burden on Newfoundland

• "NORTH SPUR IN A NUTSHELL" A Call To Action By Canadian Hydro Engineer

16 December 2015

• Mandate Letter to new Minister of Natural Resources (I don't see any review of MF)

05 December 2015

• The white elephant can't be ignored

03 December 2015

• Ontario Liberals' power regime a fiasco

27 November 2015

• Muskrat Falls contractor failing

31 October 2015

• Study: U.S. power market may be harder to crack than expected
• Review of Newfoundland and Labrador Electricity System

NOTE:--- Page 265 of the above-noted report states:--- "At this time (when Muskrat Falls comes on stream) about 98% of the province’s electricity will be from renewable energy resources whose costs are largely fixed, with costs to customers generally declining over time as the facilities’ capital costs are paid for." (emphasis added).

Now, note this excerpt from a Nalcor Energy email dated Dec. 2012 :-----

"1) For 2018 (the first full year of operation) the Muskrat Falls PPA payment is $167,637,000 and the Labrador-Island Link payment is $250,868,000.  Muskrat Falls energy at Soldiers Pond is 2,075 GWH.......(and)..... 2) For DG3, the 2067 Muskrat Falls PPA payment is $987,899,000 and the Labrador-Island Link payment is $88,368,000. Muskrat Falls energy at Soldiers Pond is 4,635 GWh....".

So, is it true that "costs to customers generally declin(e)"?

While Nalcor forecasts that by year 50, the province will use twice as much energy from Muskrat Falls as in year 1, the power purchase agreement (based on early project cost estimates only)  requires customers to pay six (6) times as much in year 50 for Muskrat power as in year 1.  How then can government consultants say that "costs to consumers generally declin(e) over time" ?????

Clearly, costs to consumers will go up considerably (and the above numbers DO NOT take account of project cost overruns of ~ 50% !!!!!!!!!!!!

I would encourage readers to again review the Holyrood page (you will note, from the above Nalcor email that the rates derived from the estimated PPA costs are dependent on the province using from 2, 075 GWh of energy from Muskrat in year 2018 and up to 4,635 GWh in 2067. However, you will also see, from the Holyrood page, that Holyrood (in 2012) provided only about 850 GWh of energy (and trending downward) ---- a far cry from the more than the 2,000 GWh in 2018 that the PPA costs refer to. If our needs are half, then it would seem that the Muskrat Falls rates to meet the PPA payments could be double, and double again if costs keep going up).



27 October 2015

• Liberty Consulting Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro March 4, 2015 Voltage Collapse

24 October 2015

• We will pay dearly for Muskrat Falls

08 October 2015

• Ed Martin -- The Jig Is Up

07 October 2015

• Alternatives to the Falls

05 October 2015

• Lowballing Muskrat Falls
• Deja' vu all over again

• Muskrat schedule in jeopardy says hydro expert

• Consumer electricity costs to increase 59% due to Muskrat Falls

03 October 2015

• Meaningless Muskrat milestones
• Muskrat Falls is no longer the "least cost option"

02 October 2015

• Muskrat Falls: the price of not paying attention

18 September 2015

• Next to impossible to get people out

07 September 2015

• Will only the innocent be punished?
  
  

10 August 2015

• Serious Flaws in Crummell's Letter  on North Spur

13 July 2015

• David Vardy in conversation with Pete Soucy on VOCM's Backtalk

11 July 2015

• Muskrat Falls: asset or liability?

08 July 2015

• Skyrocketing electricity rates may force one in five Ontario businesses to close

EXCERPT:
"Soaring electricity rates in Ontario are threatening industries and businesses across the province, with one in 20 reporting they expect to shut down in the next five years, according to a major study by the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC).....................Businesses can’t grow, make improvements or investments or even hire new workers because of the increasing rates, energy demand in the province dropped 8 per cent between 2003 and 2014 – but generation capacity has increased by 13 per cent. This means that Ontario has a huge surplus and so it gives away electricity. These costs of producing electricity and then basically exporting it for free are passed on to customers." ---------- Sound familiar?

• Liberty's Prudence Review Report

04 June 2015

• Derrick Dalley;s Oratorical Manure

23 May 2015

• The Photos Nalcor Don't Want You To See

18 May 2015
If you have never read anything else on Muskrat Falls, READ THIS

11 May 2015

• It's the spending stupid

• Just keeping track

• Nalcor exposed

08 May 2015

• Our squandered pride and prosperity

06 May 2015

• Avoiding court

04 May 2015

• A Cancelling We Must Go

• Fearful Symmetry

01 May 2015

• Demand the fall of government

28 April 2015

• Stop work Order Issued to Muskrat Falls Subcontractor

24 April 2015

• Letter from NL Power to the PUB requesting the PUB to order NL Hydro to provide information regarding reliability

15 April 2015

• Written Submission by Winston Adams (former NL Hydro electrical engineer) to the PUB's Phase I Review

10 April 2015

• My Written Submission to the PUB's Phase I Review

23 March 2015

• IN NALCOR WE TRUST

13 March 2015

• Contingency budget tapped for Muskrat Falls

26 February 2015

• Nova Scotia won't get Muskrat Falls electricity

19 February 2015

• RCMP charges SNC-Lavalin with bribery, fraud

13 February 2015

• You have to change your Ode To Newfoundland:  Mis'el Joe    (I would suggest a -- Vision for All Time)

12 February 2015

• Portrait of a money pit

10 February 2015

• Power sharing

09 February 2015

• Giving Nalcor The Ax (Part III)

06 February 2015

•  Letter from Vardy and Penney to the PUB re North Spur risks.

03 February 2015

• Manitoba Hydro Horror Show   EXCERPT :---   "It's TIME TO PANIC! Manitoba Hydro didn't ask for a rate increase last month--- they begged, they pleaded, and ... they threatened dire consequences if they didn't get their way"
   

• The Fork in the Road  EXCERPT:----- "...we will need $4.8 billion for Muskrat Falls and $4.5 billion to cover current account deficits from 2015 to 2018. That means $9.3 Billion in additional provincial loans from 2015 to 2018, if we are to continue with Muskrat Falls without implementing massive public service layoffs /cutbacks. This comes to an additional $3.1 Billion per year. Even a Canadian Province can only borrow so much money and $9.3 Billion is simply an extremely large amount of money for 500,000 people.
  
  This is not a next year problem – serious steps must be taken in this year’s budget."
  
  

---

31 January 2015

• NewsAlert 

                "Inadequate design blamed for failure of B.C tailings dam" ------ Excerpt :-- "...evidence indicates there was a glacial lake deposit under the foundation of the dam".

28 January 2015

• Consumers could pay less for power in March   

27 January 2015

• All options are on the table

26 January 2015

• Why We Should Dismantle Nalcor (Part I)

24 January 2015
Heat Pump Results (after 1 full year).

Note that the winter months with an average daily use of 75 KWh or more has been reduced from 5 to 2 (and November was reduced by 40%)

13 January 2015

• BC Hydro - a Crown corporation - has borrowed more than $3B to pay dividends to B.C.'s government

12 January 2015

• We're never going to see $100' a barrel oil again, Saudi Prince says

09 January 2015

• Tough times call for tough decisions

05 January 2015

• Big Hydro's big days are behind it
  

2014

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22 December 2014

• The 'Advisors', 'Boosters', and 'Shills'  (a great gift of truth from Des Sullivan) --- An EXCERPT -- "Business and unionism in NL is all about dividing the spoils. The unions now want government to spend its way out of overspending"

12 December 2014

• Muskrat Falls Costs as of November 2014
  

         ($8,300 Million)

11 December 2014

• Alderon's Iron Kami project "simply won't work" at current prices, says Dundee Capital

• Muskrat straightjacket getting tighter

08 December 2014

• Nalcor: The "Bullshit' Still Thrives

07 December 2014

• Almost $2 billion later, Muskrat Falls still not the answer

04 December 2014

• Court tosses out injunction sought by Nalcor

• NunatuKavut celebrating after Muskrat Falls injunction thrown out

26 November 2014

                                                                                              HEAT PUMP RESULTS

                              (1st 10 months after installation, with the Dec 2014 and Jan 2015 months extrapolated until actual hydro bills received)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For 1 billion dollars Nalcor could have installed a heat pump in almost every residence.

While the $8.3 billion Muskrat Falls project MUST HAVE an almost 1% annual increase in island energy use (mostly from residential heating), along with ANNUAL 2% rate increases for Nalcor to claim that Muskrat is the 'least-cost' option, these heat pumps could actually DECREASE energy use (and rates could actually go down, NOT UP).

Who will be taken to task for this "10 times the cost", fabricated yoke that Nalcor is placing around the necks of ratepayers (especially our children and grand children)? And what will a new Liberal government do about it?

It should also be noted that:

1. I am currently using only half of the 24,000 BTU capacity of the outdoor heat pump unit  (full capacity may be used for a later renovation)
   
2. there have been no insulation upgrades in my 33-year old residence since it was built in 1981
3. temperatures have been consistently kept at between 22 and 23 degrees throughout the 10 month period (dropped briefly to 21C during record -19C temps in Feb 2014)
4. also, the Feb. and Mar. 2014 numbers (when using the heat pump) are during a time when we had record low winter temperatures (so weather adjusted, the benefits of using the heat pump would likely be significantly better) than those indicated above.
   

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21 November 2014

• Province Not Investing, It's Taking Risks, Says Crosbie, Barry

18 November 2014

• The Bloombox   (energy in a box)
  

17 November 2014

• The surprise (almost) everyone saw coming 

13 November 2014

• Hydro says timeline for combustion turbine 'under pressure'

11 November 2014

• Iron Ore Seen by Citigroup Below $60 as 2015 Forecast Cut   (EXCERPT:--- "Iron ore prices will plummet to less than $60 a metric ton next year as global supply increases and demand remains weak"

10 November 2014

• Williams says Labrador transmission line 'a no-brainer'

• Hydro asks for electricity price increase

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08 November 2014

• B.C landowners group launches a second legal challenge of Site C dam approval 

06 November 2014

• Not too late to stop Muskrat Falls (be sure to read the comments at the bottom of this letter as well)

03 November 2014

• Premier Davis: Tear Down That Wall       

02 November 2014

• Map of the day ......

01 November 2014

• Banking on oil prices a risk

• Fusion power: goodbye fossil fuels?

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31 October 2014

• PUB Revised Schedule 

28 October 2014

• "Independent" (?) Engineer's October Report

EXCERPT -- The IE considers that the various geotechnical concerns for the North Spur have generally been satisfied by the studies described above. These studies confirm that the designed remediation and stabilization works are adequate and that there is no significant hazard from stability problem-related seepage, strength loses in sensitive soils and/or earthquake shaking during construction or operation of the project. The IE also agrees with the plan that further geotechnical observations will be made as the remedial works progress and as new geotechnical monitoring is performed. These observations will be calibrated against the expectations of the various analysis reports. Designs will be amended if any significant surprises or discrepancies are encountered"  (emphasis added).

My comment ---- Have these studies addressed actual or potential increased risks caused by the North Spur remedial measures (i.e. increased risk of a breach of the reservoir upstream north bank leading to the Kettle Lakes area, and what will any such 'amended designs' COST?


27 October 2014

• SaskPower CEO resigns after Smart Meter report

26 October 2014

• BRIGHTON: Big industries leery of the (Maritime) Link's rationale      EXCERPT:--- " Ten of the province’s (Nova Scotia's) leading industrial companies claim the economic justification for the Maritime Link has been “called into question” by a new planning document from Nova Scotia Power Inc...............energy efficiency programs could push electricity demand below levels that would warrant drawing an “optimal” amount of market-priced power under the Maritime Link agreement."

24 October 2014

• Schedule scrapped for power review   (I would highly recommend readers read both Nichol's and Maggy Carter's comments posted at the bottom of this article).
  

22 October 2014

• Will interconnection improve reliability?

• PUB Order addressing NLH's motion to quash many of Danny Dumaresque's and Grand RiverKeepers' Requests For Information
  

20 October 2014


                                                For additional North Spur and Kettle Lakes info scroll down to 13 September 2104 and link to North Spur page.


18 October 2014

• Canada's still waiting on that $225 oil         EXCERPT:-- "The certainty of uncertainty is a rule that never seems to guide those who assume that the future, even the near future, will be much like the past. So now, with oil prices tumbling and natural gas prices falling, yesterday’s assumptions are once more called into question................A whole lot of people, and some governments in Canada, bet heavily on fossil fuel prices continuing an inexorable march – if not to $225 a barrel, then at least to some higher plane. That assumption has crashed, and with it go many certainties of not so long ago."

16 October 2014

• International expert on key Muskrat Falls feature to deliver public talk

15 October 2014

• Given that the price of oil is now down to $85 per barrel, readers may find my 2011 Telegram article "The danger of long term forecasts" worth reviewing.

14 October 2014

• IEA sees 2015 oil demand growth much lower, supply hitting prices                  EXCERPT:--  "Total U.S. liquids production continues to exceed Russian and Saudi Arabian oil supplies"

• Who's in your wallet?

12 October 2014

• Happy Thanksgiving   from a London food market ---- (I thought for a moment it might be Frank Coleman celebrating and saying thanks to Nick McGrath for Humber Valley's recent gift from the NL government/taxpayer).

08 October 2014

• Too big to prosecute?  (video)

• SNC-Lavelin says bribery charges could force closing
  

• PUB divides Hearing and Review into Two Phases (link here)

03 October 2014

• Cabana wins legal victory

02 October 2014

• Churchill Falls Transmission Line Suspended (line to Alderon's virtual Kami mine project)
  

01 October 2014

• Why the U.S. Power Grid's Days Are Numbered   EXCERPT :--- "...a confluence of green energy and computer technology, deregulation, cheap natural gas, and political pressure ... poses .....a mortal threat to the existing utility system...... Regulators set rates; utilities get guaranteed returns; investors get sure-thing dividends. It’s a model that hasn’t changed much since Thomas Edison invented the light bulb. And it’s doomed to obsolescence."
  

30 September 2014
Solar power is growing so fast that older energy companies are trying to stop it   (Excerpt -- "As solar technology gets dramatically cheaper, tens of thousands of Americans are putting photovoltaic panels up on their roofs, generating their own power. At the same time, 43 states and Washington DC have net metering laws that allow solar-powered households to sell their electricity back to the grid at retail prices.

That's a genuine problem for utilities. All these solar households are now buying less and less electricity, but utilities still have to manage the cost of connecting them to the grid. Indeed, a new study from Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory argues that, without policy changes, this trend could soon put utilities in dire financial straits. If rooftop solar were to grab 10 percent of the market over the next decade, utility earnings could decline as much as 41 percent....

To electric utilities, this poses a dilemma. As rooftop solar becomes more popular, people will buy less and less electricity from their local power company. But utilities still have plenty of fixed costs for things like maintaining the grid. So, in response, those utilities will eventually have to raise rates on everyone else. Trouble is, those higher electricity rates could spur even more people to install their own solar rooftop panels to save money. Cue the death spiral."


29 September 2014

• Smart meters dumbed down by Muskrat agreement     Also, this EXCERPT from Wikipedia ----"In Connecticut,...regulators declined a request by the state's largest utility, Connecticut Light & Power, to install 1.2 million of the devices, arguing that the potential savings in electric bills do not justify the cost. CL&P already offers its customers time-based rates. The state's Attorney General George Jepsen was quoted as saying the proposal would cause customers to spend upwards of $500 million on meters and get few benefits in return, a claim that Connecticut Light & Power dispute"
  

25 September 2014

• As readers will know, Nalcor bases the viability of Muskrat Falls on its forecast increase in residential electricity demand, driven primarily by customers increasingly using electricity as their primary heat source. Here is a quote by Winston Adams posted on today's Telegram website:--

• Comment From Winston "Hi Peter, as follow up from yesterday on electric heat use, info can be found on the PUB website, Nfld Power response to questions no 163 where they file a survey report.Page 20 says electricity as the main source dropped from 70 to 58 percent from 2009 to 2013. Oil rose from 19 to 22 percent and wood rose from 11 to 18 percent (a 64 percent increase) And  exclusive electric heat in St. Johns dropped from 80 to 58 percent, while the rest of the province it dropped from 52 to 35 percent ( the report says it dropped strongly. "

• Letter to the PUB from Danny Dumaresque re release of 100 MW turbine costs

23 September 2014

• Further Requests For Information from Danny Dumaresque re Nalcor's 100 MW combustion turbine

• The iron ore industry is headed for a brutal shakeout as prices collapse  (and NL ratepayers will pay for a $300 million transmission line to Alderon?)

15 September 2014

• Danny Dumaresque's September 10, 2014 submission to the PUB (re NL Hydro's new 100 MW combustion turbine)
  

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13 September 2014

Cancelling a hydro project? Imagine that

               Muskrat Falls reservoir (and North Spur 'stabilization')
                                         (going from bad to worse) 


In James McLeod's recent Weekend Telegram article ["Landslides near dam expected: Nalcor"], Nalcor's Gilbert Bennett summarizes how the North Spur risks will be addressed by stating that, among other things, the spur will be flattened, a concrete wall (essentially a breakwater) will be built the length of the North Spur and that water will be pumped out of the spur to help keep it dry.

Accordingly, Nalcor is suggesting that these measures will mitigate the risks associated with the spur, and combined with the two concrete dams and the spillway being built on the south side of the river (south of the North Spur) to block and control the river flow, these measures will ensure the integrity of the resulting reservoir.

But will they?
 
Once the reservoir is filled , the reservoir depth will increase significantly (from just a few metres deep to about 30 metres deep) --- a doubling, tripling, quadrupling or more, thereby significantly increasing the horizontal thrust of the water pressure, not only on the west, upstream side of the North Spur, but on the north side/shoreline of the reservoir/river itself, the area leading toward and adjacent to the Kettle Lakes area.

While the depth of the water in the reservoir may only double or triple (or perhaps more), a doubling, for example, of water depth does not increase the horizontal thrust/pressure on a river bank in a similar linear fashion. Instead, a doubling of the water depth in the reservoir increases the horizontal thrust/pressure on the river bank fourfold (exponentially).  A tripling or quadrupling -- by nine or sixteen times as much.

Of course, if the upstream, north reservoir river bank was comprised of solid material (like bedrock) a deeper water reservoir would not be a problem.

But that is not the case.

If the upstream, north river bank's quick clay layers were all many metres below and not adjacent to (and/or in contact with) the filled reservoir, a deeper reservoir may not be a problem.

But that is not the case.

In October 2013, Nalcor gave a presentation to the 1st International Workshop on Landslides in Sensitive Clays in Montreal. See (http://blog.nalcorenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/North-Spur-Poster-Presentation-October-2013.pdf ). 

Nalcor's presentation (Figures 7 and 8) shows that while stratigraphy interpretations before 2013 (Figure 7) of a cross section between the upstream side of the North Spur and the Kettle Lakes area had shown both upper quick clay layers underlying the area to be well above the river level and that the upstream river bottom level was separated from the lower quick clay layer by an intermediate sand layer, the new stratigraphy interpretations (after 2013, Figure 8) shows the highest upper clay layer to be partially (about half of its thickness) in contact with the water in a newly filled reservoir. And furthermore, the lowest upper quick clay layer would be in full contact with the bottom of the river and would extend from the river bottom to about 10-15 metres up the side of a newly formed reservoir.

Also, before 2013 the ground layer that separated the lower of the two upper quick clay layers from the lower quick clay layer was classified "intermediate sand" , while after 2013 (Nalcor's Figure 8) shows the separation layer to be only about half the previous thickness and is now being described as "intermediate silty sand/sandy silt" --- silt (next to quick clay itself) being one of the least stable categories.

Furthermore, assuming Nalcor's proposed measures will indeed mitigate the risks associated with the North Spur itself, the available data (Nalcor's Figure 1 presented at Montreal) seems to suggest that the largest landslide in the area was not the 1978 slide that occurred on the east/downstream side of the North Spur, but instead, the very large landslide just a few hundred metres to the northeast of the North Spur on the north bank and adjacent to/just east of the Kettle Lakes area.

Dr. Stig Bernander (Former adj. prof., Luleå Techn. University, PhD on ‘Downhill Progressive Landslides in Long Natural Slopes’. Former chief design engineer in Skanska West Ltd, Sweden), http://www.muskratinfo.ca/Bernander.pdf refers, described the Kettle Lakes area as "...the extremely long valley – some 1000 metres in length with three small lakes just west of the bottleneck landslide scar mentioned above – bears the features of an older bottleneck landslide...".

Once the Muskrat Falls reservoir is filled, the exponential increase in the horizontal water thrust/pressure would seem to expose this north reservoir bank to weaknesses that Dr. Bernander (and Nalcor's Figures 1 and 8) both seem to allude.

While Nalcor's Montreal 2013 (Figures 1 and 8) may not, in themselves, demonstrate that the Kettle Lakes area poses an equal or even greater risk to the safety and integrity of the new reservoir than the North Spur itself, along with Dr. Bernander's and Nalcor's Figure 1 and 8, there does appear to be some indication that the large landslide east of the Kettle Lakes area is (and points to) a cause for concern  (see http://www.vision2041.com/north-spur.html ).

Also, in January 2014, Dr. Bernander wrote (see http://www.muskratinfo.ca/Bernander.pdf ), that:

"b)The massive landslide scar in the NE part of the North Spur is of particular interest in the current context due to the fact that the contour lines for equal levels clearly indicate that this slide belongs to a category named ‘Bottleneck’ slides. Such slides typically take place in normally consolidated highly sensitive clay formations in close vicinity of a ravine or a steep slope. Bottleneck slides develop as serial retrogressive smaller slides, in which the disturbed sensitive (quick) clays ‘liquefy’ due to disturbance and flow away–usually down the escarpment or the steep slope.

Extremely large such slides have occurred in Norway, e.g. at Verdal, and at Rissa, (i.e. the third phase of the latter landslide). A large typical bottleneck landslide scar can be seen close to the river canyon of Slumpån in the Göta River valley, (Sweden).

The extremely long valley –some 1000 metres in length with three small lakes (Kettle Lakes) just west of the bottleneck landslide scar mentioned above –bears the features of an older bottleneck landslide...The importance of identifying these landslide scars as bottleneck slides lies in the fact that such slides clearly signify the presence of highly sensitive normally consolidated clays in the North Spur. This indicates in turn that the other three somewhat smaller landside scars on the east side of the North Spur may very likely be downhill progressive landslides –considering that retrogressive landslides (spreads) are normally confined to areas with highly over-consolidated clays. ........... the prediction of stability in progressive slope failure analysis calls for at least two separate and differently defined failure criteria."

In light of what seems to be evidence of retrogressive and/or bottleneck slides in the Kettle Lakes area, has Nalcor utilized what Dr. Bernander describes as "relevant methods of progressive failure analysis (where required, and by)... "at least two separate and differently defined failure criteria" to fully, adequately and appropriately assess the risk of a breach of the reservoir's north bank once the reservoir is filled?

Nalcor's vice president (Gilbert Bennett) has said that "If we look at the conditions upstream and downstream (from Muskrat Falls), we know that...(land)slides have happened at multiple locations...(and that) they are going to continue to happen".

What independent studies (what evidence) can Nalcor provide that demonstrates that the landslides that Mr. Gilbert Bennett says "are going to continue to happen" will not be one or more that breaches the north bank of the Muskrat Falls reservoir?

Given also that Natural Resources Canada has said (see NRC info-slide below) that not only is there a "Pre-existing problem", but also that the "Potential occurrence of large scale earth flow (is) not adequately considered in the assessment of bank stability...", what studies, what evidence can Nalcor provide to assure citizens that even if/after the North Spur is stabilized, and in the absence of any publicly known and appropriate risk assessment of the Kettle Lakes area, that there will not be a breach of the reservoir's north bank, resulting in the unrestricted flow of the Churchill River --- through the Kettle Lakes area --- to the sea?

Maurice E. Adams


11 September 2014

• VISION BUILT ON DELUSION (PART II)   EXCERPT  --- "Failure of the PUB to permit the Grand River Keepers and Danny Dumeresque to ask questions relating to the Water Management Agreement would not only be a failure of public transparency.  It would constitute a failure of the PUB, itself, to fulfil its legislated responsibility.  Indeed, why have a regulatory body if issues of this public importance and interest are not fully investigated?"

10 September 2014
Goldman Sachs calls 'the end of the Iron Age'     Excerpt:--- "...oversupply will...hold prices back, Mr Lelong said, with a forecast of $US79 per tonne in 2016."

09 September 2014
Gilbert Bennett (Nalcor's vice president) recently said that "If we look at the conditions upstream and downstream (from Muskrat Falls), we know that...(land)slides have happened at multiple locations...(and that) they are going to continue to happen".

NOTE ---- Natural Resources Canada has said that not only is there a "Pre-existing problem", but also --- the "Potential occurrence of large scale earth flow not adequately considered in the assessment of bank stability..."

Also, the Independent Engineer's November 2013 report asked, among other things, that Nalcor provide "...more information on:-
Progressive (landslide) failure"




While Nalcor's North Spur 21 July 2014 Update presentation said, in part, that "There is no evidence of downhill progressive failure landslide along the Churchill river valley", in January 2014, Dr. Bernander (see http://www.muskratinfo.ca/Bernander.pdf ), wrote that:

"b)The massive landslide scar in the NE part of the North Spur is of particular interest in the current context due to the fact that the contour lines for equal levels clearly indicate that this slide belongs to a category named ‘Bottleneck’ slides. Such slides typically take place in normally consolidated highly sensitive clay formations in close vicinity of a ravine or a steep slope. Bottleneck slides develop as serial retrogressive smaller slides, in which the disturbed sensitive (quick) clays ‘liquefy’ due to disturbance and flow away–usually down the escarpment or the steep slope.

Extremely large such slides have occurred in Norway, e.g. at Verdal, and at Rissa, (i.e. the third phase of the latter landslide). A large typical bottleneck landslide scar can be seen close to the river canyon of Slumpån in the Göta River valley, (Sweden).

The extremely long valley –some 1000 metres in length with three small lakes (Kettle Lakes) just west of the bottleneck landslide scar mentioned above –bears the features of an older bottleneck landslide...The importance of identifying these landslide scars as bottleneck slides lies in the fact that such slides clearly signify the presence of highly sensitive normally consolidated clays in the North Spur. This indicates in turn that the other three somewhat smaller landside scars on the east side of the North Spur may very likely be downhill progressive landslides –considering that retrogressive landslides (spreads) are normally confined to areas with highly over-consolidated clays. ........... the prediction of stability in progressive slope failure analysis calls for at least two separate and differently defined failure criteria."

North Spur page provides further (and earlier) information.

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05 September 2014

• Let's hear from a real expert

MY Comment on the above letter:-    Maurice E. Adams, September 05, 2014 - 09:43                To "J's" comment and the writer's point #3:------- If Nalcor has done such expert work, why not provide the public with the study that addresses the writer's 3rd issue.----- 1. upstream horizontal trust/water pressure on the reservoir's bank will increase exponentially with the expected 3-4 fold increase in the water depth, 2. the resulting distance between the 39 metre reservoir elevation and the downward slope leading to the approx. 28 metre elevation of the middle Kettle Lake/1000 metre long valley/gorge to the downstream 3 metre river elevation level, is less than the 600 metre distance between the upstream/downstream sides of the North Spur itself, 3. there are 2 (upper) quick clay layers beneath this shorter, high risk area, 4. with the higher elevation of the reservoir, both these quick clay layers will then be either totally or partially BELOW the reservoir level, 5. Nalcor's proposed North Spur design fix excludes this area, 6. Nalcor's proposed design fix will increase the water pressure in this area, 7. earlier stratigraphic interpretations described a layer below these upper clay layers as the more stable 'intermediate sand', while later interpretations now describe that layer as intermediate silty/sandy or sandy/silt (silt being the very next category adjacent to 'quick clay').-------- So, will the North Spur fix create an even higher risk by way of a possible breach through the Kettle Lakes area?



04 September 2014

• EXCERPT from PUB letter to NL Hydro:-- "Delays in the responses to these and previous RFIs have impacted the schedule contemplated by the Board and the Board's consultants, The Board had anticipated issuing its final report in the first quarter 2015. This schedule may now have to be revisited by the Board."

02 September 2014

• Mudslides and Band-Aids  

01 September 2014

• The Snow Job (Part I)     A MUST READ (excellent) article by JM. ------------ Is this "proof" of government (or Nalcor) corruption?  It appears pretty damming.
  
  EXCERPT :---  "The people of Newfoundland and Labrador have been exposed, perhaps, to the greatest ‘Snow Job’ in our history.  If the consumers of the province are expected to pay additional rates to meet the delivery of 167 MW to Nova Scotia, the proposition is worse than a deception; it is a corruption of governance."

• While JM (in the above-noted article) quotes the Public Utility Board's March 30, 2012 Report To Government as follows, that  “(t)he information provided by Nalcor in the review is not detailed, complete or current enough to allow the Board to determine whether the Interconnected Option represents the least-cost option….” , I would also refer readers to pages 18 and 19 of my February 2012 Written Submission to the above-referenced PUB review.
  

My written submission (February 2012) to the PUB's 2012 Review, on which the March 30, 2012 Report to Government is based, reads in part, as follows:--

"...these DG2-quality, Class 4, feasibility level estimates ... provide no prudent, rational and reliable grounds for a finding or a report that concludes that the lnfeed Option is "least cost".

"Accordingly, since there are no rational and reliable grounds for a finding that the Infeed Option is `least-cost', any such finding would not be well founded, would be fundamentally flawed --- and in error....there are insufficient grounds on which the Board can reasonably, rationally and reliably conclude that the Infeed Option is least-cost....there is a lack of clear evidence that the Infeed Option is least cost..."

"The evidence therefore before the Board (the cost estimates themselves, their quality and relationship) is not sufficient from which an objective and reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the Infeed Option is "least-cost".

"...with respect, it is suggested that the answer to the Reference Question can be found not only in the risk and error inherent in Nalcor's 57-year magnified load forecast and cost comparison estimates, but also in Nalcor's DG2 low reliability level cost estimates..."

Further quotes from the PUB's 2012 Report to Government:--

Page 65
"MA suggested that the magnified risks of a 57-year load forecast and the high margin of error of the cost estimates (Decision Gate 2, low quality, Class 4, feasibility level) are both critical factors and should be considered together. He concluded that the two options are in a statistical tie given that the Decision Gate 2 cost estimates are within each other’s margin of error and suggests there are insufficient grounds on which the Board can reasonably, rationally and reliably conclude that the Interconnected Option is least-cost.

Page 66
Board Comments
...there are issues in relation to the degree of project definition and the range of accuracy of the capital cost estimates used in the CPW analysis. There are also notable gaps in Nalcor’s information and processes which may impact the CPW analysis. The Board is of the view that the Decision Gate 2 CPW analysis does not form an adequate basis upon which to consider the two supply options as set out in the Terms of Reference, especially given the concerns in relation to Nalcor’s load forecast and capital cost estimates"



25 August 2014

• Large dams just aren't worth the cost    EXCERPT:-- "The study’s authors — three management scholars and a statistician — say planners are systematically biased toward excessive optimism, which dam promoters exploit with deception or blatant corruption. The study finds that actual dam expenses on average were nearly double pre-building estimates, and several times greater than overruns of other kinds of infrastructure construction, including roads, railroads, bridges and tunnels. On average, dam construction took 8.6 years, 44 percent longer than predicted — so much time, the authors say, that large dams are “ineffective in resolving urgent energy crises.”
  
  DAMS typically consume large chunks of developing countries’ financial resources, as dam planners underestimate the impact of inflation and currency depreciation. Many of the funds that support large dams arrive as loans to the host countries, and must eventually be paid off in hard currency. But most dam revenue comes from electricity sales in local currencies. When local currencies fall against the dollar, as often happens, the burden of those loans grows."
  
  

23 August 2014


• Construction started on $51 million Fogo Island/Change Islands ferry  (for the 20,000 million unnecessary dollars we will be spending because of the Muskrat Falls dams and generation plant we could build 392 ferries. Tied up (bow to stern) they would stretch about 12 kilometers long--- see BELOW graphic and associated "Who will stop the Muskrat madness" article)
  

• Awash in cynicism [This commentary by The Telegram's Pam Frampton, from which I copied the above-noted quote by George Bernard Shaw, is just  too good (and also, in my view), too applicable to the MADNESS that is Muskrat Falls not to also provide a link to (to post) it here].
  

Who will stop the Muskrat madness?


This graphic has been copied from my Fixed Link web page. The large BRIGHT RED portion is the cash flow that will come out of the pockets of NL ratepayers because of the Muskrat Falls dams and generation plant (about $29 BILLION over 50 years). Ratepayers will only need to pay out about $6 BILLION for the transmission line. And the power we need from Hydro Quebec to get us to 2041 (IN DARK GREEN) would only cost us about $3 BILLION over 25 years.

Hence, if we cancelled the MF dam, we would see about a $26 BILLION (26,000 MILLION) savings for ratepayers (mostly your children and grand children).

Plus, once 2041 rolls around, the transmission line can be used (and upgraded as needed) for Upper Churchill power [not so with Muskrat --- as we will be tied in for another 25 years to Muskrat's very, very high cost power purchase agreement (PPA) between Nalcor and NL Hydro].

Come 2041, that puts Hydro Quebec in the driver's seat --- ONCE AGAIN.



Readers please note (from the above graphic) that of the $35 billion to come out of the pockets of NL ratepayers over 50 years, only 6 billion is for the transmission line, and the rest is due to the Muskrat Falls dam and generation plant. Accordingly, add to the transmission line cost of $6 billion over 50 years, the $3 billion over 25 years (to 2041) to purchase power from Hydro Quebec, and NL ratepayers can save approx. $26 billion (26,000 million dollars) --- AND in 2041 they will have access to the NEAR-ZERO cost Upper Churchill power.

Accordingly, the continued building of the Muskrat dams and generation plant NEGATES the future benefit (in 2041) of Upper Churchill power and is therefore pure madness.

•    Comment by Nichol :-- copied from The Telegram website............... Nichol August 21, 2014 - 12:08 I too have been looking for the 'someone ' among us to stop this madness. We all should know that Muskrat Falls will be the biggest white elephant ever, clearly based on wild unabated political ambition. 'Build around Quebec ' was the mantra. When wholesale electricity prices were declining, Nalcor took no notice. Correctly, you point out the average price realized for export power by Quebec last year was 3 cents/KWh. The wholesale spot price paid in New England for today, Aug. 21, is 3.43 cents/KWh (source EIA). It is interesting that 60% of Muskrat Falls capacity will depend on these market prices. The revenues from the other 40% which is the amount we will use to replace Holyrood, will have to carry the whole project. No responsible entity ignores 60% of its production potential, which is what Nalcor is doing....no revenue from the 20% to NS for building the link, and very much losing prices on the wholesale markets for the 40% export block. The great lie of the project, 'the least cost option', could not be further from the truth. It was the least cost of the only two options allowed to be considered. Our Government is blind to the facts. They have milked all the elections they can from this folly, and will be destroyed at the polls in 2015. We are left with the debt and no compete legislation smugly passed by this Government in favour of Nalcor. I suggest the Nalcor execs are much more concerned with their completion bonuses than they are for our future. We need to stop this project in its tracks....now. Every day counts. Quebec is canceling phase 3 and 4 of the Romaine project due to depressed prices. There are huge surpluses of electricity available today. Where is the person to do it? Buying from Quebec would save the millions you point out. 2041 is only 27 years away, yet we are obligated to pay for MF for 25 years after that. Are we really too late to stop this madness? Where are all the main proponents today?....Williams, Dunderdale, Kennedy, et al, will all go down in history as the egotistical, foolish opportunists that they are. The 'Cuckoo's Nest' has nothing on NL politics.....to wit, hockey stick factories, chocolate factories, the great paper mills, the giant petrochemical complexes, the cucumber foray, buffalo, and yes even the boot plant ....gone! And now we put $8 or $9 billion into generating power for all the vapourware demand we have! God help us.
  

• Alderon provides project financing update  EXCERPT:-- ("Alderon" or the "Company") announces an update on the progress of its financing plan for the Kami Project. Alderon and BNP Paribas ("BNP") have mutually agreed to terminate the engagement of BNP Paribas as lead arranger of the senior debt financing facility for the construction of the Kami Project......
  
  

19 August 2014

• Conservative Misinformation and the Public Service Sector Debt Problem          EXCERPT:--  "...if you really want to see the picture, accurately and honestly,  take the debt we service,  all $13.5 billion of gross debt according to the Auditor General and whack the $5.0 billion onto that.  $18.5 billion, headed for $20."

18 August 2014


• The 20/20 Roadmap  (be sure to scroll down and view the Cheapest Option graphic)
  
  Comment
  Your item `The 20-20 Roadmap`is an excellent one to show the potential of wind power. We have only 2 percent power here despite one of the best wind resources in the world. Our wind gives about 43 percent average rated capacity of the wind turbine, higher than most locations. Yet it is still subject to low wind and too high wind conditions, which at our winter cold snaps would impact its available power. Manitoba Hydro International nevertheless stated our wind could be 10 percent of our total and 15 percent with some improvement to operation and controls. And that is without a water pumping scheme. Water pumping, whereby excess wind is used to pump water and is stored and then used when the wind is unavailable is indeed a proven method to maximize wind power potential. There, on the island off Africa, they have no hydro power as we have, and they were dependent on diesel generation. Now they have significant hydro powered entirely by wind, a wind-hydro hybrid. Here we have 85 percent regular hydro, and obtaining an extra 15 percent with wind-hydro(pumping) hybrid would have been reliable and low cost compared to Muskrat Falls. And this hybrid system described in this article is up and running as of June this year! A fine example of alternatives that were not considered by Nalcor.      Winston Adams

• PPA: Absolute, Unconditional and Irrevocable     EXCERPT : ---- It is not clear if the 51 years of “Base Block Payments”, rising from $148.5 million in year 2 to $933.3 million in year 50, include the transmission costs, too,  or whether we ought to expect a second PPA. ....................“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, including Section 15.1, until the date on which the Initial Power Purchase Agreement Page 33 of 76 Financing is Paid in Full, NLH’s obligations to make the Base Block Payments shall be absolute, unconditional and irrevocable, and shall not be subject to any reductions under any circumstances whatsoever.” (Emphasis added)
  

14 August 2014

• Those dam[n][ed] dams

13 August 2014

• Just how bad are the new Muskrat Falls cost estimates
  
  

• Interested readers may access eight (8) key agreements between Nalcor or NL Hydro and Emera or Nova Scotia Power that relate to the Maritime Link here.   Readers should note (from the above, item #8), that the deadline for the completion of the terms and conditions for a definitive Energy Access Agreement between Nalcor, Emera and Nova Scotia power for the supply and purchase of energy surplus to NL native load requirements is October 1, 2014)

• Hydro aware supplier under investigation

12 August 2014                  

• Venezuelan Energy Company Investigated in the U.S.
  EXCERPT :---- "ProEnergy Services, a Sedalia, Mo.-based engineering, procurement and construction company that sold dozens of turbines to Derwick and helped build the plants, is also under investigation,... A ProEnergy representative declined to comment on any investigation and said the company "is committed to doing business in full compliance with all applicable laws and to cooperating fully with regulatory and legal inquiries."....people familiar with the matter said prosecutors in the Justice Department's criminal fraud section are reviewing the actions of Derwick and ProEnergy for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits offering foreign government officials improper payments in exchange for a business advantage. Federal prosecutors are scrutinizing the difference between the prices ProEnergy charged Derwick for its equipment and the prices Derwick ultimately charged the Venezuelan government, one person familiar with the matter said. The person said that in some past FCPA cases, excessive margins have been used to conceal bribes to foreign officials."
  
  

• Newfoundlanders deserve better health care     By Paul March, MD is a former chief-of-staff at Florida Hospital... EXCERPT :--- "I read about billions being poured into Muskrat Falls, whatever that is. You obviously have money to spend. I think that your priorities need to be adjusted. A lot. "
  
  

07 August 2014

• Nalcor's new combustion turbine for Holyrood will have sufficient fuel storage to keep it running at capacity for 2.5 days (and this is Nalcor's way of providing assurance of no more blackouts?)

06 August 2014

• Re Nalcor's 100 MW turbine generator:---  EXCERPT from Nalcor's document ---- "NL Hydro indicated that the unit may operate for less than 500 hours per year".   That amounts to about 20 days per year (most of which would be when it SUBSTITUTES FOR (not in addition to) one of the existing Holyrood generators (because it can operate at a lower fuel usage level). The new unit has only about 2/3rds the capacity of Holyrood's smallest unit and will be used to mostly replace the use of an existing unit. Since it is SUBSTANTIALLY smaller than any of the existing units, one must ask "How is it then, and how much, ADDITIONAL capacity do we really need? Or do we really need any? I think not.
  

• Nalcor estimates the addition of a 100 MW turbine generator at Holyrood (at a $119 million cost) will add 1.6% to retail rates. How much then will an added cost of more than $8,000 million for Muskrat Falls impact retail rates?
  
  • Also, Nalcor's NOTE 3 (same 1.6% Nalcor document referred to above) states that "Fuel savings anticipated from the avoided operation of Holyrood units at low inefficient loads offset fuel expense for new unit" (I would suggest then that those same savings significantly reduces the so-called $2 billion least-cost advantage of Muskrat Falls, since this so-called $2 billion advantage is largely based on projected fuel costs for Holyrood) .  At that rate, $600 million could replace all existing Holyrood units and result in only a marginal increase in rates (not the doubling of rates required by Muskrat Falls).

05 August 2014

• EXCERPT from Reply (section 5) to Request For Information by the Consumer Advocate :---- "ProEnergy identified that Nalcor plans to use No.2 diesel as the fuel oil for this GT equipment at Holyrood. This will require a new fuel handling system and burner system to be provided by ProEnergy since the existing GT was designed and stored as a natural gas unit. The fuel oil is not a significant issue for the rest of the GT or balance of plant but will result in more frequent GT maintenance. ProEnergy/Energy Parts are also looking at air intake and filter materials that would be more consistent with the salt water ambient air environment at Holyrood versus the original design of the stored equipment/materials. Provided this addresses the issue appropriately, this issue is not a showstopper, but also may require additional monitoring and maintenance over the longer term. "
  
  

• Treason or reason?

• EXCERPT of comment from Luke O'brien (posted at UNCLE GNARLEY) :---- "According to the project's May 2014 monthly report (page 7), approximately 29.5% of the DG3 estimate for the dam and generating facility has already been spent. At this pace, more than 50% of the DG3 figure will be spent prior to achieving the first milestone and there are many milestones after that one until the facility is fully commissioned (now targeted as June 2018)"

31 July 2014

• Muskrat Falls Project Oversight Committee (Committee Report -- July, 2014)
  
  My Note:--- WINDOW DRESSING.       A recipe for the continued drib-drab, for the continued access and release of bad news to the public in DIGESTIBLE CHUNKS.
  
  It seems that most of this report's emphasis is and will continue to be on costs and schedule.
  
  While the word "risks" is mentioned, these risks seem to essentially relate to "costs" and "schedule", while the PUB has identified "adequacy and reliability" as key risks.
  
  After a quick scan of this first report (?), I see little or nothing about such key risks as the so-called Water Management Agreement (which Quebec has NOT signed --- and is currently before the Quebec courts) and without which there may be as little as 170 MW of  power available from Muskrat Falls.
  
  And of course the key risks are associated not just with costs, but with the WMA and the North Spur (and Additional Risks).
  
  

• When Legacy Trumps Common Sense

28 July 2014

• Is Quebec's electricity business model broken?

EXCERPTS:--- "...the average selling price (Quebec) Hydro is currently able to obtain for its exported power at 3¢ per kWh...“What’s become much more obvious in the last few months is that this project (the Romaine River) is in fact a white elephant. It’s built on a sort of speculative bubble that mining companies will come and will be expanding in the north and will require all this energy and that aluminum companies are going to continue expanding their operations, which hasn’t been the case.............“By blindly subsidizing useless projects, the premier and her government are impoverishing Quebec families and hindering economic development,”


27 July 2014

• Solar power surging to forefront of Canadian energy
  

EXCERPT:-- “Our numbers show that by the end of the construction season next year, Ontario will have installed 2 gigawatts [2,000 megawatts] of solar, and the majority of that is utility scale.”

Canada still sits behind leaders such as the United States, however, where 4.7 gigawatts of solar was installed last year alone. “In the U.S., 33 per cent of all new electricity generation installed was solar,” Mr. Gorman says."


26 July 2014

• Treason in the air

• On to Plan B

25 July 2014

• In light of the loss at the Quebec court level of Nalcor's 'good faith' argument before the Quebec court, Dwight Ball questions how strong are the legal opinions that Nalcor is relying on with respect to its Muskrat Falls Water Management Agreement.

• Here is Nalcor's News Release concerning the recent ruling by the Quebec court  (you will note the following phrase from the News release "We have instructed our legal team to commence preparation for an appeal following a comprehensive review of the decision received yesterday".) Shouldn't "a comprehensive review of the decision" precede any instruction to its legal team to prepare for an appeal? And isn't this the kind of flippant action/reaction that has been the driving force behind Muskrat --- rational analysis be damned (non-existent, biased, twisted, ignored)?

• Muskrat Falls landslides show dam built in danger zone: opponents

Nalcor's Gilbert Bennett says they are through the clay and down to the bedrock. Check the North Spur page and see for yourself that the bedrock AT THE SPUR is hundreds of meters below the top of the Spur. Bennett is speaking (and intentionally so) of where the concrete dam is going. Also, see landslide VIDEO

21 July 2014

• T.E. Bursey Wrong About Muskrat Falls Says David Vardy

20 July 2014

• VIDEO showing recent "Quick Clay" landslide near Muskrat Falls (half kilometer out into the river)
  

18 July 2014

• GRK requests that a paper hearing on NL Hydro's Motion to Strike be held on August 16, 2014

• For those who might not have read this comment from Nichol posted on The Telegram:-- (also copied and posted BELOW)

Nichol July 13, 2014 - 15:58 "Mr. Martin, with all due respect, you have just put your name to an article that was surely composed in conjunction with the best spin doctors the Government has to offer. Indeed it is nothing but another sales pitch. It is nothing new and a rehash of everything that is wrong with your project.
Hydropower projects like Muskrat Falls can normally attract private capital. MF could not. To a potential investor, who follows energy markets, you seemingly ignored market realities in the US and elsewhere over the past ten years. The politics of your situation took precedence over the realities of the marketplace.
The premise of such a high cost, isolated project as MF, with a relatively small production capacity was fundamentally flawed in expectation, and particularly, in timing. You sold it as a project where 40% of output was to replace Holyrood, 20% to NS in return for the ML, and 40% for export, at a time when the energy markets were undergoing a paradigm shift in the US due to rapidly increasing production of shale oil and gas, some 8 to10 years ago. Today the production of shale gas is estimated at enough to last 100 years, with much more inferred. This change has lowered wholesale electricity prices dramatically in the markets you targeted. More NG plants have and are being constructed to replace the old oil and coal burners. NG and LNG is the much more desireable and clean burning fuel.
The UK has recently built the largest LNG storage facility in Europe in Wales. LNG carriers, now having capacities of 175,000 cubic meters and up are able to capture economy of scale in transport.
My point is, that Nalcor did not even consider this option, the Government eliminated the PUB from the process, and the Manitoba Hydro review mandate was simply too narrow. Market conditions including pricing and supply of NG changed substantially before MF sanction in 2012.
There are no sales that we know of for 40% of MF production, and even if US sales were to materialize, market wholesale prices guarantee a loss, as does the 20% to NS.
Hydro Quebec, a leading hydropower producer, is expected to have a massive surplus of some 30 terawatt hours this year. They are canceling all new projects, and with the Quebec energy review commission about to recommend cancellation of the last two phases of the 1550MW Romaine project, (where power was estimated to cost $0.0600/KWh), things are very bleak for MF as a competitive project. This scenario should have been recognized some time before MF sanction.
You quote some expected 2017 domestic sales prices for the 'average' consumer. When spread over a 12 month period theses averages certainly do not come closes to the annual cost of heat and domestic hw for the average new home on the NE Avalon. This is deceptive at best. The real question the owners of Nalcor want answered, is how much will MF power cost to produce, transmit and sell in the various markets, and how much will that cost us.
A positive return on our investment is certainly a long, long way off in that 50 year agreement. With 2041 only 27 years away, I submit that the acceptance of a vain political mandate to build around Quebec, at any cost, was a self defeating proposition.
Nalcor, our little energy Company, was the same group, by their own admission, that inexcusably, and inexplicably introduced unsuitable fuel to its' own equipment in January 2013, causing severe damage to the Holyrood unit, and affecting decaying downstream equipment as well. This is the same team that wants us to trust them on the MF project.
Hydro Quebec produces some 35,000MW annually, and are among world leaders in this business. When we remove the 5400MW produced by CFLCo, Nalcor produces less than 2,000MW. This comparison of scale is reflected in the way Nalcor conducts the MF project. They could not resist the very questionable, ego driven political pressure to build around Quebec after court challenge losses.
HQ are very professional in protecting their interests, but that is history, and now we have a relatively small Nalcor being supported by non compete legislation, which also ensures all costs of MF are paid by the NL ratepayers, when no private investment at all would touch it. We could have built a combined cycle 500MW NG replacement for Holyrood, which is much, much cleaner than the bunker oil now burned. It would be more efficient and the overnight capital cost would have been around $1B including LNG storage.
These units have sufficient life cycle to carry us past the 2041 reversion date, and we need back up anyway. Then, the Strait crossing and transmission facilities could be built in time for 2041. Lower Churchill generation facilities may be feasible by then...again, maybe not.
With population decay in NL continuing, and industrial demand nowhere on the island horizon (Terra Nova Shoes being just another example), where, exactly, is the demand for MF power coming from...other than Holyrood replacement?
When will Governments in NL learn that the days of 'the great industrial development announcements' of the Smallwood era in NL are long gone? Spending at least $18B in oil revenues, and running a $500M deficit this year alone, appears to have done nothing to improve the lives of the average NL family.
Other jurisdictions, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, as examples, have overbuilt generation resources, made mistakes, and admitted them. We have not.
NL needs to recognize the fundamental errors in timing and expectation of the Muskrat Falls project, and come clean with the ratepayers who have been legislated to pay for it all. You have not done that Mr. Martin, and your continued leadership of Nalcor must be reviewed. We will review the political leadership next year."


16 July 2014

• DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business

14 July 2014

• Muskrat Falls manager claims safety decision caused firing

• Electricity Rates --- An Industrial-sized Mess

        Excerpt from the above article: -- "The problem for individual ratepayers, as much as for industrial customers is that the escalating capital costs associated with that public policy choice (including Muskrat Falls) have barely begun.",
        and, here is an excerpt from my article "Muskrat Falls:boon or boondoggle"  (The Telegram, September 11, 2011) --- "...what Muskrat Falls will do, however, is...decrease the competitiveness of our business community while improving the competitiveness of our neighbouring provinces..."


12 July 2014                                                                         NOTICE
Cabot Martin's eye-opening book "MUSKRAT MADNESS" is NOW available by mail with payment by Pay Pal by clicking HERE


11 July 2014
Below is a question posed to Steve Kent on yesterday's Naked Lunch program (hosted by The Telegram's Peter Jackson):---

• One participant asked --- " In cases both internationally and in Canada SNC Lavalin has used an intermediate company between SNC and the contractor to funnel bribes that have led to charges for bribery and corruption of public officials against SNC Lavalin. Will you as Premier demand Nalcor release the name of the company that was the intermediary between SNC Lavalin and Astaldi's billion dollar Muskrat Falls contract that Nalcor refused to name at the last AGM? "

And today, below  is a Question posed by David Vardy to Nalcor quite some time ago and Nalcor's recently provided Answer. I would ask therefore whether there is also perhaps any link between the above-noted (Naked Lunch) question and the answer to a different question posed earlier by Mr.Vardy? Also, I would ask whether Spectrol Group, a SNC-Lavalin subsidiary might have other contracts related to Muskrat Falls, including perhaps what has been characterized by Nalcor as inspection (or other) services related to the Astaldi contract?

Mr.Vardy's QUESTION

• "19. On January 29, 2014 I asked whether SNC Lavalin or its subsidiaries play any role in the Strait of Belle Isle cable installation and burial. The response from Nalcor dated March 14, 2014 did not deal with the question of subsidiaries of SNC Lavalin. Please respond to full question: do the subsidiaries of SNC Lavalin play any role in the Strait of Belle Isle project?
  

Nalcor's ANSWER

• A19. The Strait of Belle Isle marine cable crossing is not part of the EPCM contract with SNCLavalin. This is a Nalcor responsibility using consultants and contractors who specialize in subsea cables, horizontal directional drilling and marine environments. For further clarity, no subsidiary of SNC Lavalin plays a role in the cable installation and laying of the cable across the Strait of Belle Isle. At the 2014 AGM, a different question regarding the role of subsidiaries of SNC-Lavalin was asked – “Does SNC Lavalin or its subsidiaries play any role in work relating to the Strait of Belle Isle?” While the role of Spectrol Group, a SNC-Lavalin subsidiary, is unrelated to cable installation and burial, they do provide third-party inspection services for equipment to be installed as part of the Strait of Belle Isle marine cable crossing project"
  

Also, Nalcor's answer to one of Mr. Vardy's other questions (Question #5) about conservation stated that "...going forward the business case (...of a conservation program...) would be assessed based on the value conserved energy that could be sold into export markets".

So even if conservation and efficiency could save NL ratepayers energy that costs them $0.20 per Kwh, Nalcor would only initiate a conservation program if the export value of that saved energy would help make it a profit. It seems clear that in such an instance, Nalcor's driving force has nothing to do with what is in the best interest of ratepayers.

Why would Nalcor  try to conserve energy on the part of people who are paying the full cost if they can only sell it for export at a discount?

Is then Nalcor's current energy conservation and efficiency program little more than a sham?

For less than 5% of the cost of Muskrat Falls, an efficiency program could reduce energy use by TWICE the average needed production of Holyrood, and thereby totally eliminate any perceived need for Muskrat Falls.

10 July 2014

• Hydro plan a costly NDP legacy

• Excerpt:- The PUB, in a report this week, says Hydro has not served Manitoba ratepayers interests because it has not sought better alternatives to expensive new hydro generation, mainly alternative-energy sources and increased conservation. That's why the PUB recommended the province set up a new, independent energy authority to guide such explorations in the future.

09 July 2014

• NL Hydro's Notice of Motion to strike Requests for Information filed by Danny Dumaresque and Grand Riverkeepers

08 July 2014

• NL Hydro goes to the financial markets for $200M

• An Estimate of Electricity Prices in Newfoundland Post Muskrat Falls

• Muskrat Falls as 'crown jewel' --- hilarious

• "MUSKRAT MADNESS" A Book Review by David A. Vardy

07 July 2014

• The Thing Speaks For Itself     (be sure to read the comments at the bottom of this article)

06 July 2014

• Muskrat Falls debt burden? $15,600 per person

• Requests For Information (RFIs) filed with the PUB from the Grand Riverkeepers (well worth the read). RFIs from the Consumer Advocate and Industrial Customers are also available on the PUB website (July 2nd).
  

• Cabot Martin's book "Muskrat Madness" is for sale at Afterwords bookstore (245 Duckworth Street) and he will be signing copies there today between 3 and 6 PM.
  

• Here is another interesting comment on the UNCLEGNARLEY blog :---

• Anonymous5 July 2014 17:31Both Baie d'Espoir and Cat Arm were designed with the ability to add an additional 25% turbine capacity. This would add an additional 175 MW peak output but would not increase the total power output as it would drain the reservoirs faster. However they could add another 175 MW of wind at about $2.5 M per MW and set it up for pumping water into the reservoirs when the wind output is not needed. There is also an ideal energy storage advantage in central whereby water that normally flows north could be pumped into the Baie d'Espoir reservoir that flows south so that the height the water is lifted is less than it flows down producing more energy out that put in. This is a very unique opportunity.

• The wind studies conducted for Nalcor used older (ten year old) wind technology which is about ten per cent less efficient than newer systems. They also used a higher cost of capital than they used for Muskrat. The external gas studies used a new hub at a $5 B cost for our own offshore. Everything was set up as a straw man approach so Muskrat would look like the winner and then off course they underestimated the costs for Muskrat.

• If Quebec wins that court case on water management rights then they will dictate when the water flows into the system. Their big market is the New York air conditioning systems in the summer so I suppose that is when we will get full output from Muskrat. The contracts Quebec has in place to supply US customers leads me to believe that they have a NAFTA case to continue to control the water flow. The fact that the upper Churchill extracts about 7 time more energy out of the same reservoir water leads me to believe that they also have an environmental case to control operational time.

• We can easily be further under the mercy of Quebec with this project.

05 July 2014

• Thought this comment (below) posted today on UNCLEGNARLEY blog was worthy of a re-print here:--

• Anonymous 5 July 2014 13:51 All good points in this blog post and the comments. Ditto Rany Simms' column in The Telegram today. The present and future demand fundamentals do not exist on the island to justify the expense of Muskrat Falls and never did. The extra cushion of power we need could be provided by a couple of small wind farms such as the one in Fermeuse or a gas turbine and the third line from Bay D'Espoir. For the record, Wade Locke made the comment about $8B being too much when he appeared as guest speaker at the Irish Loop Chamber of Commerce in May 2012. It is extremely perplexing and disheartening that neither of the Opposition parties, nor anyone on the government side, has had enough backbone to come out and call this thing a dud, if not a fraud, which is what the Muskrat Falls project really is. The old cliche that people deserve the government they elect is proven true again. All the fight seems to have gone from Newfoundlanders. It's enough to make you wonder whether it was ever there, with a few notable exceptions, in the first place? What Newfoundland desperately needs, but alas doesn't have, is a young Richard Cashin type, someone with energy, integrity and courage enough to speak the truth and do the right thing in public life. The only real opposition to the project for the most part has come from a very few of us in the media and a few of our elder statesmen and bureaucrats, such as Ron Penney and David Vardy, who are now retired. The age 40 to 60 generation looks to be a wash when it comes to living up to our civic duty. That includes many journalists, almost all of the academic community at MUN and espeically the politicians.

          Craig Westcott
          Topsail

04 July 2014

• Cabot Martin's book “Muskrat Madness “ is now for sale at Afterwords Used Books on Duckworth Street .

• The Supreme Court's BC land title decsion. It's more important than you think.

03 July 2014

• MUSKRAT'S CHANGING NARRATIVE     

            Excerpt:---  " The new total is $8.33 billion...."

02 July 2014

• Labrador Iron Mines on Hold    (and Nalcor is spending $300 million for a power line to Western Labrador)

---

30 June 2014

• Comment (below) to The Telegram website, from Maggy Carter:--- June 28, 2014 - 11:02  (re Wangersky's "Muskrat Falls: good, bad and ugly" article:-
  

• While I agree with the gist of your column Russell, there are some points that need clarification. You start with the assertion that "it could be worse". Granted, but please keep in mind that construction is barely begun - perhaps as little as one-fifth into total expenditures. Oddly, and somewhat out of character, you appear to accept Martin's assurance against further over-runs. Time will show that to be an unreliable assumption. As well, there seems to be some confusion regarding the costs of financing. The $1.2 billion to which you refer is only the interest during construction and has nothing to do with interest costs over the life of the $5 billion loan or the $1 billion savings which NALCOR attributes to the federal guarantee. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, interest during construction is capitalized - and indeed NALCOR has properly capitalized that $1.2 billion in its Sources and Uses of Funds Summary (April 29, 2014). But for reasons that are obvious, it chooses not to include those costs in any public discussion of total capital costs. Rather than accept the number of $6.99 billion (as someone previously quipped, Martin must have worked for K-Mart), it would be-hoove the media to begin using the correct capital cost which as of now is $8.2 billion for the NL portion only (i.e.- excluding the Link). Any CA will confirm this for you if you're still uncertain. Without a copy of the lender term sheet on the $5 billion, my own estimate of the financing costs of the project based on a 40 year amortization is $3.67 billion. As opposed to interest during construction, this debt servicing is not capitalized but rather expensed as part of the annual operating costs. But then there is the other elephant in the room - from where are the remaining funds coming? Thus far NALCOR and the province have said equity, although occasionally they have raised the possibility of taking on further long-term debt. The crown has already pumped a significant amount of equity into the project - what portion is interim as opposed to long term is not clear. Nor is equity 'free money'; economists assert, correctly, that it presents an 'opportunity cost'. But almost certainly we will see the province borrow again for Muskrat before the project is complete. How much of course depends on the extent of the over-runs. If we assume that the final tab is $10 billion (i.e. that we will see an additional $1.8 billion over-run), which I think is a fairly safe assumption, then we will have just doubled the original estimate of $5 billion (which was the number given to the PUB and the limit of the federal loan guarantee). Again as noted in its Sources and Uses Summary, all costs are to be absorbed by the NL ratepayer (notwithstanding Marshall's tepid suggestion that proceeds from the sale of surplus power could be used by some future government to offset rate hikes). For the meantime, government can be expected to err on the side of borrowing as opposed to emptying the Treasury to pay for that $5 billion overage (assuming it was in the Treasury in the first place). The rate attached to a second tranche of borrowing will - by NALCOR's own estimation - be at least a billion higher than the first $5 billion. Indeed, additional borrowings for that and the associated upgrades on the Island are likely to add an additional $5 billion in interest costs over the same 40 year period. There is also the prospect that NALCOR will be hit by a demand from Ember that it pick up some or all of the expected over-runs associated with the Maritime Link. As well, there is the unknown impact of outstanding litigation with Hydro Quebec and the prospect of renewed demands for compensation by native groups - demands bolstered by yesterday's SCOC ruling. And it goes on and on. The point is that we are nowhere near being out of the woods on this project. It is already - as your headline suggests - ugly and, I fear, about to get uglier. The Telegram's editorial assessment yesterday of this as 'a gaping money pit' is perhaps an apt characterization. Pundits often compare it with the Upper Churchill - the one important difference being of course that, while Churchill Falls represented an enormous lost opportunity to capitalize on our natural resources, it was not our money and generally speaking it posed no risk of bankruptcy to the province. Apologies for the lengthy response but I think it important to put the admissions regarding cost over-runs from NALCOR and government in the past few days in proper perspective.

• Here is my comment on The Telegram's "Muskrat Falls: good, bad and ugly" article (see link to the article at June 28th entry below): Maurice E. Adams June 28, 2014 - 06:02 "Watched a movie last evening (Edge of Darkness) where there was an expert who specialized in cleaning up loose ends for some very questionable characters. ....Part of his specialty was making things so confusing that nobody could ever figure out the truth. ---- That is Nalcor/Muskrat Falls --- and intentionally so. .... SO the question is --- why was and is it necessary to make the Muskrat Falls project so confusing that no one could ever figure out the truth?" and then read Des Sullivan's COST OVERRUNS: YOU CAN'T HANDLE THE TRUTH     ----    Excerpt:- "From $5 billion to $8.19: and the project has barely begun!  That is the key point."

Then read, Ed Hollett's

• Paying everyone but ourselves

29 June 2014

• "...if we look  20 years down the road, it (Muskrat Falls) may not be 'state of the art', it may be 'state of the arc'",  --- Gerry Rogers, MHA

28 June 2014

• Muskrat Falls: good, bad and ugly

27 June 2014

The Telegram's Poll Question

Nalcor Energy provided an update on the Muskrat Falls Project Thursday, which included an updated capital cost forecast for the hydroelectric and transmission development. Do you support this project?

• 40% Yes
• 42% No
• 9% Somewhat
• 1% Undecided
• 8% Don't know enough about it

• This is your future

        Readers should particlularly note the "comments" (by Maggy) at the bottom of the above-noted editorial. Real costs are likely billions of dollars more than Nalcor's latest 'digestible chunk' of $6,990 million.

26 June 2014

• Muskrat Falls costs going up
  

• Supreme Court expands land title rights in unanimous ruling

        Excerpt:--- "The Supreme Court of Canada has given aboriginal groups a major victory, expanding their rights to claim possession of ancestral lands and control those lands permanently."....................The court said that where title is asserted but has not yet been established, the government needs to consult with the aboriginal group in question and accommodate it where appropriate. But once aboriginal title is established, and the aboriginal group refuses to consent to an incursion on its lands, government would have to prove an important public purpose and fulfill its duties of trust and care towards the aboriginal people, before a project can go ahead"

• Muskrat Falls Update Scheduled For Today
  

24 June 2014

• At least they're thinking ahead

• This time we are doing it to ourselves

23 June 2014

• Muskrat Fall Needs To Be Exposed To The Light

20 June 2014

• For those interested, there was a fairly spirited debate on Nalcor/Muskrat on The Telegram (Peter Jackson's) Naked Lunch today.

• The economic viability of Muskrat Falls is predicated on continued increases in residential electricity use. How is this possible when a New Report Confirms a Rapidly Declining Population?  Muskrat Falls (and the continued waste of BILLIONS of our tax dollars) must be stopped.

19 June 2014

• Time for change at the top of Nalcor
  
  My comment on the above article:--

• Maurice E. Adams June 19, 2014 - 07:10 Agree wholeheartedly --- and have been calling for Ed Martin to be fired for quite some time now. Nalcor (not our elected government) has become the province's policy -maker. In short, a government unto itself. Nalcor is driven by hubrus, self-interest, visions/delusions of grandeur --- all paid for (and to be paid for) by NL ratepayers. It will cost NL ratepayers an average of $700 million per year every year for the next 50 years for Muskrat so that Nalcor can get revenues from Nova Scotians that will be miniscule -- about 1/10th of what NL ratepayers will pay. Time to put a stop, not only to Muskrat, but to elevating an incompetent bureaucrat to the position of proxy premier and policy maker.

18 June 2014

• Is the new "fix" (Natural Resources Minister and Muskrateer, Derrick Dalley) already in the premiership race? The Telegram's Ashley Fitzpatrick however is tweeting that "Natural Resources Min @DalleyDerrick says he won't be seeking leadership".
  

14 June 2014

• A reply to Nalcor's chairman of the board

• Hydro: now it's Newfoundlanders who pay

• PUB Final Process (The Board's Investigation and Hearing into Supply Issues and Power Outages on the Island Interconnected System)

• Danny Dumaresque's Comments re NL Hydro's request for extension of time for filing its responses to RFI's (NOTE:- other parties, including the Consumer Advocate, either had no comment or no objection to NL Hydro's request)

12 June 2014

• Canada's economy could take a hit from China's banking crisis: BoC

            Excerpt:---  "So how would China’s problems spread to Canada? In a word: commodities."


11 June 2014

• With respect to the new 100 MW  turbine for Holyrood, on June 4th the PUB requested that NL Hydro provide among other things, an update on the " iv) Forecast project costs (based on tender award);".  Here is NL Hydro's June 10th response:  "Forecast Project Cost — Hydro is tracking with compliance to cost as submitted at $119 million".

• Also, NL Hydro had been requested to reply to RFIs (Requests For Information)  by June 16th, NL Hydro is now requesting that date to be changed to July 25th.

07 June 2014

• Self-praise  (you will note that while The Telegram's editorial focuses on slightly different and more varied details, it does not differ considerably from my 05 June entry below).

05 June 2014

• For a summary of yesterday's AGM, see Ashley Fitzpatrick's Telegram article "Costs to become clearer with Nalcor numbers".
  
  Unfortunately there is little in the article that informs or expands on the many questions asked by members of the general public.
  
  The AGM was, to a very large extent, yet another public relations exercise by Nalcor. While Ed Martin did indeed "respond" to all questions, there is a significant difference between 'responding' and making every reasonable effort to better inform, to elaborate.
  
  Nalcor focussed a whole lot, and emphasized how much "growth" has and will be occurring with respect to Nalcor's capital expenditures. 
  
  Yet, at the same time, Nalcor said vitrually nothing about how, and how much, these multi-billion dollar additions to its "rate base" will detrimentally affect ratepayers (the value of Nalcor's 'rate base' is what drives electricity rates for customers  --- the higher the value of the rate base, the higher rates for residential and industrial customers).
  
  At least, Ed Martin did commit (perhaps as a result of political pressure/polls) to providing by the end of June updated cost estimates and project schedule (as well as the power purchase agreement signed last November).
  
  


03 June 2014

• Re NL Hydro's PUB application for a 100 MW combustion turbine for Holyrood, Requests For Information filed by Danny Dumaresque (May 26), the Consumer Advocate, NL Power, Vale, and the PUB (June 02) have now been posted on the PUB website.

31 May 2014

• SNC-Lavelin's $191 M  McGill hospital bill snubbed by Quebec
  

            EXCERPT:--- University of Ottawa law and corporate ethics professor Penny Collenette said "...it's time Canadians and public works ministers across Canada begin assessing whether SNC-Lavalin can be trusted with existing and future contracts"

                                                                                                                        I would ask:---
                                                   Is our NL Government, Nalcor, and SNC-Lavelin all in this together?
                                                  Why is the Opposition so quiet? Are they any different?
                                                        Who is standing up for ratepayers/taxpayers?

Also,

• Below are excerpts from an Independent Inquiry, May 26, 2014 report by Commissioner  Graham Lane into Manitoba Hydro's massive hydro and transmission plans (please note that my copying has resulted in a change from the report's original 2-column format).

• While the numbers in Mr. Lane's report apply to Manitoba and would be different for NL, I would suggest that the issues, the risks and concerns identified by this independent inquiry are largely applicable to our government's and Nalcor's single-minded push for Muskrat Falls. 

• In many respects, the risks and negative impacts for NL ratepayers are worse, perhaps much worse (e.g. percentage wise, about twice as many NL ratepayers need electricity to heat their homes. In NL, electricity is not a luxury, it is a basic need).
• In both provinces ---- ratepayers pay, ratepayers take all the risk (in effect, taxation by stealth --- a MASSIVE TAX GRAB --- especially on the poor, and on low and middle-income earners):

Excerpts from Commissioner Lane's report:

"The Government has a practice of using its Crown corporations to serve its objectives, leaving ratepayers of those Crowns to absorb the costs, resulting in low levels of accountability and transparency"

Also,

"Hydro presently has clear incentives not to reduce demand, time for a change before billions of dollars are borrowed and wasted"

and,

"...it is well known that the plan that Government so ardently supports is one that maximizes the income flow from Hydro to the provincial treasury. If the plan goes ahead, as Government clearly wants it to, billions of dollars billed to ratepayers will come to rest in the Government's coffers."

and,

"...conflict of interest is evident with Hydro's lackluster effort to improve energy efficiency and demand suppression. Hydro believes it has a need for more demand to bolster its case for expansion. Effective energy efficiency and demand suppression do not support that goal.
Conflicts galore: appointments to PUB, money to Government maximized by dams and transmission lines and debt, Hydro reporting to Government just as PUB does, Hydro's board of directors appointed by Government, and Hydro’s hobbling of the alternatives by controlling energy efficiency and demand suppression.
And, if that were not enough, Hydro controls the expansion or, better said, non-expansion of the natural gas grid; expanding it would allow for more ratepayers to switch to natural gas for heating, thus lowering electricity demand, perhaps significantly.
Based on the situation, including the plethora of conflicts of interest, I see no reason to hope PUB will bring sanity to this file."

CLICK TO ENLARGE


Commissioner Lane's report goes on to say:

Critics call for the following steps:

• Slow down the 'bus', including Bipole III;
• Truly consider alternatives to current development plan
• Return Hydro’s emphasis to servicing domestic ratepayers, not ideological and political objectives
• Establish a truly independent expert review of development plans, with all options on the table
• Change the selection process for Hydro's Board and PUB
• Require competitions based on credentials, vetting by an all-party committee of the Legislature
• Expand PUB’s jurisdiction to include Hydro's electricity capital expenditures;
• Direct PUB to implement rate protection against power hogs
• Direct PUB to undertake a comprehensive review of Hydro’s rate model
• Direct PUB to review the service extension policy and energy efficiency
• Direct the Auditor General to review Hydro's expenditures with respect to First Nation negotiations
• Investigate the allegations of the whistleblower
• Review Hydro's contractual actions through the 2002-2004 drought period
• Direct Hydro to prepare projections, based on known variables, taking a probability perspective
• Benchmark Hydro’s operations, including its personnel complement
• Prepare and release an asset condition report
• Review the condition and value of ex-Winnipeg Hydro assets
. Assess the condition of assets on Hydro’s books, write-off intangible assets
• Write down Wuskwatim, assets purchased from Winnipeg Hydro and single cycle gas turbines
• Record pension plan under-funding
• Develop a new and higher rate for new and expanding energy intensive industry
• Reduce the risk of the expansion of large industry requiring subsidy by existing ratepayers
• Finalize the Cost of Service Study, ensure fair distribution of the Utility’s costs between classes
• Require the Utility to re-visit its load forecasting methodology and result
• Incent energy efficiency
• Bring back openness and transparency, needed for a monopoly utility
• Return Hydro to its previous focus: lowest-cost reliable electricity for Manitoba ratepayers
• Divest Hydro of responsibility for energy efficiency, demand suppression and other demand side management functions and;
• Divest Hydro of Centra Gas.

Commissioner Lane's full report can be obtained through here.


30 May 2014

• I wonder how much extra cost will SNC-Lavelin add to Muskrat? There has already been talk about overruns, delays and a "dome" being built over the generation plant/dam.

29 May 2014

• Danny Dumaresque's information requests filed with the PUB
                                                         ______________________________________________________________
  

•                                                               "a scam,.... a fraud"  (?)

                                                                                                                                          -- Roger Grimes

•                                                                "...something wrong"

                                                                                                                                          -- Jim Morgan

                  VOCM Backtalk Roger Grimes on Alderon and Frank Coleman


                  VOCM Backtalk Jim Morgan on Alderon and Danny Williams


                  Swimming in a sea of sharks


27 May 2014

Re today's Kami mine announcement:----

•     This tweet extracted from The Telegram's Ashley Fitzpatrick:---  "Tayfun Eldem says construction will start this year subject to securing full funding"         (emphasis added)

•     Also, this from Kami document ----  "Kami LP is released from further processing obligations, including any requirements related to the construction and operation of a pellet plant"
  

China's banks call in loans to troubled steel sector
        Excerpt:---    "The golden age of large-scale infrastructure construction guided by the central government is over"


24 May 2014
     DEMAND  SIDE  MANAGEMENT (conservation and efficiency)

• Why is it that Liberty Consulting's (and the PUB's) Interim Reports said virtually nothing about conservation and efficiency?

• Below are excerpts from a presentation by Dr. Laliberte (as part of an Independent Review of Manitoba's plans to build additional hydro generation and transmission systems). These slides show how Demand Side Management (conservation and efficiency) can impact load growth and reduce ratepayer costs.
• 75% of new load in the U.S. is being met by DSM.
  
• Accordingly, DSM (at that rate) would cut the island's annual load growth rate from Nalcor's forecast of 0.8% to 0.2% annually --- making DSM LEAST-COST (and Muskrat Falls UNECONOMIC)
  

Readers can access Dr. Laliberte's  full presentation at www.bipoleiiicoalition.ca

• Now compare 2 to 4 cents per KWh to Muskrat's 20 to 40 cents per KWh
  
  • How therefore can the NL Government and Nalcor keep saying that Muskrat Falls is   ---- "least-cost"?
  • See this short video ---- While Manitoba's numbers are larger --- the principles are the same
  • We too need a "time out"

• NL ratepayers are being taken to the cleaners  ----  BIG TIME  !!!!

23 May 2014

• And what year was SNC-Lavelin awarded the Nalcor's first contracts?

22 May 2014

• Is this how SNC-Lavelin did business then ? And now?
  

21 May 2014

• I see that while government has directed Nalcor to proceed with a $300 million transmission line to Western Labrador (paid for by ratepayers), the May 20th, 2014 CIBC New iron ore forecast price for 2016 (and long term) is $80 per mt ($105 for 2014). The downward forecast is "driven by increased seaborone supply from Australia and Brazil, high Chinese iron ore port stocks, weaker Chinese steel prices and anxiety over Chinese credit markets, while high-cost Chinese iron ore supply has yet to curtail output".  Are the so-called multi-billion dollar speculative mining ventures in Western Labrador, much touted by Nalcor and government, even viable at these prices?
  

• Comment from former NL Hydro electrical engineer Winston Adams May 20, 2014 - 10:09 (copied from The Telegram website)  Extreme weather was the cause of the 2013 outage, salt contamination causing flashovers at Holyrood and incoming transmission lines to Holyrood. This is documented on numerous pages of Hydro report in the Appendix of the events. The contamination lasted 9 hours.Guess no one reads that. As for 2014, to say that no unusual event were significant factors..... well that is yet uncertain. Two large power transformers were damaged and the cause is yet not determined. There was acetylene gas present in the oil, which is an indicator of arcing. The transformers were only loaded to half of its rated capacity, so it was not overloaded. Arcing can be a result of recent or past accumulative damage of GISs (geomagnetic induced currents). There are a number of factors pointing to this, but it may not be conclusive. That these problems occur in about 3 years out of 11, would make it unusual but not extremely so. They not often cause transformer damage, but transformers are most vunerable, and GICs were the cause of the great blackout of the northeast USA in 1989, including Hydro Quebec. These issues were monitored as far back as the 1970s when I did outage analysis for Nfld Hydro. I am not sure if Hydro has neglected the monitoring of GICs, compared to other utilities (given we encounter perhaps the highest currents from this in North America.) . It seems premature to conclude that an unusual event did not cause or contribute to the transformer damage, and hence the outage of 2014. Are GICs unusual. Compared to wind, ice loading and salt contamination , yes. Who but a half dozen engineers in Nfld have even heard of GICs being an issue for power reliability. Unusual , yes. Proven for this damage, no. But surprising that Liberty or Hydro did not state if GICs was being assessed. They merely say the gas analysis should be further assessed. Good reason too, for Hydro to be vague. It has far reaching implications for the reliability of the Muskrat Falls transmission line. WInston Adams , Logy Bay

20 May 2013

How much is NL Hydro paying for Muskrat Falls power?

Excerpt (below) from page 30 of Nalcor's 2013 Annual Report:-- 
"Commercial Arrangements

In November 2013, long-term power supply and transmission-related agreements were executed by Hydro and a number of the newly formed project subsidiaries. These included the following:

•    PPA between Hydro and Muskrat Falls – provides for the purchase by Hydro and the sale by Muskrat Falls of energy, capacity, ancillary services and greenhouse gas credits, payments for which are made on a full cost recovery basis.

•    Generator Interconnection Agreement (GIA) between Hydro, Muskrat Falls and Transco – provides for the construction of LTA by Transco to enable interconnection of the MF generation facility with the Newfoundland transmission system. Muskrat Falls will make payments to Transco and recover such costs from Hydro via the PPA on a flow-through cost recovery basis."

18 May 2014

I would suggest that it is worth noting what this excerpt from the PUB Interim Report means:

        "Causes and Contributing Factors

        The Board is able to conclude at this stage that... :

• Hydro’s deferral of scheduled preventive maintenance and testing of key transmission system equipment, including the 2013 scheduled and recommended testing and maintenance on the transformer and circuit breaker at Sunnyside, which failed.... (caused or contributed to the outages)
• Hydro’s failure to properly execute repairs and maintenance.... (caused or contributed to the outages)
• Hydro’s failure to ensure the availability of qualified resources and vendor support.... (caused or contributed to the outages)
• Hydro’s failure to procure critical spare parts for its generation assets... (caused or contributed to the outages)
• Hydro’s decisions on timing of generation asset repairs, notably the Hardwoods and Stephenville gas turbines.... (caused or contributed to the outages)"

Readers should note therefore that, contrary to early public commentary from Nalcor, not one of the above-referenced "causes or contributing factors" were due to the need for more, additional installed net island generation capacity. In fact, and as first suggested here at vision2041.com, (see January 8th and 9th entries below) the PUB Interim Report lists preventive maintenance and testing related to "key transmission system equipment... (and) transformer and circuit breaker.." as the first cause or contributing factor.

This interpretation seems to be supported when the PUB's Interim Report lists its "SUMMARY OF (seven) KEY PRIORITY ACTIONS", where "Generation Availability" is listed, not as the first priority, but instead --- the 2nd priority item ---- and NOTE that it is Generation "Availability", not additional Generation "Capacity" that is listed.

And of the four items listed under the Generation Availability heading, "the procurement and installation of the 100 MW (nominal) gas turbine" is listed as the 4th and last item on the list (the 1st three are below)

Acquisition of additional generation capacity by December 1, 2014 is thereby only the 4th priority, after Hydro ---- "...:i) complete(s) the work necessary to ensure winter readiness of its (already existing) generation assets, ii) address(es) the issue of critical spares of its generation assets, (and)  iii) complete(s) negotiations in relation to interruptible load and, to the extent that it can secure economically available interruptible load, have a contract in place...", the 4th being ""the procurement and installation of the 100 MW (nominal) gas turbine".

So, contrary to Nalcor and government's early statements to the contrary, there is nothing in the power outages and supply issues that support their claim that these outages show that we need Muskrat Falls power.


16 May 2014

• ORIGINAL (ROOT) CAUSE?

• Was salt contamination a "root cause" of the island's power outages/supply interruptions?         If so, what are the implications for the reliability (or lack thereof) of the Muskrat Falls transmission line that must pass through the Great Northern Peninsula ---- where outages have historically been up to 10 times more frequent?
  
  

• With respect to the interim Liberty Consulting Report, former NL Hydro design (electrical) engineer, Winston Adams (whose most recent comments have not yet been posted on the PUB website) are, for the benefit of interested readers, posted BELOW:-

To: [email protected]
Subject: OUTAGE INVESTIGATION
Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 10:46:37 -0200 Cheryl Blundon
PUB , St John's
 
In respect of the Liberty Consulting Report:
 
While the report is valuable in your assessment , my analysis is in disagreement with the report on several issues.
 
ORIGINAL CAUSE ISSUE:
 
Liberty attributes the "origins" of both outages (both 2013 and 2014) to generation and transmission issues, and that the weather merely "affected" the outages.
I have experience in Controls and Protection Issues, having worked in this capacity as an electrical design engineer with Nfld Hydro. As such, I was involved with the design of our 230 KV grid, high voltage substation design, equipment specifications, and specifically the analysis of power outages.
I respectfully disagree with Liberty as to the origins of the 2013 outage. The origin was in fact caused by weather conditions.
The cause was a series of electrical faults (short circuits) that resulted from salt contamination on the Holyrood Station outdoor equipment, and also on transmission lines connected to the station. The faults then cascaded into generation and transmission issues.
This is mentioned in Nfld Hydro's report in the Introduction and Summary, but in the detail events in their Appendix B and in more detail in their Appendix D.
 Airborne salt with high humidity acts as a conductor of electricity, causing a flashover, that is a short circuit. On January 11, 2013, the first such fault got cleared quickly, in one tenth of a second, and so caused no outage. The second, some 3 hours later, took ten times longer to clear, which resulted in a cascade of trips, that led to the Avalon being separated from the main island 230KV grid, with outages all over the island.
 There were other such salt contamination faults on the  high voltage bus at Holyrood. And there were salt contamination faults on the incoming transmission lines.
 In particular, these type of faults persisted on line TL242 (the line from Hardwoods, near St. John's to Holyrood)  until about 1 PM, some 9 hours after the first such fault.
 Such faults are not uncommon on our system. What was uncommon was how it cascaded to such a widespread outage.
 Given that Nfld Hydro's analysis provides much evidence on this, and Liberty had access to this, it is surprising that Liberty states that the origin was a generation and transmission issue.
 In due course, in follow up, I can itemize the evidence provided by Hydro in their report on this issue.
I feel it is a very important issue, especially as to the implication of reliability of the DC in-feed line from Muskrat Falls through the coastal region of the Great Northern Peninsula. This region has a very high rate of salt contamination faults, perhaps 10 times higher than  the average for the island. And my recollection is that Nalcor and MHI indicated that for that proposed line, salt is NOT a contaminant. This I find incredible.
 While there is much of value in Liberty's report, I intend to comment on other areas of disagreement in due course.
Respectfully,
Winston G Adams

• PUB Interim Report

13 May 2014

• Tell us the truth

• Tale of two projects

12 May 2014

• The Telegram poll today:

In view of substantial cost overruns expected for the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project, do you believe Nalcor and the provincial government should be more forthcoming with the media and the public about the project's actual cost estimates?

        78%      Yes, I believe the public has a right to know what it will cost taxpayers? 
        17%      No, the release of this information now could jeopardize contract negotiations related to the project.
           5%    I have no opinion.

• Comments from Grand Riverkeepers on Liberty's Interim Report

• Anxious communities still await outcome of Site C dam   (sound familiar?)

10 May 2014

• Comments to the PUB from Enel re proposed expansion of their existing St. Lawrence wind farm (why then are we spending $120 million to add another combustion generator at Holyrood? Even NL Hydro said we only need 60 MW, so combined with available interruptible generation capacity and some conservation and efficiency improvements?) Whatever happened to the "lowest possible cost" legislative requirement? WHO is looking after the ratepayer?
  
  And now Nalcor is in the U.S. trying to get support to do Gull Island (ratepayers are doomed).
  

08 May 2014

• Even though the EXISTING total island interconnected system capacity is already about 300 MW MORE THAN the island's wintertime peak demand, the PUB has approved NL Hydro's plan to add a 100 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood (at an estimated capital cost of about $120 million)

06 May 2014

• Regulatory Oversight of Energy Megaprojects in Newfoundland and in Manitoba  by David Vardy
  

• Also, is this our future? :--  News Release, May 6, 2014 (from Manitoba's PUB):--
  NOTICE OF DECISION
  In Order 49/14 dated May 6, 2014, the Public Utilities Board (Board) approved a 2.75% rate increase to Manitoba Hydro customers effective May 1, 2014, denying Hydro's higher rate request because the Board has not finished its review of Hydro's proposed development plans.
  
  In its decision, the Board approved a 2% increase to approximate the annual rate of inflation.  The Board also included an additional 0.75% increase to flow into an existing Deferral Account established in April 2013 to assist with the payment of in-service costs for the Bipole III Transmission project.
  
  The major reasons for this interim rate increase are as follows:
  
  * Reduced revenues from export sales;
  
  * Higher operating costs related to the Wuskwatim Generating Station;
  
  * Higher Operation, Maintenance & Administration costs;
  
  * Funding of capital expenditures undertaken to support the reliability of electrical service;
  And
  
  * Manitoba Hydro's financial and credit rating integrity over the longer term.
  
  The Board notes that Manitoba Hydro's Interim Application for a 3.95% rate increase is consistent with Manitoba Hydro's Preferred Development Plan that involves the construction of both Keeyask and Conawapa Generating Stations. This Preferred Development Plan is currently under review by the Board in the Needs For and Alternatives To (NFAT) Review process.  The issues and decisions that result from the NFAT Review will have impacts on the rates set in future General Rate Applications. Manitoba Hydro's next General Rate Application is expected in the Fall of 2014.
  
  A copy of the Order, which contains additional information, may be reviewed on the Board's website www.pub.gov.mb.ca, or be obtained through the Board's Office.
  
  The Public Utilities Board
  400 - 330 Portage Avenue
  Winnipeg, MB  R3C 0C4
  Telephone:  (204) 945-2638
  Facsimile:   (204) 945-2643
  Toll Free:   1-866-854-3698
  Email: [email protected]

• My post-Liberty Interim Report written comments to the PUB

05 May 2014

• Comments to the PUB from Cathy White, Curtis Mercer & Jack Parsons, the Consumer Advocate, David Vardy & Ron Penney, NL power, NL Hydro and the Industrial Customers

04 May 2104

• China's looming debt bomb

Excerpts:--- "On Monday, the China Iron and Steel Association said the first quarter brought $373-million (U.S.) in losses to the country’s steel industry, with fully 45 per cent of firms posting red ink. All but one Chinese province missed growth targets in the first quarter...........................The steel industry was meant to be Caofeidian’s champion, with Capital Steel, the Chinese corporate giant, its anchor tenant. But that industry is not doing well. Local reports suggest Chinese steel makers are sitting on $266-billion (Canadian) in debt they’re unlikely to pay back – a bit more than Canada’s annual federal budget – and Capital Steel, in particular, has fallen on hard times. In Caofeidian, only two of its eight stacks showed any signs of life on a recent visit. An official at a nearby port office said it was operating at 25 per cent capacity."

Isn't China is the only export destination for Alderon's iron?

03 May 2014

Muskrat Falls --- a gigantic sponge

                                         "Oh what a grand scheme, what a great delusion, $8 billion of the people's own money can buy"  

On December 20, 2012, then Minister Tom Marshall said that the Muskrat Falls project "...will pay a dividend to the people of Newfoundland and Labrador of in excess of $20 billion, starting in 2017 for the life of the project. If we were to include estimates of sales of surplus power ... it would be over $24 billion".

No doubt, it was this kind of thinking by Minister Marshall that was the driving force behind Nalcor's Muskrat Falls' project information session presented at Memorial University's engineering department on the evening of April 2, 2014.

Although the Muskrat Falls project itself has been sold to ratepayers as the best way to meet the island's power needs, Nalcor's MUN information session was about 90 percent an expose of government's (and Nalcor's) Grand IIlusion or Delusion (take your pick) about how great it will soon be to access the great energy markets of the Maritimes, the eastern seaboard of the United States and even Ontario, and that as a result, billions in revenues will soon be rolling in.

However, other than providing attendees with an overview of the number of kilometres of electrical cable, the  number of cubic metres of concrete that will be used, etc., there was hardly one fact to demonstrate (and support) Nalcor's argument that NL ratepayers need (and will benefit from) Muskrat Falls.

But if former Minister (and now premier) Marshall Is correct, then one must ask --- "Who will pay this 20 (and 24) billion dollars to Nalcor?". Where are these dividends coming from?

Slide number 34 (above) of a 2011 Nalcor media presentation shows that the $20 billion in dividends referred to by then Minister Marshall will come totally out of the pockets of NL ratepayers (not from the grand export scheme outlined and emphasized during the above-referenced MUN presentation).

Furthermore, any real portion of that amount that may eventually be returned to government (and hence to ratepayers) will be AFTER Newfoundland Power, NL Hydro, Nalcor and Emera all get their cut. Even then, Nalcor has not committed to returning any dividends to government.

Also, NL ratepayers should keep in mind that in addition to the $20 billion that make up these so-called dividends, slide 34 also shows that NL ratepayers will also be passing over a further $15 billion to Nalcor. The additional $15 billion is the amount needed to cover Nalcor's debt servicing (and the project's) operating costs. In total (over 50 years) NL ratepayers will fork over approximately $35 billion for approximately 40% of the estimated Muskrat Falls energy output that Nalcor says we need.

In The Weekend Telegram article dated April 5, 2014 ("Marshall talks legacy") by James McLeod, Premier Marshall further confirms the $35 billion projection wherein he is quoted as saying that "By 2025 ... (total revenues will) be up to $700 million, $750 million per year...", in other words, $35 billion over 50 years (including revenues to cover debt servicing and operating costs) ---- info-graphic (above) refers.

Minister Marshall has also said that when including "estimates of sales of surplus power" Nalcor would receive dividends totaling not $20 billion, but $24 billion --- or approximately $4 billion from Nova Scotia customers ($35 billion in total revenues from NL ratepayers versus $4 billion in revenues from Nova Scotia ratepayers).

Given that NL's approximately 250,000 ratepayers pay $35 billion for 40% of Muskrat power and Nova Scotia's approximately 400,000 ratepayers will pay $4 billion for their 40% of surplus Muskrat power, that is a ratio of approximately 14 to 1 (on average each NL customer will pay approximately 14 times as much for his or her portion of the island's 40 percent of Muskrat power as compared to Nova Scotia customers).

So, while Nalcor's most recent information session extolls the virtues of how wonderful it will be that we (that is, Nalcor) will soon be a very "big player" in the energy marketing field, the facts show that Muskrat Falls is really nothing more than a gigantic sponge that will suck 90 percent ($35 of $39 billion) of its revenues (not from Nalcor's grand export sales illusion), but from the pockets of NL ratepayers. Over 50 years, approximately $140,000 ($2,800 per year) per NL household versus approximately $10,000 ($200 per year) for every Nova Scotian household.

While Hydro Quebec may be overjoyed to find out (from Nalcor's MUN presentation) that there are indeed some small pockets and snippets of time frames in the northeastern U.S. that may occasionally (in extraordinary cases) pay up to 50 cents per kilowatthour for power, given that even Hydro Quebec has been unable to sell their massive amounts of surplus energy for even five cents per kilowatthour, one can only question the rational thought processes behind Nalcor's suggestion that such a remote occurrence has in any way any influence whatsoever on the economic viability of trying to sell Muskrat's 20-40 cent power into a 3-6 cent energy export market.

Notwithstanding the real facts, Nalcor continues to extoll the virtues of how great an energy export opportunity is about to unfold --- once Muskrat is built of course --- as if most of Nalcor's revenues will be "net" to the province, and in turn, "net" to NL ratepayers.

Oh what a grand scheme, what a great delusion, $8 billion of the people's own money can buy. 

After all, for the low,  low price of $8 billion ($35 billion over 50 years), Nalcor (with Hydro Quebec's approval) will soon be able to move electrons around at will --- and Nalcor will soon be a very "big player", if not in the real world, in Nalcor's 'virtual' world of energy marketing --- 90 percent paid for, lock, stock and barrel, not by revenue from outside sales, not from revenue that will be "net" to the people, but revenue extracted in the first place from your friendly "take charge" (?) NL ratepayer.

Joey would be very proud.

02 May 2014

• Written submission from Vale with respect to NL Hydro's application for an additional 100 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood.

• Written submission by the consumer advocate supporting NL Hydro's application for an additional 100 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood.

01 May 2014

• Nalcor is deferring its return on equity in the early MF years to keep power rates artificially low (see info-graphic above) so as to avoid MF sticker shock in 2017. To sell the Muskrat Falls project to NL  ratepayers the power purchase agreement (PPA) is back-end loaded.  

• Nalcor's  DG3 PPA  payment (paid by ratepayers) for the Muskrat Falls dam/generation facility for year 2018 is $167M. And in year 2067 it is $987M  --- 6 times more (ratepayers will stiil be paying almost $1B per year 50 years later).

• Nalcor's DG3 MF Transmission Line (TL) payment  for year  2018 is $251M (a little more than for the dam/generation). But for year  2067 it is  $88 M.

• Accordingly,  by year 2067  ratepayers will be forking over $987 for the Muskrat Falls dam/generation PPA , or 11 times the $88 M for the transmission link.

It is time therefore to put a hold on building the UNECONOMIC MF dam/generation plant and use the money to finish the feasibility of a fixed link between Labrador and Newfoundland. Between now and 2041 we can buy much cheaper power from Hydro Quebec.  A fixed link reduces the cost of putting a cable across the Strait, more reliable, easily/more cheaply upgradeable to handle the massive (near zero cost) Upper Churchill power, and will put us in a stronger fiscal and practical position pre-2041. While pre-2041 negotiations with Quebec will be critical, having the fiscal and practical means to handle the massive amounts of Upper Churchill power that will be coming available will (unlike with Muskrat Falls) provide a tremendous political and economic advantage to Labrador and Newfoundland's bargaining position (whether it be with Quebec OR Nova Scotia). THAT is what will put NL in the driver's seat. Muskrat Falls, instead, has weakened this province's fiscal, political and economic bargaining position --- merely shifted it from Quebec to Nova Scotia.   Muskrat Falls needs (must have) a strategic re-think.


• (Winnipeg) Hydro review called better than nothing

30 April 2014

• Hydro applies for more spending

• Audio of interview with Ed Martin by James Mcleod re whether or not a delay in construction/in-service date will mean higher costs
  

• The PUB has granted Grand Riverkeepers Labrador Inc. Intervenor Status into the upcoming Investigation and Hearing concerning this year's power outages.
  

• Intervenor submission from Danny Dumaresque opposing NL Hydros' application for the addition of a 100 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood. Readers please note that Danny failed to mention that on page ES-2 of Liberty's Interim Report, Liberty states clearly that "Addressing the continuing risks of supply/demand imbalances requires either or both of adding resources and making sure that existing resources are available at peak times (during winters in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador)"  --- emphasis added. So this section is the section that specifically deals with "addressing the continuing risks..." and in so doing clearly suggests that "existing resources" can do the job ---- PROVIDED THEY ARE "AVAILABLE AT PEAK TIMES".

29 April 2014

• Comments  from Winston Adams to the PUB regarding NL Hydro's application for a 100 MW combustion turbine generator at Holyrood:-

• The PUB is suggesting that approval of NL Hydro's request for a 100 MW combustion turbine may be necessary. The PUB is awaiting comments from Intervenors by May 2, 2014..

• Deadline for comments to the PUB re Liberty Consulting's Interim Report is May 2, 2014

28 April 2014

• Comments from Maurice Adams, Intervenor Submissions from Industrial Customers, Vale Newfoundland, Newfoundland Power, the Consumer Advocate, and  Request for Intervenor Status from the Sierra Canada  re NL Hydro's Application for an additional 100 MW combustion generator
  
  • NOTICE:-- Today is the last day if you wish to comment on NL Hydro's $120 million application for an additional 100 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood. NL Hydro  estimates that rates will need to go UP 2.3% to cover the cost. You can support or object by submitting comments by email no later than 3:00 PM today to [email protected] and must include your name, address and phone number.

26 April 2014

• Note link (above) to NL Hydro's $120 Million application for an additional  (UNNEEDED) 100 MWs of thermal generation at Holyrood
  

• Is this the predicament Ed Martin is going to put us in? To award (yet unawarded) major contracts, before we can determine Muskrat's real cost estimates?            Once awarded, the contractor can get his money for nothing, even if the work is later cancelled, thereby effectively forcing government to keep this Muskrat Madness going?

• Related
  
  The NL Government and the Opposition parties should not allow Nalcor to put this province in such a position.
  
  

25 April 2014

• Cognitive Dissonance     --- a MUST READ article on what has gone wrong, and IS WRONG with MUSKRAT FALLS        
  

• Excerpt from The Telegram today ("At what cost") :--- "...the report steps through how the Sunnyside fire resulted in “a collapse of the transmission system and disconnection of the three Holyrood (power plant) generating units,” leading to a blackout for about 187,500 Newfoundland Power customers on the Avalon Peninsula."   -------------- Clearly, the root cause was "transmission" related. ---------- Yet, Nalcor (and to some extent, Liberty) is overly focused on "adding generation". But then again, that plays well in to Nalcor's Muskrat Falls Madness. 

• While "conservation and efficiency" was one of the key issues identified by the PUB (and stakeholders) for Liberty to assess, and while low cost efficiency improvement has the potential to drastically reduce our energy needs (and thereby ANY need for additional generation), I do not see one word in Liberty's report on this subject.
  

• Report Shows NL Hydro Failed on Maintenance (from VOCM website)
  
  Short excerpt from Liberty's report:
  

   "Our second “standards” observation relates to the adequacy of reserves. In this regard, we found at Hydro:

• A design frequency of supply-related interruptions of roughly twice that of other locations

• The calculation of reserve adequacy to meet an “average” worst winter day
  

•  Past planning practices that have tended to allow decisions at the margin to favor more versus less reliability risk."


24 April 2014
Liberty Consulting Interim Report

• "Liberty believes it is time to reassess the service reliability and cost balances that underlie the decisions on what level of supply resources to make available" (emphasis added)
  

• Frequent readers will also recall that I had requested through the PUB (see my March 4th entry BELOW)  that NL Hydro's Daily Reports should show data for the Total Island Interconnected System (and not just the NL Hydro's Island Interconnected System). While the PUB had concluded that NL Hydro's Island Interconnected System daily reports were sufficient, Liberty has concluded that the Total Island (and not just the NL Hydro) Interconnected System daily reports are more appropriate and should be used.
  

• From Liberty's Report --- QUOTE: "Finally, we observed that most data reported by Hydro, including all of the Request For Information responses as well as the March 24, 2014 filing, were given on a “Hydro system” only basis. For practical purposes, the load and supply of the Hydro system alone does not provide a useful basis for assessing reliability. Capacity and load on the IIS would have more significance. The difference (about 200 MW) between the two arises from customer-owned generation, including Newfoundland Power and Corner Brook Pulp & Paper Ltd. Hydro advises that it will assure consistency by focusing on IIS capacity and load in future analyses. We view this change as appropriate. ...... (Liberty's Recommendation No. 7.) ....Hydro should follow through on its plans to assure consistency in future reliability analyses by focusing on the IIS, as opposed to the Hydro system alone." UNQUOTE

• Interim Report The liberty Consulting Group

Excerpts:--

• "The causes of the outages arose on Hydro’s system, making responses to, rather than causes of, outages the focus of Liberty’s examination of Newfoundland Power".

• "The outages of this past January stemmed from two differing sets of causes: (a) the insufficiency of generating resources to meet customer demands, and (b) issues with the operation of key transmission system equipment."
• "Addressing the continuing risks of supply/demand imbalances requires either or both of adding resources and making sure that existing resources are available at peak times (during winters in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador). First, Liberty found that Hydro’s shortage of generation capacity was exacerbated by a failure to complete planned outage work needed to ensure the availability of its full range of generating facilities as the winter season began. Hydro should increase its emphasis on scheduling and completing required outage work prior to the winter season, in order to increase assurances of unit availability when most needed."

23 April 2014

• Written comments to the PUB from NL Power opposed to the Grand Riverkeepers' application for Intervenor status in the upcoming PUB hearing.

• Written comments to the PUB from NL Hydro opposed to the Grand Riverkeepers' application for Intervenor status in the upcoming PUB hearing.

• Written comments to the PUB from Maurice Adams (in support of the Grand Riverkeepers' application for Intervenor status in the upcoming PUB hearing).

• Written comments to the PUB from the consumer(?) advocate (Tom Johnson) opposed to the Grand Riverkeepers' application for Intervenor status in the upcoming PUB hearing.

• Interesting interview with Bill Barry (from VOCM)

• Muskrat to Continue Until too Expensive: Premier    (It is TOO EXPENSIVE NOW, but the numbers are not updated and are not being objectively determined and thoroughly/fully audited and fully released)

Excerpt (from VOCM website):
"Tom Marshall says development related to the Muskrat Falls project will continue until it's determined that it's no longer the least-cost option"

21 April 2014

• Grand Riverkeeper wants in on PUB power review
  

• Grand Riverkeeper PUB application

• Comments from "concerned" (copied from The Telegram) on an earlier comment by "Fact or Fiction" (at the bottom of a letter "A reply to Nalcor's chairman of the board" by Ron Penney and David Vardy:--

            concerned April 21, 2014 - 06:02
Fact or Fiction, has propagated what Nalcor have been doing for the past 3 years. Providing partial answers, which demonstrates the appearance that they are             open and transparent. The truth is far from it. I have read all the documents mentioned and I would like to offer the following response. I expect the Nalcor                     staffer who wrote "Fiction or Fact" will read this, and I welcome a reply:

• Q1) Power in Our Hands provide blended rates from almost 2 years ago. Mr. V and P are asking for incremental, and current rates. What will MF power cost NL'ers on a stand alone basis, calculated from the current inputs? Answer this please. Do not provide the blended rate, which provides no value to the debate about Muskrat.
  
• Q2) Commercial sensitivity for competitiveness is a bullshit argument. There are few projects completed that I know of where the proponent will take this approach. To the contrary publically announcing the results of contracts (like Statoil, Petrobras etc) will lead to more competitive tenders. For publically traded companies the updated estimates would be demanded by the shareholders. Nalcor’s position is an easy way to delay the inevitable announcement of over-runs.
  
• Q3) You are correct it is very clear in these reports that any debt over 5 Billion will be financed by the Government of Newfoundland. The Government of NL needs to provide a guarantee of equity financing. What is not clear is when all this money is ever repaid, which could be 2.5 Billion or more by the time we are done with the project. Also what is not clear is that when Nalcor and the Government talk about the dividends from MF (500 million a year), it does not include the repayment of this equity financing. When the repayment of the equity loads are considered the real returns from MF are less than 50 million a year until 2035 or so.
  
• Q4) Your response is not quite correct the province has committed an additional 1.2 TWhr on Average which can be reduced by about 300 GWhr. This is what the UARB insisted on prior to giving approval. Open democracy protecting the tax payers of NS.
  
• Q5-7) No one from Nalcor or the Government are talking about the risk imposed on the NL ratepayers in the event of damages from Emera for non delivery, or the Feds in the event of default in FLG. The language is there in the agreements, but not all the agreements are posted, or the commercial tables are redacted in some instances. What Nalcor need to provide a plain English assessment of these Agreements so people can understand them. What worries me most about this contract with Emera is how God Dammed complicated they are. Take for example the discussion on penalties from “First Commercial Power”. Well the ML-JDA and the EAA both had separate definitions of First Commercial Power. This was unbelievable in itself. However, Emera also have the ability to go after damages at law, and Time is of the essence. So from my interpretation Nalcor really do have exposure to Emera if they can not deliver power in 2017. It may not be “Penalties” but they are exposed to damages at law. Not predefining these damages was a weakness in the Agreement for Nalcor.
  
• Q8) Section 14.1 of Bill 61 clearly gives NLH the exclusive right to supply, distribute, and sell electrical power to retailer and/or industrial customers. Not sure how you have arrived at your answer which seems to contradict this clear language. I provide this clarification as a concerned citizen who is totally pissed off how our tax dollars are used, without the real information being provided in the public. Fact or Fiction, if you are a Nalcor or government communications staffer you will one day realize the great fraud on the taxpayers of Newfoundland and Labrador we has been perpetrated by your respective organization.

20 April 2014

• Heat Pump Results for the mid-March to mid-April period (as compared to the same period last year, recalling that over the same period last year we had record warm temperatures and this year record cold temperatures)
  
  My average daily energy use last year was 29.4% more (or 21.9% less this year than last)
  
  

• Excerpt from The Telegram article "Ball moves past Muskrat Falls decision"
  "...I like Nalcor as a company and we want to see the benefits coming from Nalcor,” Ball said. [My comment --- if there are  ANY so-called benefits, they accrue to Nova Scotia and must come out of the pockets of NL ratepayers in the first place].... “The way I look at it, the decision’s made now and we’ve got to make sure that we do whatever it takes to make sure that all the parameters around this project work for us as a province. If not, we all lose,”  he said. [My comment --- there are "no parameters" around this project that "work for us" --- PERIOD.            Accordingly, it is one thing to say we must make sure that the parameters work for us, but when they DO NOT, and the legal parameters are FRAMED and ANCHORED to prevent "making sure" they work FOR US (and prevent Ball from changing them) so that they would work for us, then Ball's statement is either naive or disingenuous.

           Show me the money. Show me where and how these parameters can be changed. Otherwise Ball's statement is empty, hollow rhetoric.

• Accordingly, (even if there is a potential to change the parameters) there remains only one alternative  --- put a hold on this project until these parameters are independently identified, assessed and a determination made where and how they can be changed --- if at all, so that they do work for us. Right now --- THEY DO NOT].
  
  Ball made it clear that he’s not against the Muskrat Falls development and he doesn’t want to see it fail. “If this project doesn’t work, we all lose,” he said.
  “It’s no sense in standing here today and coming to the people looking for support to be the next premier of Newfoundland and Labrador to find yourself with a project that is really not going to be able to provide the benefits for the people of the province.”
  
  

• THEN CANCEL IT !!!      Isn't Ball trying to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear? In the 4 months since the installation of my mini-split heat pump, two acquaintances have said they also intend to install mini-splits (one new construction, the other a retrofit). If every four months only two acquaintances of each additional homeowner who have installed a heat pump also decide to install a mini-split heat pump in his or her home, within six years all 250,000 NL households will have mini-splits installed ---- reducing island-wide energy use by between 20% and 30% annually. What will that do the viability of Muskrat Falls (which in order to be viable requires, MUST HAVE, not a reduction, but an average INCREASE in domestic energy use of 0.8% per year, year over year, every year, for 50 years)? ----- AND WITH MUSKRAT FALLS, as energy use goes down, rates must go UP, WAY UP.
• Last year this government provided funds to the fish processing sector to reduce energy use in their processing plants. This year government (in the recent budget) is spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to reduce energy use in schools.  These initiatives SHIFT the costs of paying for Muskrat Falls, even more so, to homeowners. The less energy that is used by both the fish processing industry and government, the more rates must go UP for other users (HOMEOWNERS) in order to pay for Muskrat.  FIX THAT PARAMETER MR. BALL  .

• IN SHORT, NL RATEPAYERS ARE BEING TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS, due to:

1. monopoly legislation for Nalcor,
   
2. exemption of Muskrat Falls from PUB review,
   
3. shifting the core of the project so that Nova Scotia has become the principle beneficiary,
   
4. locking NL ratepayers into yearly rate increases (while subsidizing Nova Scotia),
   
5. legally preventing entrepreneurs from developing, producing and supplying cheap, energy efficient alternatives to homeowners,
   
6. locking Nalcor and the province into legal commitments to Nova Scotia (even if we do not have surplus power),
7. locking Nalcor and the province into paying damages in the event of failure to fulfill its obligations to Nova Scotia, to the federal government, and/or to Emera,
8. shifting a substantial portion  of the ownership of the island's transmission system to Emera,
   
9. including in the federal loan guarantee some 15-20 "default events" that could result in loss of ownership of Muskrat and other NL assets,
   
10. risking having to go to Quebec cap in hand for authority to manage the water flow in the river (without which there is little power available from Muskrat),
    
11. risk of having to spend billions more to stabilize the North Spur /Kettle Lakes (if possible)  ---- 
12. downward shifting our system's reliability (outage occurrences) from our customary average of 2-4 hours per year to the Northern Peninsula average of about ten (10) times that --- 20-40 hours per year (to say nothing of the potential for 1, 2 or 3-month long outages)
    
13. and on and on it goes.

                                  FIX THOSE PARAMETERS MR. BALL

19 April 2014

• Sound familiar?
• A reply to Nalcor's chairman of the board
  

• On April 17th, electrical engineer, Winston Adams commented on the recent Independent Engineer's Report (see BELOW). He commented, interestingly, that "It's almost as if they were told to avoid a review of reliability of the transmission line."   ------ Accordingly, while the Independent Engineer's Report is being sold as "independent", the "disclaimer" at the beginning of the report indicates that there may be nothing at all "independent" about it. The disclaimer states, in part, that "the document was prepared exclusively for the use of Nalcor, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Natural Resources, and MWH..." (MWH being the firm to which the independent engineer is attached).------------ Wasn't the Independent Engineer supposed to do independent oversight for the both the federal government AND the "lenders". ------ Both levels of government (federal and provincial)  have an interest in pushing this project through --- and the Independent Engineer seems to be taking his/her marching orders from both --- for both. Where is the independent oversight? Who is protecting NL ratepayers?
  

18 April 2014

• Liberal or Conservative ---- What's the difference?
  

• If Muskrat is delayed, but ultimately completed, there is no penalty, but must we provide Nova Scotia with the power we have contracted to provide if Muskrat is not completed at all ? -- excepts below are from the Nova Scotia utility Board's review of the Maritime Link.

Do these excerpts (below) allow for a "cancellation" of Muskrat Falls without NL incurring an obligation to still provide the power (or PAY DAMAGES) to Nova Scotia ?  ----   even a drought is NOT FORGIVABLE.

What premier? What government? What CEO? What kind of government agency (Nalcor) would sign off on and put the ratepayers of this province in this predicament ---- AND WHAT KIND OF OPPOSITION PARTY WOULD STAND BY AND ALLOW IT TO HAPPEN ????

Excerpts from Nova Scotia hearings (see graphics below);--

"The contractural arrangements between Emera and Nalcor do not allow for non-delivery of energy. If the energy is not delivered, Nalcor is liable to pay compensation damages to Emera. If the non-delivery is as a result of Government Action, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador has guaranteed payment by Nalcor the compensation damages. Risks relating to Muskrat Falls are borne by Nalcor."

"Lack of precipitation is expressly not a Force Majeure event and is therefore not a Forgivable Event under the Energy and Capacity Agreement. The NS Block will not be Curtailed for that reason."

CLICK TO ENLARGE


17 April 2014
A "Game Changer" for RELIABILITY ?

Comment on the Independent Engineer's Report from former NL Hydro electrical engineer, Winston Adams :--

Comment

• "As to the Independent Engineers Report, I cannot find a word as to the reliability issues for the island portion of the transmission line. Nothing on wind or ice loading. Nothing on 50 or 150 year reliability standard for the structures. Nothing on electrical faults due to flash overs from salt contamination, though this region of the Great Northern Peninsula has perhaps 10 times the incident rate than inland areas. Nothing on the risks of geomagnetic currents to induce outages, given Nfld has relatively high incident issues on existing systems,due to high earth electrical resistance and other factors of concern. They state only that there will be a transmission line! Hardly sober second thought. It's almost as if they were told to avoid a review of reliability of the transmission line. When I worked as a control and protection engineer with Nfld Hydro in the 1970s, these concerns were common and important to power engineers. Are they being dismissed by the cable guy engineers? One would hope not... but living in Logy Bay, I fear our future incident rate for outages will be more like the Great Northern Peninsula. 40 hours per year without power, or worse, instead of our average of 2 or 3 hours. Perhaps a dozen outages per year, and occuring in the dead of winter when wind blown salt does its work most effectively. I have personally lost faith in an organization, Nfld Hydro, that I had been proud to have worked for. Last month I purchased a back up generator, which speaks to my faith in our future electricity reliability. I had never considered this necessary over the past 30 years. These are not ordinary times. Perhaps 10 billion dollars will be spent for a system that appears may be far inferior in reliability. This will impact the Avalon and St. John's most. We were always at the mercy of the Istmus of the Avalon, but this, in my opinion, is a game changer for reliability."

• Final cost of Muskrat will exceed $10B, report reveals

15 April 2014

• "In Nova Scotia, Energy Minister Andrew Younger said news of the possible delay would have "zero impact" in his province in terms of cost or delivery of power. He said that's because under the project agreement, a delay requires Nalcor to deliver its promised allotment of energy by some other means or reimburse Nova Scotia Power for the cost."

• Independent Engineer's Report   
  

Excerpt from Independent Engineers Report:  ---- 10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

• "2. When available, Nalcor is requested to furnish to the IE for review the complete analysis of the North Spur including the laboratory test reports that determine the strength of the soils under the loadings that it will sustain during the life of the project."

Note, this recommendation was drafted BEFORE the completion of Nalcor's geotechnical and design fix.

NORTH SPUR and ADDITIONAL Churchill River NORTH BANK RISKS ("Progressive", "Bottleneck" & "Retrogressive" Slides)

• Letter to the Honourable Joan Shea, Minister of Environment and Conservation (from Cabot Martin, dated 24 February, 2014)

• Outline of concerns  by Dr. Bernander, January 2014 (which provides expert/technical support to several additional risks first raised here in November 2013)
  

12 April 2014

• Responsible development and oversight go hand in hand

• Hydro is blinkered by history

-------------------------
          You just can't make this stuff up.

• Here  are 10 things Simone Browne, NL Hydro's Energy Conservation Manager, suggested people could do on Earth Hour 2014.

11 April 2014

• Invitation for Public Participation

--------------------------

• Nalcor uses section 43.2(1) of ATIPPA (Bill 29) to refuse Access to Information request

10 April 2014

• NL Hydro wants new generator for Avalon (and ratepayers to pay for it --- PLUS Muskrat Falls)

---------------------------

• Excerpt from today's News Release by Natural Resources Minister Dalley

        "Our government’s decision to proceed with the construction of a third transmission line between Churchill Falls and Labrador West will ensure power for new               mining developments planned in the region, fuel further industrial growth, and improve reliability for all customers.
        This multi-billion dollar industry is significant for the province with annual shipments forecast to be near $3.8 billion and highly-skilled jobs for more than 8,000             people."

        Our fishing industry is a renewable resource with a production value of $1 billion, yet employs about 20,000 people --- almost all in our rural communities.

        If the export value of our non-renewable minerals is almost 4 times the production value of our fish resources and the mining industry employs less than half the                     number of people, is the province getting its fair share of return on this resource? Why are we so quick to spend $300 million of taxpayers money for what already             appears to be a very profitable industry ?

08 April 2014

• Excerpt from Bloomberg Businessweek:-

        Muskrat Falls is clearly a profound example of  "putting the cart before the horse", and government's Review of our Electrical System is without a doubt what should             have been done BEFORE any decision to proceed with Muskrat Falls.

        If this review does not allow for consideration of whether or not Muskrat Falls should be put on hold, whether the generation plant should be put on hold (but continue         perhaps instead with an improved/upgraded transmission line that by 2041 can be cost-effectively upgraded to handle Upper Churchill power), to switch to a tunnel             for the Strait of Belle Isle crossing, to scrap the exceedingly bad deal with Emera/Nova Scotia, etc. , then, while this review may be of some benefit, it is                       profoundly insufficient. 

07 April 2014

• Empty echoes

04 April 2014

• Husky Energy Inc. eyes Atlantic Canada LNG project

03 April 2014

• Muskrat Falls oversight committee a sham

01 April 2014

• Mad as hell over Muskrat

31 March 2014

“In 2019, I expect the dividends that will come to the Province from Muskrat Falls will be about half a billion dollars a year. I expect that before the Upper Churchill comes back (2041), I think those dividends are going to amount to $3 billion a year, each and every year.” --- Premier Marshall

Now this man has been the finance minister and the minister of natural resources. He should be intimately knowledgeable about Muskrat. Obviously he is not --- scary?

The Muskrat Falls graphic (left) is from one of Nalcor's 2011 media briefings.
 
Today Premier Marshall, in the House of Assembly, said that by 2041 Government would receive $3 billion per year in "dividends" from Muskrat Falls ( he later changed it to about $500 million, which is also not correct)

Look at Nalcor's own data, where can anyone get $3 billion a year from Muskrat? ALL that GREEN, red and blue is out of your pocket by way of your power bill (how can any of this be a 'dividend' or 'profit' for ratepayers, when all the money is coming out of ratepayers' pockets n the first place?)

On average, total MF revenues (from ratepayers) amount to about $700 million per year for 50 years, or about an additional $3,000.00 per household/ratepayer per year (note the dramatic increase in the last 20 years). Nalcor is taking all of this out of ratepayers' pockets.

By way of comparison, from 2001-2010, oil costs for Holyrood averaged $92 million per year --- about $380 per year per household/ratepayer).

So what impact do you think that change will have on your electricity bill ? Who is looking out for your interest?

How can our Premier speak of 1/2 billion per year and 3 billion by 2041 ?  Clearly, government has been sold a bill of goods and even the Premier does not know what he is talking about. Any revenue in excess of debt servicing and operating costs (about $15 BILLION over 50 years) is taken from ratepayers and passed over to Nalcor (and perhaps some to government).


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Excerpt from a report by Wayne Simpson, University of Manitoba and Douglas Gotham,  Purdue University
"...the U.S. estimates that a 10% increase in the price of electricity can be expected to reduce household load by around 5% in the long run
(http://www.e3network.org/ElasticitySurvey2_matt.pdf). Compounded annually, the projected 2% (real) increase in electricity prices over 30 years amounts to a whopping 80% increase in rates over and above general price inflation. ................ Applying the U.S. price elasticity estimates, however, implies that the 80% increase in prices would reduce load by 40% (since a 10% price increase would reduce load by 5%), implying that load per household would actually decline by about 25% over the 30 years due to rising electricity rates...."

So, how valid is Nalcor's load forecast?

Comment from Winston Adams
Comment
"The assumption that the load will decrease by about 25 to 30 percent due to increased cost of electricity appears valid, when assessed from the increased cost per kwh alone. The poorer class will suffer from this. But remember the customer has the option to reduce his consumption with efficient electric heatpump heating. Many middle class and people well off will do so. This decreases typical household use by 35 percent. Either way the consumption will go down. What may not go down is the peak demand. This requires customers to optimize their heatpump style and size, which is generally not done. So expenditures in generation and transmission assets will continue, making rates even higher. There is a requirement for the utilities to treat efficiency as a resource. Others do this. Our PUB seems to have the authority to Order it, and put us on this path of lower cost. The power companies will oppose it as long as the people or government don`t demand it. The Pub should show some leadership."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time to lift the veil of secrecy over Muskrat Falls

28 March 2014
Nalcor Energy sees change at the top
----------------------------------------------------------------------
(excerpt from VOCM website)
NDP Leader Lorraine Michael wants to know what the rest of the  one-billion dollars in borrowing will be used for. While half of it is for Nalcor, government has not specified where the remaining amount will go. She sees the funding for Nalcor projects a bigger problem than the unfunded pension liability.

27 March 2014 
Budget highlights
$514 million will go to Nalcor in the 2014/15 budget (for Muskrat Falls and equity in offshore oil).

The projected deficit for 2014-15 will be $537.9 million.

$81 million for road and bridges ---- at that rate it will take ~ 100 years to spend as much on our roads and bridges as Nalcor will spend over the next 3 years on Muskrat Falls (for power we do not need, cannot afford, and where Quebec courts will decide if we have control of the water flow) ---- potentially, an $8 billion expenditure -- for nothing (or perhaps more correctly --- for the benefit of Nova Scotia and Quebec)
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Customers remain without power in Western Newfoundland   Is this surprising? See March 25th  entry (below).

26 March 2014
Why Muskrat "Oversight" committee is a farce  ----- A MUST READ article by Des Sullivan
Excerpt:-
"In the absence of significant technical expertise, especially in the engineering, project management and financial fields, this Committee is incapable of giving Government either independent thought or serious review. .....  No one should be left with the impression that four career senior public servants, each heading major departments of Government, none knowing much, if anything, about a mega construction project or possessing engineering expertise, can undertake the role of oversight of Muskrat Falls.   Who would even think that four people, working part-time, could perform that which only a dedicated expert team, intelligently assembled, could possibly undertake? "

A commentator on the above article also states, in part,
"The issue of oversight on Muskrat Falls is blown out of proportion......To help the population reach a evidence based decision we need to understand what will this project cost. Release the schedule performance. Release the updated cost estimes. Released the earned value calculations. Give the public the information to the public, and let those who are paying for this project decided if it was worthwhile. Despite Ed Martin telling the people of the province that updated cost estimates would be provided Q1/Q2 of 2014, they now will not be released until July at the earliest. After the PC leadership convention. Which is unfortunate. The wake of Muskrat Falls will be the biggest political issue for the new premier. I for one would like the PC leaders to debate the project, with all the facts in the public domain. These delays are unacceptable, and purely political. It is Bull Shit, and there should be riots in the streets. "

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25 March 2014
Muskrat Reliability? (salt contamination a major  problem?
Comment From Graham (on The Telegram's Naked Lunch hosted by Peter Jackson) ---------- "Peter, for the year 2011, outages from flashovers for all Hydro for the province totaled 79. (----------) 63 of these were on the GNP (Great Northern Peninsula) , about 80 percent..... does that give you a shiver"

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23 March 2014
How is it that all during the Muskrat Falls PUB review, Nalcor consistently reported Total Island Firm Capacity as 1,958MW,  and now Nalcor is reporting it as 1,813 MW?
Where did 145 MW of firm capacity disappear to?
Even still, you will note that for 2013 Total Island Capacity was still almost 300 MW ABOVE  the Total Island Peak Demand, and back in 2004 it was not much more --- at approx.350 MW above (a mere ~ 50 MW change over 10 years).

Extracted from Nalcor's Blog

NOTE:-- For 2013 the non-NL Hydro portion of Peak Demand (top portion of grey area) is only about HALF that for each of the pre-2009 years (down considerably). Why then isn't more of the Island "total" and "firm" capacity available to supplement NL Hydro capacity? Or is it? If it is not available, why not?

Why is our government spending $8 - $10 billion in an unaffordable, unreliable, unneeded, high risk Muskrat Falls project to solve this occasional, short term peak demand issue -- if indeed (when you look at the already EXISTING installed, UNUSED, total capacity), there is even a capacity/demand issue. However, we do indeed have a maintenance problem.
1.6 percent is less than 6 days a year (a few hours intermittently spread out over a maximum 4 month wintertime period).

And now Nalcor wants to install another 100 MW of generation capacity somewhere on or near the Avalon. Poor planning (existing ,unused excess capacity with cancellation of an earlier plan for a 3rd transmission line) and poor maintenance (generator maintenance in winter and inadequate spare parts) . Another 100 MW generator will further drive up rates. It has been known for many years that demand has been shifting (not increasing) from off-Avalon (industrial) to on-Avalon (residential) --- see graphic (above) I prepared back in January using Nalcor data. A 3rd transmission line would have made it more difficult for Nalcor to push Muskrat down our throats. It would have kept rates down, helped prevent recent blackouts, and eliminated the need for an additional 100 MW turbine.

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22 March 2014

Interesting interview with Bill Barry (Muskrat Falls identified as a key issue, among others, around the 13 minute mark) --- from VOCM website.


20 March 2014
Re BREAKING NEWS item, 19 March 2014 (Comment  below is from electrical engineer Winston Adams)

Re Life Extension study at Holyrood. Hydro says these type of units generally have a 30 year life, if operated continuously. The units range from 34 to 44 years old. But based on actual operating hours they are from 16 to 21 years of use. Even units with a full 30 years of operating hours, can still operate with a high degree of reliability, due to appropriate life extension work. Holyrood units have operated typically at low capacity factors, ranging from 30 to 50 , and typical average Capacity factor of about 35 percent.
There has been considerable upkeep on these units and appear to have a long life potential, which this study will identify the costs for extended life. The tender seems to deviate from the past plan for Holyrood which was: to have high reliability for thermal generation to the year 2017, then as a standby generating plant for several years following 2017 ( when Muskrat Falls was to be connected to our grid, to replace Holyrood, with substancial savings on Holyrood maintenance, pollution equipments, and oil expenses). The standby mode for several years was to assure the overall reliability of MF as a replacement for Holyrood. Then Holyrood was to be decommissioned as a generating station. Yet much infrastructure would have to remain, since the large generators there would run as synchronous condensers. In this mode they would give voltage and frequency support to the grid.
This present tender goes beyond that plan. It reads;.. The plant may be required to continue operating as a seasonal base loaded thermal generating station after 2017.
This seems to put in doubt that Holyrood will be decommissioned at all, that the saving to justify MF may be no longer valid, and that we will (incur)  the expense of both MF and also the extended life costs for Holyrood well into the future. This study should define those costs for Holyroods new extended life. But this seems a radical departure from the prior plan for Holyrood. Why the change. Did the blackouts put a new light on the necessity of a reliable Holyrood for the Avalon. Will MF be short on winter power for Nfld, due to commitments to Nova Scotia. Do they fear failure of the Water Management Act from the court actions. Has their poor conservation and efficiency plan indicate(d) higher winter peak loads for the Avalon for heating. Could icing problems reduce MF power at critical times, as recently happened at Deer Lake Power and Exploits, and some smaller Nfld Power hydro sites.
Whatever the reason, there now seems they foresee a need to operate Holyrood for seasonal base load ....beyond 2017,... which is what it has always operated for.
Is the extension for one year or a decade or more.
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RE     HEAT PUMP  RESULTS
Compared to the same period last year, this month's energy use was down a daily average of 19%  (it was down 27.5% last month).
However, I think the 19% may be misleading.

On closer review of my electricity bill, I note that on average last year for the mid-Feb to mid-March period I used about 11% less energy per day compared to last year's mid-Jan to mid-Feb period. However, this year my daily average energy use for the mid-Feb to mid-March period (compared to this year's mid-Jan to mid Feb period) did not change.

This indicates that last year's mid-Feb to mid-March period must have been significantly warmer (the electricity bill shows that last year from the mid-Jan/mid- Feb to the mid-Feb/mid-March period daily average energy use was 11% less (clearly indicating a warmer period last year).

If therefore this year's mid-Feb to mid-March period were 'weather adjusted", it would appear that energy savings for this most recent 1 month period would have been very similar to last months (somewhere in the 25% - 30% range).

NOTE:-- For the 1st week of this 3rd full monthly period, energy use reduction appears back to around 28% (compared to the mid-Feb to mid-March period last year).

19 March 2014

BREAKING NEWS
Nalcor looking at extending the life of Holyrood?
Solicitation Title: Phase 2 Condition Assessment & Life Extension Study for Generating Station      

Where, then, is the 'so-called' cost advantage of Muskrat Falls?

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News Release from the Leader of the Official Opposition
Subject: No truly Independent Oversight on Muskrat Falls Project

March 19, 2014

For Immediate Release

No truly Independent Oversight on Muskrat Falls Project

Opposition Leader Dwight Ball is calling on Government to publicly release all documents pertaining to the Muskrat Falls Project, now that a new oversight committee has been struck. Yesterday in the House of Assembly Government revealed that there is nothing to prevent the public release of reports, not even the Bill 29 legislation.

“The Premier has gone on record as saying there is nothing in ATIPP legislation that prevents Government from voluntarily releasing information. His statements also applied to Bill 29 and documents presented to Cabinet,” said Ball. “A truly open and transparent Government would take the initiative to make public all documents on Muskrat Falls including those of the newly formed oversight committee.”

Meanwhile Ball is questioning the autonomy of a committee made up of senior bureaucrats that will provide oversight into Nalcor’s spending on the construction phase of the Muskrat Falls Project.  Now that Government has admitted the need for more oversight of the multi-billion dollar project, they should also ensure the participation of the Auditor General.

“Government is crafting a committee that will report directly to Cabinet. Government has the authority, under Section 16 of the Act, to request that the AG provide oversight of Nalcor’s role in the Muskrat Falls Project, however they are refusing to make that request,” said Ball. “We have come to expect this from a Government that believes saying something is the same as doing something.”

Ball is challenging Government to commit to a truly independent oversight of the Muskrat Falls Project instead of leaving it in the hands of a bureaucratic committee of Government, with oversight by Nalcor.

-30-

Media Contact:            Carla Foote| Director of Communications| Office of the Official Opposition| 729-6151| 691-6673 E copies @ www.liberaloppositionnl.com
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My HEAT PUMP RESULTS for mid Feb. 2014 to mid Mar. 2014:--
Average daily energy usage (KWh)  was 23.5% more over the same period last year (or 19% less over the same period this year).

A much colder period this year and a much warmer period last year may account for a lower efficiency improvement than recorded last month. Nevertheless, still a significant savings.


18 March 2014
Is this a government that wants ratepayers to use LESS electricity --- when they need your cash to pay for its unneeded government project -- Muskrat Falls? The Federal Loan Guarantee requires NL ratepayers to pay for Muskrat --- no matter what? If we use LESS energy, then rates have to go up.
Province says conserve, but cuts aid for energy efficiency

17 March 3015

Excerpt from VOCM web site:--
"Rob Henderson, Vice President of NL Hydro responded to the accusations on VOCM Backtalk with Pete Soucy, saying that while there were operational issues in early 2013 due to contaminated oil, those were unrelated to the failure of Generator One.  
Henderson says the 2013 implosion was due to lubrication issues, and not fuel quality.   He says that while the release from the PUB Intervenor states that fuel shipments were up to 25 times the limit of aluminum and silicon, Henderson is unaware of any specified limit for that type of fuel in a thermal plant.     He says there is no local or industry standard that he knows about recommended alumina/silica levels for a thermal plant."

• Hydro knew dirty fuel bad for Holyrood, Dumaresque says
  

• Dirty fuel may have caused power blackouts, Dumaresque says

• Hands tied by Bill 29
  

• Excerpt from today's Telegram :---- "Just in case you were wondering who was going to be paying for the new $300 million-or-so power line in Labrador — needed to supply future iron mining ventures — the provincial cabinet made it official on Feb. 13 with Order in Council OC2014-034. But you can read all of it for yourself: “Under the authority of section 5.1(1) of the Electrical Power Control Act, 1994, the Lieutenant Governor in Council is pleased to direct the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities to review the costs incurred by Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in the planning, design, and construction of a new 230 kV transmission line project between Churchill Falls and Labrador West, as described in the Labrador West Transmission Exemption Order, and where the board determines that costs were prudently incurred within the scope of the project, the board shall include such costs in Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro’s rate base for recovery in Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro’s rates.” Well, cabinet may be pleased — ratepayers, not so much."

15 march 2014
DEER LAKE POWER
Water to be released through Main Dam next week

• Readers will note that during the Muskrat Falls PUB review (see Nalcor's Exhibit 10a), Deer Lake Power was listed as part of the "Purchases" group.

Would the availability of excess Deer Lake Power capacity have eliminated any 'apparent' reserve/buffer challenges on the Avalon? This energy is being spilled over the dam (wasted). Would this power also have helped eliminate any apparent need for Nalcor's high risk, high cost, low reliability pet project ---- Muskrat Falls?


14 March 2014
Further to my inquiry to the PUB (see my 04 March entry below), here is the response I received 11 March 2014.

QUOTE:
Mr. Adams:

I apologize for not replying earlier. My reply to you had been saved in my draft message box.

This is further to your email of March 4, 2014.

We have reviewed the Board’s letter of January 10, 2014 directing Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro to file daily reports of the status of the Island Interconnected System and are satisfied that the information currently being provided by Hydro meets the requirements outlined in that letter.

The graphical representation at the top of the report is in addition to the information originally requested by the Board and shows the activities of Hydro’s owned and controlled generation resources for the immediately preceding day on a minute by minute basis as recorded through Hydro’s Energy Control Centre.

The generation and transmission system serving the Total Island System is not controlled by a single entity. Customer owned generation is controlled by the customer owning the generation to meet their demand. Hydro does not currently have the capability of monitoring customer supplied generation on a minute by minute basis and therefore this information cannot be reported by Hydro or included in the graphical presentation.  Hydro does obtain limited data which is included with its own data and reported in the Total Island System information contained at the bottom of the report. This data is manually sourced through direct contact with the owner customer.

I trust this responds to your inquiry.

Cheryl Blundon

Board Secretary
UNQUOTE

Readers please note that notwithstanding the above, effective 11 March 2014, the 'format' of NL Hydro's daily reports have been changed for the purpose of providing more clarity.
Also, please note that I have again requested more substantive changes (partial information, NL Hydro only data, may portray a smaller reserve/buffer than otherwise would be the case).
Maurice Adams

13 March 2014
Why not the PUB?

12 March 2014
Iron ore price craters 8%
Iron failings

09 March 2014
Atlantic disconnect   (link to an excellent article on Muskrat Falls in the Atlantic Business Magazine). Excellent overview of the wishful thinking of the drivers of this boondoggle, how water flow at Muskrat could at times be a trickle without Quebec's signature on a water management agreement, and many other things.

06 March 2014
NDP proposal to fix Ontario's energy woes veers into crazy talk   (sound familiar)
Also,
Cod tales  
And,  The case against Muskrat Falls

04 March 2014
In early January, the PUB requested that NL Hydro provide daily reports containing the following:

"Commencing Monday, January 10, 2014 and continuing until advised otherwise, the Board requests that Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro ("Hydro") file, by 9:00 am each morning, a report on the status of the Island Interconnected system providing at a minimum the following information:
1. The previous day's peak demand;
2. The previous day's total available generation from Hydro sources only;
3. The previous day's total available generation from all sources; and
4. The forecast peak for the current day"

While Nalcor has long confirmed that the island's NET  capacity is 1,958 MW (now down recently to 1,946MW), it appears that what Nalcor is showing in the info-graphic contained in its reports (see link to NLH's 02 March report below) is "NLH's system" capacity/demand only, and not the Island Interconnected System capacity  and "generation from all sources" as requested by the PUB.

See Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (NLH System Supply and Demand Report) to the PUB, dated 02 March 2014.

It seems that the info-graphic presented by NLH tends to always show a much smaller gap between actual demand/system supply than would be the case if the graphic contained the total Island Interconnected System capacity/demand (from all sources) and the actual demand, as requested by the PUB.

Accordingly, I have today asked the PUB to consider whether it should  request NL Hydro to provide the information that the Board originally requested (net capacity from all sources and actual demand).

Copy of my email to the PUB is below:

---- Original Message ----
From: Maurice E. Adams <[email protected]>
To: cblundon <[email protected]>
Sent: Tue, Mar 4, 2014 10:23 am
Subject: NLH Daily Reports

Good morning Ms. Blundon.

I write concerning the Board's request to NL Hydro of January 2014 wherein the Board required NL Hydro to provide daily reports on the status, not only of NL Hydro's generation systems, but the status of the Island Interconnected System "from all sources".

You will note that NL Hydro itself (in its presentation to the Board) describes the Island Interconnected System as follows:

Island Interconnected System Supply
Installed Capacity
Hydro owned and operated 1,507.5 MW
Purchased                              178.8 MW
Customer Owned                   259.8 MW
Total Supply                         1,946.1 MW

However, the reports provided by NL Hydro includes an info-graphic with a GREEN line which represents not the Island Interconnected System capacity from all sources, but only the NL Hydro system capacity (and demand).

Accordingly, I would respectfully submit that even though the Board has asked for daily reports on the status of the supply and demand from both NL Hydro's system and from all sources (i.e. the Island Interconnected System), then I would submit that it is inadequate (and potentially misleading, and likely misleading for the general public) for these reports to show (graphically) only the difference between the NL Hydro capacity/demand and not also the difference between the Island interconnected System capacity (from all sources) and demand.

I would respectfully ask therefore that the Board consider what seems to be an oversight by NL Hydro, and that the Board request NL Hydro to either replace the info-graphic so as to show the total Island Interconnected System capacity/status/demand or a separate graph (in addition to the one already provided) which shows the full picture and the full buffer available between what the Island Interconnected NET capacity actually is and the actual demand.

Respectfully,
Maurice Adams
Paradise, NL

773 1564


03 March 2014

Below is an article by Graham Lane (former Chair of the Manitoba PUB)

Gas-Fired Generation Plant in Brandon

Manitoba Hydro, pressured by the provincial government, continues to spend and make commitments for its $22-billion “preferred development plan”. The plan involves the construction of Bipole III, down the extreme west side of the province and through prime agricultural land, and two new northern dams, Keeyask and Conawapa (the dams in partnership with First Nations, their investments largely borrowed from Hydro).
If, instead of implementing its plan, the Utility built a 850-MW gas-fired generating plant in Brandon, as advocated by Len Evans, a former NDP Cabinet Minister, Hydro could shelve Bipole III and Keeyask and, when the time came, decommission rather than replace Pointe du Bois, while increasing the Utility's overall capacity and diversifying power generation, thereby reducing risks due to drought.
The cost of such a plant would likely be no more than $1.25-billion, 5 per cent of what the Utility plans to spend on its current plans. No need to borrow $20 billion, thus less capital tax, debt guarantee fees and interest costs for ratepayers to bear.  As well, with a gas-fired plant there would be no water rental fees levied by the Province, further reducing the cost loaded on to ratepayers, and no need for partners. Documents filed by Hydro at PUB's restricted review confirm the expectation of massive new revenue for government associated with the "preferred development plan".
The construction of the gas-fired plant in Brandon would involve about 800 construction and 50 on-going well-paying jobs for the area. It would also provide an opportunity to extract natural gas from southwestern Manitoba's share of the Bakken field, which is already producing oil.  More resource jobs, along with pipeline construction to carry the gas to Brandon. The economic boost to the area would be in the hundreds of millions,
The demand for electricity in Manitoba is nowhere near high enough to justify the current plan. There has been no new major industry for Manitoba in over ten years, with some operations either shut down (Tembec) or planned to be reduced (Vale and HudBay). Recently, despite Manitoba's low electricity prices and advantageous central geographic location in Canada, Rogers and Facebook took their expansions elsewhere. Rather than counting on increased industrial activity, Hydro plans to export more power to American utilities, and boost Manitoba rates by more than 100%.
The ‘known’ problems associated with Hydro’s plans include a history of bad forecasts, including ever-increasing construction cost projections and excessive expectations for the demand for electricity. Low natural gas prices and sluggish growth in industrial demand have led to low wholesale spot electricity prices. Adding to these concerns, there is increasing opposition from landowners as to the Bipole III route and the very real risk of a substantial jump in interest rates.  And, there is growing recognition of needed repairs, upgrades and expansions to Hydro’s infrastructure, adding another $12 billion to the capital expenditure bill. Under the current plan, future challenges would be met by a system for electricity generation that lacks diversity--the next drought could devastate Hydro’s financial position and require even higher rate increases.
In aggregate, Hydro’s current forecast calls for large-scale borrowing by the provincial government. Governments have only so much room to borrow before credit rating agencies downgrade their credit rating, potentially bringing sharp increases in interest rates on the Province's growing debt.
Let’s summarize some of the advantages of adding a Brandon gas-fired plant to Manitoba Hydro's generation mix:
-    Ability to develop Manitoba’s own natural gas resources;
-    Generating new Brandon jobs for construction and continuing operation;
-    Reducing the risks that lie with borrowing tens of billions of dollars;
-    Eliminating the need for complex partnerships;
-    Reducing the current forecast of 4% annual increases in rates for Manitobans;
-    Reducing the volumes of imported electricity required in times of drought;
-    Improving Manitoba’s balance of payments;
-    Increasing security of supply, a reduced dependency on lengthy power lines; and
-    Eliminating transmission line damage to Manitoba's prime agricultural lands.
Government has stated that it has no interest in a gas-fired generation, yet Manitoba Hydro has had inefficient gas-fired turbines for a decade or more to provide the surplus capacity required to meet export rules.  Does the loss of revenue for government that would occur with a Brandon gas-fired plant - due to no water rentals and much reduced levies on Hydro for capital tax and debt guarantee fees - play a role in its opposition to such a plant?
The building of new northern dams, with the additional transmission required for conveying the power south, west, or east, should await a different day.  Deferral would allow time for improved market opportunities to develop, reducing risks now present.
Let’s re-evaluate the situation, put away ideologically based blinders and take a serious look at what likely would be the safest and most economical way to meet Manitoba’s current power needs.  Hydro's objectives used to be reliability and lowest possible rates, let's go back to them.
Graham Lane is a retired Chartered Accountant. He is also the former Chair of the Public Utilities Board.

02 March 2014

Is Quebec's electricity business model broken?      (link to The Financial Post)        
Excerpt:---
"... if government leaders and Hydro officials had taken better stock of the situation, they may never have approved ground-breaking at La Romaine in the first place. As for all the regional development groups and promoters in the province clamouring for new renewable power generation projects in their towns, he says they’re delusional."

Also:--
Ontario Could Save Billions By Buying Quebec's Hydro Power

01 March 2014
Readers may recall my Feb. 7 letter to The Telegram So happy to share our wealth with the world     
If I recall correctly, Turkey is one of the countries that has received from Nalcor one or more large contracts associated with the Muskrat Falls project.

Below is the latest I have read regarding alleged "...corruption in large construction...projects" in Turkey.

Corruption, meet Turkey  (link to column by Gwynne Dyer).  NOTE this quote, there has been " ...criticism of official corruption in large construction and real estate projects ....In the alleged phone calls on Dec. 17, the prime minister is asking his son Bilal to dispose of millions of euros in cash that are currently sitting in a house somewhere. Bilal is to entrust the money to several businessmen for safekeeping and make sure that none is left in the house."

28 February 2014
Alderon's transmission line:--

These are quotes from The Telegram's Peter Jackson (from his Naked Lunch discussion today) -------

"1:26 Peter Jackson:
OK, Graham. Ashley is trying to explain the Alderon assurance. That is all it is. It is not a contribution to the capital cost of the line, just a guarantee on power purchases. If they decide to go elsewhere, they default. So in that sense, no, it is not cash down. It is essentially a bond..................

1:28 Peter Jackson:
Yes, but again, it is not money down on the cost of the line. They are assuring their commitment to purchase power."  .

27 February 2014
Just one short quote from Ed Hollett's blog today wherein he quotes Kathy Dunderdale (and others) in the House some time back:--

“With the introduction into the House of Assembly of the proposed Energy Corporation Act we are establishing a new energy corporation to separate the regulated operations of Hydro from the unregulated operations of the energy corporation. By completing this restructuring, our government is ensuring that energy investments in non-regulated activities will not affect electricity rates." http://bondpapers.blogspot.ca/2014/02/the-sound-of-silence-nlpoli.html

So Nalcor was never supposed to undertake any activity that would affect electricity rates, yet we have Muskrat Falls.

Also, the purpose of the enabling legislation was/is to "separate" Nalcor's non-regulated activities (such as Muskrat Falls) from Hydro's regulated activities (yet Ed Martin is the CEO of both and the Board of Directors for both Nalcor and NL Hydro are almost identical) ------ see   Nalcor                     NL Hydro

25 February 2014
If you need to acquire of sense of how well this Muskrat Falls project in being overseen by our provincial government. you must listen to the 2 interviews below that The Telegram's James MacLeod had yesterday with our Minister of Natural Resources, Derrick Dalley.

Interview 1       Interview 2

24 February 2014
Government not talking to independent Muskrat Falls watchdog    (link to The Telegram article)

22 February 2014
Dialogues start with information  (link to article by David Vardy and Ron Penney in The Weekend Telegram)

19 February 2014
Key (Muskrat Falls related) portions of the PUB's planned Investigations and Hearing Issues:
(copied from today's PUB information release)

Evaluation of Island Interconnected system adequacy and reliability up to and after the interconnection with the Muskrat Falls generating facility

• Load forecasting methodologies
• Utility coordination of system operations and load growth planning
• Asset management strategies for generation and transmission assets, including maintenance of the Holyrood plant and the gas turbines
• Adequacy of resources to manage capital and operating programs

• New generation options and the role of conservation and demand management to address load growth until the interconnection, including consideration of possible delays in the interconnection
  

• Back-up generation and/or alternative supply requirements after interconnection
• Other system planning, capital and operational issues which may impact adequacy and reliability before and after interconnection

It seems "adequacy and reliability" are key.

18 February 2014
                                                                                                               HEAT PUMP RESULTS
                                                                                                                                       (Actual)

Installed a mini-split heat pump in my 33-year old home on December 14th, 2013.  This house has had no insulation upgrading since it was built in 1981.

Average electricity usage is down ---- from 112 KWh  per day last year to 81 KWh per day this year (calculated over the billing period from mid-January to mid-February).

This equates to an average 27.7% reduction in energy usage, and means that last year on average 38.8% more energy per day was needed to provide the same level of heat and electrical energy to the home.

This savings was achieved even though only about 50% of the 24,000 BTU capacity of my outdoor heat pump unit was being utilized (currently using only one 12,000 BTU indoor unit, while the system has the capacity to add up to two more indoor units).

While it is perhaps too early to provide a clear statement as to the expected payback period for the $4,600.00 supply and installation cost, I expect (based on this early evidence) that payback will be in the range of 4 years.

Clearly, such preliminary results also points to the potential for a total island reduction in energy demand in excess of 25%, thereby not only negating the need for Muskrat Falls, but savings for the provincial treasury of billions of dollars in unneeded generation and transmission line costs and dramatically reducing rather than increasing ratepayers' power bills.

NOTE:   Winston Adams (an electrical engineer) also points out (among other things) that "...since this is a reduction on your total energy use, which also has hot water, stove, refrigerators, TV, computer, and lights etc, this suggests a saving on your heating of about 50 percent reduction...."

17 February 2014

"If there is any one thing related to the Muskrat Falls project that is, in my opinion, perverted, it is not the government's communications strategy, not government's single-minded approach, not a poor leadership style by the government. Instead, it is Nalcor's application of industry's decision gate (DG) project planning process". ("Nalcor should be brought to task") --- article by M. Adams, The Telegram (09 November, 2013).

To understand the truth of the above observation, read today's UNCLE GNARLEY blog --- an article ("The right side of history") by JM.

Excerpt:--
"...Nalcor abandoned its own Gated Management Process...If Muskrat Falls is not a success, historians will view the DG2 endorsement as the critical failure point in Nalcor’s governance."

14 February 2014
Report alleges Federal agency boss took 1.5m in kickbacks from snc-lavalin    (re bridge contract in Montreal)

10 February 2014
Population plunge predicted for Newfoundland and Labrador

08 February 2014
Below is an excerpt (and link) from DUNSKY Energy Consulting report (link to Manitoba PUB). Also, NOTE the cost of "efficiency" improvements, Figure 5., compared to additional power generation such as hydro and others :--

GETTING LOCKED IN TO CAPITAL PLANS

"In theory, a plan is only a plan – it does not in and of itself lock in capital commitments beyond
those immediately required. My concern, however, is that once a utility commits to new capital
plans (as opposed to future DSM, PPAs, or other resources) , reversing those plans becomes
exceedingly difficult, as momentum, expectations and interests align to push those plants
forward, no matter what the alternatives. From our experience, the resulting fate is too often
repeated, resembling a four-part act:

1. the utility commits to building (because it fails to fully account for alternatives and risk);

2. the utility proceeds to build in spite of new “facts on the ground” or alternative options
(no matter how glaringly obvious they may become);

3. the utility finds itself awash in (needlessly expensive) surplus energy; and

4. the utility scrambles to find demand for its new supply – by selling at a loss (whether to
similarly depressed export markets or to new loads through generous rate subsidies),
and/or by reducing or eliminating its lower-cost DSM programs.

I have watched this play out in my own province, where we are currently inundated with surplus
power and selling it at a fraction of what it cost us to build (at tremendous cost to the
economy)."


07 February 2014
So happy to share our wealth with the world  

Comment from Phil Earle (on the above-noted letter):-
phil earle February 08, 2014 - 04:28 Ahhhh dear scribe your vision transcends the crass monetary manipulations of the megalomanias who's champions and high priests in secluded temples expound upon on the moon and stars. Only their argosies can sail the seas of nectar and oganate on the intoxicated ambrosia of the Gods! Even the brilliant mystic Archimedes, who jumped out of the bath tub running into the streets giving away 100 of his oxen to the poor on his discovery, could not touch the stately economic donations and favors our confederate priests bestow upon our countries, and the worlds, capitalists. Our high priests have even surpassed all other parts of the country in bestowments as their average of this bestowment is 15% of GDP while our confederate temple bestows 35% . That is 35% of what ever our NL government produces in value is taken off the top, by our siders, never a penny of which is ever seen again in this province. I heard that the Williams and dunderdale PC party members have been building summer homes on the Ross Ice Shelf ..! With out door swimming pools to..!! All this was leaked by an insider to me (Bill 29 I suppose)....! He told me they know that when global warming melts the shelf there will be rivers of water run off and with their expertise in hydro muskrat power they will build the worlds biggest power generator. Their working on 2 small remaining problems however....the first, how to build a zero resistant 10,0000 mile under water transmission line to America and second where to find, not 500,000 conscripted Nlers to pay for it, but 500,000,000 NL conscripties!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


05 February 2014
Can Alderon Iron Ore Have Their Power Lines?  (link to Rock Solid Politics), see excerpt below:

"Should we place one penny in the Alderon/Lab West transmission line? No. And frankly neither should Alderon's shareholders. Bottom line is without a court tested water management agreement, so there is actually power to send down the transmission line, and until Hydro-Quebec get's on board and allows the modification of the Upper Churchill facilities (which in the Power Contract includes roads, lines, town site, everything) no more power can be sent to Lab West - not one kwh.

It's time the government was honest with the people, and say: " Look we came to an agreement with Hydro-Quebec to swap documents and examine each other's witnesses, and that's agreed by court order to take to August 2015, then we go to court, and then we may have to appeal all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. We feel it would be irresponsible to spend money on a line like that until we are sure we can send power down it. Wouldn't be fair to taxpayers or Alderon's shareholders."

03 February 2014
Consumer Advocate: The Lap Cat Has No Claws   (link to UNCLE GNARLEY blog)

01 February 2014
Ratepayers and risks

30 January 2014
Discussion about Muskrat Falls should be based on facts (link to article by Nalcor's Gilbert Bennett published in today's Telegram)
I would also encourage readers to read the comments at the bottom of Mr. Bennett's article).

26 January 2014
Second thoughts on Muskrat Falls  (link to The Telegram, wherein the writer asks -- "Was there a less costly option than Muskrat? ")
BELOW is my comment on the above-noted article :--

Maurice E. Adams January 25, 2014 - 14:11 CORRECTED COPY ---- John Smith, government and FictionOrFact keep pushing the fictional $2.2 billion advantage for MF, and say MF is thereby the least cost option as compared to any other option for the province. FACT, I recently installed a heat pump in my 33 year old, electric baseboard-heated house for $4,600 and am averaging a per day reduction in energy use of 35%. At that rate, government could install such unit in every residence on the island for $1 billion. That would reduce energy use by between 25 and 40% and would beat Muskrat Falls as the 'least cost option' to the tune of about $6 billion. We do not need "more power". The island's maximum capacity is 2,500 MW, the island's NET (FIRM) capacity is 1,958MW ---- and during the recent "peak" demand period Nalcor reported that we hit a momentary 1,720 MW ---- almost 800 MW BELOW the island's maximum, and more than 200 MW below our existing "firm"/ NET capacity ----- Nalcor just did not keep the EXISTING, INSTALLED NET CAPACITY maintained ------- why not ???

25 January 2014
Bill Barry to Seek PC Leadership
I guess that will mean real, authentic "change".

After all, it was only this past November, in his letter to The Telegram that Mr. Barry referred to those who expressed concerns about his pet issue (CETA) as people who demonstrated "hysteria" and "stupidity" ---- no doubt, a real change from how government described those who expressed concerns about its multi-billion dollar Muskrat Falls boondoggle --- "naysayers" --- and other such 'respectful' phrases.

Real change --- "You betcha".

I guess we will also soon see whether Tom Marshall will indeed push -----"reset".

We will soon know if government will again bypass our PUB and use taxpayers/ratepayers money (this time, $240 million) to build a 3rd transmission line from Churchill Falls to Danny's/Alderon's KAMI mining project in Labrador West.

Real change?  Or real, re-affirmed allegiance to the PC Party's corporate agenda?  ---- all at the expense of taxpayers/ratepayers.

24 January 2014
Taxpayers' dollars used to help fish processors reduce energy costs
(and which will help drive up costs for other ratepayers, as Muskrat legislation requires ratepayers to pay whatever it takes to pay off Muskrat Falls). If industry pays less, residential ratepayers MUST pay more.
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Copper and Zinc Mine Closing in Central  (another reduction in power demand?)
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Also, I had a mini-split heat pump installed in my 33 year old home on December 14, 2013 and will provide some very interesting results to readers after my next heat bill arrives (around mid February).

23 January 2014
Call for PUB or Courts to Appoint Consumer Advocate

22 January 2014
Excerpt from South China Morning Post:---
Hebei Iron may face closer watch
Steelmaker's foreign deals could be under greater scrutiny amid the sudden removal of its chairman over corruption allegations

"Huge foreign investments made by Hebei Iron and Steel may face greater scrutiny by anti-graft investigators on the mainland and elsewhere after allegations of embezzlement and mismanagement at the company saw the sudden removal of its chairman, Wang Yifang................The most recent foreign forays made on Wang's watch include July's purchase by Hebei Iron and Steel of a 35 per cent stake in South African-listed Palabora Mining, where the Chinese firm was part of a consortium that acquired 74.5 per cent of South Africa's biggest copper-mining firm for US$476 million; a C$194 million (HK$1.4 billion) deal in April 2012 with Canada's Alderon Iron Ore for a stake in mining assets....."

21 January 2014
Is there any difference between the governing PC Party and Dwight Ball?   Wabush Calling for Third Hydro line to be Released  (Ball asking for line TO DANNY'S KAMI PROJECT to be EXEMPT FROM THE PUB !!!!!!)

One Unit at Holyrood Operating at 50 Per Cent  (link to VOCM website)

20 January 2014
Full-page Hydro advertisement adds insult to injury (link to The Telegram)
Muskrat Falls "On Ice": News from the field (link to UNCLE GNARLEY)

18 January 2014
Hydro-Quebec/Nalcor Management Order   (according to Brad Cabana ---  the court hearing in Quebec that, in part, would determine if Nalcor's Water Management Agreement is on firm legal ground, has been moved from January 20, 2014 to August 2015. Cabana suggests that while this change protects Hydro Quebec's interests and preserves any rights it may have for damages, a delay in the court hearing is to the detriment of this province. He describes this latest maneuver as being  "One government bound and determined to build its gallows. Another watching with glee."

Why would Nalcor want a Quebec court in the coming weeks to decide that Nalcor's so-called Water Management Agreement is not on solid legal ground?

Like other "bad news" elements that would reflect badly on its pet Muskrat Falls project ---- much better to put it off until this province is hook, line and sinker (to a point of no return) into an unneeded, unaffordable, high risk dinosaur of a project.

17 January 2014
PUB Pre-hearing Conference

PUB Requests for Information

16 January 2014
The Vibrant Unsustainable Super Energy Debt Warehouse
Excerpt from Ed Hollett's blog :-
"Newfoundland and Labrador is an energy super warehouse where rolling blackouts may become the new normal. (It is not a crisis)   It is a “have” province with so much money rolling in that the government must borrow and increase the public debt to keep everything running while the finance minister claims debt is going down."

14 January 2014
A MUST LISTEN 2 hour, easy to understand, Muskrat Falls overview on talkradio between Sue Kelland-Dyer and Danny Dumaresque

Underestimating peak load and the potential impact on the Muskrat Falls solution  (link to an essay by JM published by Ed Hollett)

13 January 2014
VOCM talk radio host
Tim Powers -- a lobbyist from Nalcor  AND ALDERON?

12 January 2014
NL Hydro withdrew applications for Holyrood upgrades in 2012  (apparently, shortly after Muskrat Falls was sanctioned).

Excerpt:
"Please be advised that Hydro is withdrawing four projects from its 2013 Capital Budget Application. These are all Holyrood Thermal Generating Station projects and are being withdrawn from Hydro's 2013 application due to refinements and changes in the anticipated deployment of Holyrood with the sanctioning of the Muskrat Falls project" ...................................

10 January 2014

There is a CBC outline of our power system and recent outage timeline HERE (NOTE, while the timeline info from Nalcor confirms that peak demand hit 1,532 MW during the outages, in fact 1,532 MW  is below our 12 year average peak and for 6 of the last 12 years our demand has peaked well above 1,532 MW, see below).

Public Utilities Board to hold inquiry and hearing

Ontario exporting electricity at 2-3 cent wholesale prices     (so NL ratepayers will pay approx. 40 cents / KWh to build and produce Muskrat power so that we can give 20% to Nova Scotia for no revenue for 35 years and almost twice as much more again up to 2041 for the "market" price (which is 2-3 cents / Kwh) ----- great energy policy for ratepayers.

Ratepayers (Vardy and Penney) submission to the PUB

Nalcor's report to the PUB
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09 January 2014

Excerpt from Nalcor's report to the PUB:  

"January 8, 2014
Transmission System –Sunnyside Transformer T1, 138 KV bus B2 and transmission line TL212 currently out of service. Burin Peninsula customers supplied via TL219"
Next Steps
•  Complete investigations of Holyrood switchyard and Sunnyside Terminal Station T1 incident"

My question.

If "generation" is the main problem (in part, due to high demand), why is the first "Next  step"  ---- not "generation related" issues as such ---- but "Transmission System" issues?

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Premier announces an independent review of electricity system

Sound encouraging?    Don't get carried away.
The review will "...will look at the operation, management and regulation of our system to ensure a smooth transition into an interconnected system in 2017"

In other words, a mechanism to drive home the completion of Muskrat falls (the 2012 "interconnected system" referred to above).

-------------------------------------------------------------

During the power outages, Nalcor made much of the fact that its gas turbines at "Hardwoods" and "Stephenville" were not working and that that was a significant contributor to the rolling blackouts.

Here is the what BOTH of the these turbines contributed to the generation capacity in 2010:

Hardwoods   ----- 3, 088,800 (KWh?)
Stephenville  -----      381,600
Total                       3,470,400

While NL Hydro's total net generation was 5,066,331,338

Therefore, these two turbines only contributed less than 1/10 of 1% to our energy needs.

So I ask ---- how much of a factor was these much-touted generation outages?

How much was the issue therefore one of "generation" capacity?
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Muskrat Falls and the power of obstinacy     Excerpt:--- "The rolling blackouts of recent days are the result of reliance on existing electricity infrastructure that has been starved of investment while Ms. Dunderdale’s government places all its bets on Muskrat Falls."

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08 January 2014

A "system/distribution" problem?

This power shortage (rolling blackouts, etc.) seems more and more like a "system" distribution/capacity problem, rather than a generation shortage problem ----- in short, little or no proper planning, upgrading and maintenance in response to the shift in demand from western/central NL to the Avalon..

Nalcor's Planning document (section 3, System Capability) states --- "Hydro is the primary supplier of system capability to the Island Interconnected System, accounting for 78 percent of its net (generation) capacity...." ........ 78 % of 1,958 MW (our island NET generation capacity) is 1,548.3 MW . ..... So is this the capacity limit (nominally, 1,550 MW) that Nalcor's Dawn Daley was concerned about? .... Over the last 12 year period  (for half of those years) the total island peak demand was about 1,600 MW (way above our recent peaks --- without incident).

But much of that historical peak was due to high "industrial" load in western and central NL (so our distribution capacity on the Avalon was required to handle a lower share of the load).

Now, that load has shifted to the Avalon. The total island demand has not increased, but merely shifted to an area (the Avalon) where Nalcor/NL Hydro has failed to upgrade our distribution/capacity network.   

WHY? --- Poor, inadequate planning, insufficient upgrading and maintenance.

Accordingly, there is  no need for Muskrat, whose purpose is supposedly to replace Holyrood's GENERATION capacity, but with an even more UNRELIABLE 1,400 kilometer extension cord (distribution system).               

With Muskrat --- will we be going from bad to WORSE?

Someone should be fired.


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NALCOR: THE SPIN DOCTOR DOES NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE
(article from UNCLE GNARLEY'S blog)

07 January 2014

Consumer advocate calls for inquiry

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Opposition points finger at proposed power line
NOTE:--- please take particular note of the comment by former NL Hydro electrical engineer (Winston Adams) at the bottom of the above-noted Telegram article.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
PEAK DEMAND?

On or about Thursday of last week Nalcor's Dawn Daley said that the peak demand on the system is reaching an all time high of 1,550 megawatts (MW) and in recent days much has been said by Government and Nalcor (one and the same) about how peak demand last week was "35% higher than our average over the last 5 years".

Here is an email I received from Nalcor some time ago which gives the Island Interconnected PEAK DEMAND for both years 2012 and 2013:---

QUOTE:

Thanks Maurice for the reminder.

The total Island Consumption for 2012 was 7686.7 GWh.
On a weather adjusted basis Total Island Consumption for 2012 is 7913.3 GWh.

Annual peak demand for the Island Interconnected System for 2012 was 1550 MW and occurred in January 2012.
The peak demand for the  Island Interconnected System during this past winter was 1570 MW and occurred in February 2013.

Please let me know if you need any additional information.

Thanks
Karen
  Karen O'Neill
Vice President (Acting)
Corporate Relations
Nalcor Energy
t. 709.737.1427  c. 709.690.2012  f. 709.737.1816
e. [email protected]
w. nalcorenergy.com

UNQUOTE
 
Now, here is the  ACTUAL Peak Demand  from years 2002 to 2011 (these* are the exact numbers extracted from Nalcor's Exhibit 103 filed with the PUB in 2011). Bolded numbers show that for 6 of the last 12 years the island's peak demand exceeded this most recent 1,550 MW demand occurrence and was even below both the 10 and 12 year averages.

  1,592*
  1,595*
  1,598*
  1,595*
  1,517*
  1,540*
  1,520*
  1,601* 
  1,478*
  1,544*     

10-year average peak --- 1,558 MW

   1,550   (year 2012)
   1,570   (year 2013)

12-year average peak --- 1,558.2 MW

So how can government and Nalcor say that the demand last week was unprecedented, when it seems clear that it was lower than it has been in 6 of the last 12 years and lower than both the 10 and 12 year averages?

WHERE, WHEN AND FROM WHOM CAN WE GET THE TRUTH?


06 January 2014
PUB weighs in
 
                                                                                      
05 January 2014

Government and Nalcor is pushing through the UNRELIABLE Muskrat Falls generation facility while avoiding the implementation of systems, technologies, pricing mechanisms and other options proven effective (long ago) in other jurisdictions.

Why would Nalcor  try to reduce demand?  Nalcor needs high demand and/or high rates to pay for its $10 billion folly. Even still, we had significantly higher demand in 2002, 03, 04, 05 and 2009 (about 100 MW higher than Thursday's's peak island demand) see DEMAND page --- and the island's EXISTING "NET" capacity is 1,958 MW (500 MW more than Thursday's peak island demand) --- even  the average over the last 12 years was higher than Thursday's reported peak of around 1,550 MW.

Also, the island's maximum capacity is around 2,500 MW ..... Even our NET capacity is still 400 MW more than recent peaks, even with the loss of 100 MW from a partial failure of 1 unit at Holyrood...........

Which politician will have the best interest of the people in mind and call for an INDEPENDENT REVIEW?


04 January 2014
Quebec in talks with Nova Scotia?

02 January 2014

You will note HERE (from CBC website) that Nalcor is saying that peak demand today is at its all time peak of 1,500 megawatts. However, if you go to my DEMAND  web page, you will see that in 2009 total demand exceeded 1,600 megawatts (and was near that for years 2002, 03, 04 and 05) and if you look closely at the the Holyrood usage chart on the same page you will see that even then Holyrood was used at only about half its NET capacity.

Also, keep in mind that the island's NET capacity is 1,958 MW (almost 500 MW MORE THAN yesterday's peak)

2013

31 December 2013
Powering down: home energy use in the U. S. has fallen to 2001 levels
(of course, with Muskrat Falls, if our home electricity use goes down, our rates must go up, and Nalcor's business case for MF relies on our residential electricity use going up)

Comment (from Winston Adams on the above-noted article)
"To your item "Powering down"...recall that Nalcor said we "are approaching saturation in efficiency gains for housing".With that false statement they proceeded to build their Muskrat house upon the sand and mud. With essentially no efficiency gains for this province, they forecast a yearly growth of some 1 percent a year for island residential load. They ignored technologies that were very cost effective, and programs to bring them forward. They need houses here to power up while the rest of the world powers down. And Dunderdale calls Nalcor's engineers world class! When it comes to efficiency gains to power down, Nalcor and Nfld Power have no class, and certainly a failing grade. Other jurisdictions outclass them 10 to 1 in ...... efficiency gains for their customer loads,which keep power use and cost lower. And there is no efficiency awareness here, as to the how it can save the consumer on it's power bill. WE have the silly and misleading ads about how the lady got her shoes from the setback thermostat.... a low tech gadget that saves little, likely increase the grid peak demand, and often leads to more condensation problems within the house. Is there an award for worst ads? And both the cost of these ads and rebates for the gadgets goes on top of our electricity bill,,,, not from their profits. Overall, how effective is this gadget? All considered, it is very ineffective. Nfld Power saturates the airwaves with half truths that misleads the customers as to its value for saving energy dollars. And for the few using efficient heatpump systems, setback thermostats are actually detrimental, they actually increase energy consumption, when the temperature is set back more than 1 degree."

Also, --- read below to see how NL ratepayers are forced (by law passed by our own government) to pay for Nalcor's folly:

24 December 2013


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